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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines how the government of Edward Heath (Prime Minister 1970-
74) managed the two most significant domestic political and economic crises which 
determined both its fate and its long term reputation; first, the 1972 miners’ strike 
and secondly, the 1973-4 miners’ dispute and the three-day week.  
 
Its defeat by the miners in 1972 was an enormous humiliation from which the Heath 
government never fully recovered. The violent mass picketing which accompanied 
the strike shook both the government’s and the public’s confidence in the ability of 
the state to maintain law and order. Their victory boosted the miners’ confidence to 
take industrial action again in the autumn of 1973 when their position was 
strengthened by the oil price rise in the wake of the Yom Kippur war. This led to the 
imposition of a three-day week on industry which ended in the general election of 
February 1974 and the fall of the Heath Government.  
 
This thesis uses the new material in the National Archives to examine the interplay 
between these events and the government machinery for handling civil emergencies. 
It reveals the manner in which Heath’s first attempt to reform the system was 
defeated by Whitehall resistance. The incompetent handling of the 1972 miners 
strike then strengthened the case for reform and led to the thorough overhaul of 
contingency planning which laid the foundations for the system which exists to the 
present day.    
 
It examines the factors which influenced the handling of the crises, including the  
relationship between the Prime Minister and his colleagues, between ministers and 
officials, the problems posed by external events and the cumulative exhaustion which 
placed ministers and officials as well as the machinery of government under 
increasing strain. 
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Introduction 
 
General Aims 
The 1970s have been perceived, both at the time and in retrospect, as a ‘benighted 
decade’ in British politics.1 Near contemporary commentators described it as ‘a 
decade of gloom and fitful despair’2 and contrasted the successes of the earlier 
postwar period with the ‘discontented, quarrelsome, unsteady, ineffective, self-
defeating seventies’.3 Politicians of both the left and right have castigated the era,4 
and one former senior Whitehall official has described it as ‘the nadir of British 
government’.5  
 
Recent historians have adopted a more revisionist approach to the decade and 
attempted to redress what they see as an imbalance in previous accounts and 
emphasised such positive aspects of the era as relatively low unemployment, 
compared to the 1980s and after, rising living standards, the renaissance of the 
women’s movement and the vibrancy of popular culture.6  Black and Pemberton 
have also argued that memories of the decade have to some extent been constructed 
by politicians of left and right so that, ‘What might be dubbed “false memory 
syndrome” is therefore powerfully reinforced by present-day political rhetoric and 
“spin”.’7 But the predominant memory of the era is still one of strikes and power 
cuts, the national humiliation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) dictating the 
terms of a loan to the British government and the bitter confrontations on the picket 
line during the public sector strikes in the winter of discontent of 1978-9. 
                                                 
1
 Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton, 'Reassessing the seventies: the benighted 
decade', British Academy Review, no. 14, 2009, p. 15.  
2
 Phillip Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall: Britain in the Seventies (London: 
Michael Joseph, 1985), p. xiii. 
3
 Samuel H Beer, Britain Against Itself: The Political Contradictions of Collectivism 
(London: Faber, 1982), p. 1. 
4
 Andy Beckett, When the Lights Went Out: Britain in the Seventies (London: Faber, 
2009), p. 1.  
5
 Sir John Gieve (Permanent Secretary, Home Office, 2001-05, Deputy Governor 
Bank of England 2006-9) interviewed on Peston and the Money Men, BBC Radio 4, 
17 August 2009.  
6
 Beckett, When the Lights Went Out.  
7
 Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton, ‘The benighted decade’, paper presented at 
the Centre for Contemporary British History conference on ‘Reassessing the 1970s’, 
London, July 2010. 
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The overall purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the reassessment of this 
reputation for poor government in the light of the recent releases of the government 
papers in the National Archives. Its methodological aim is to achieve this by 
examining how the government of Edward Heath (Prime Minister 1970-74) managed 
two episodes which constituted major crises. The term ‘crisis’ has been defined as 
having two meanings; first, ‘an unstable situation of extreme danger or difficulty’, 
and secondly, ‘a crucial stage or turning point’.8 The events which have been 
selected for examination conform to both senses of the term; they placed the 
government under immense strain and they left an indelible mark on the political 
landscape.  
 
The defeat by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in the 1972 strike was an 
enormous humiliation for the Heath government from which it never fully recovered. 
The violent mass picketing which accompanied the strike shook both the 
government’s and the public’s confidence in the ability of the state to maintain law 
and order and became a familiar feature of strikes and demonstrations throughout the 
decade. Their victory in 1972 boosted the miners’ confidence to take industrial action 
again in the autumn of 1973 when their position was strengthened by the oil shock in 
the wake of the Yom Kippur war, which marked the end of the era of cheap energy. 
This led to the imposition of a three-day week on industry which ended in the general 
election of February 1974 and the fall of the Heath Government.
9
  
 
Two main arguments underpin this thesis and justify a study of the early 1970s. First, 
it was an era when the government faced an acute series of economic, social and 
political problems, often in conjunction with each other, which placed greater strain 
on ministers, officials and the machinery of government than at any time since the 
Second World War. It was also a period of transition during which many of the 
assumptions which had underpinned economic policy making since the late 1940s 
                                                 
8
 http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=crisis, online thesaurus, accessed 
12.3.2012. 
9
 The overtime ban which preceded the 1972 strike began on 1 November 1971 and 
that which preceded the 1974 strike on 12 November 1973 but, for the sake of 
brevity, they will be referred to throughout as the 1972 and the 1974 disputes or 
crises.    
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were eroded. Ministers and officials thus struggled to deal with a changed political 
and economic landscape with inadequate policy instruments.   
 
Secondly, the two main political parties drew different lessons from the conflicts of 
1972 and 1974 which determined the course of British politics for the remainder of 
the decade and beyond. Their two defeats by the NUM left a legacy of bitterness in 
the Conservative Party which informed its view of industrial relations into the 1980s. 
After Margaret Thatcher replaced Heath as Party Leader in 1975 it determined that 
never again would it allow itself to be beaten by the trade unions. The role which the 
trade unions played in the fall of the Heath government in 1974 convinced the 
Labour Party that it could only govern with the consent of the unions. This lay 
behind the policies of high public expenditure and the absence of wage restraint 
followed by the government of Harold Wilson (Prime Minister 1974-76), which 
resulted in the soaring inflation of 27% in the autumn of 1975 and led to the IMF 
crisis in the autumn of 1976. 
 
Themes 
A number of inter-related and overlapping themes run through the history of the 
early 1970s and will be examined in the context of the crises. While this thesis is not 
an economic history the issue of relative economic decline played a dominant role in 
the politics of the 1960s and 1970s. The long-standing and controversial debate over 
the causes of relative British economic decline began in the late 1950s. One view 
linked poor economic performance to global overstretch: the retention of 
unsustainable international military and political ambitions, coupled with the defence 
of the sterling area and the international role of the pound as a world reserve 
currency, led to low domestic investment, which was the key cause of Britain’s 
decline.
10
 Another perspective emphasised attitudinal conservatism on the part of 
both management and unions, which led to commercial, technological and 
managerial weakness and restrictive practices by workers, as the key factors behind 
economic stagnation.
11
  
                                                 
10
 Andrew Shonfield, British Economic Policy since the War (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1958). 
11
 Michael Shanks, The Stagnant Society: A Warning (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1961). 
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The UK’s relative economic decline has generated a heated academic debate and an 
extensive body of literature, of which the most controversial was the work of Correlli 
Barnett, who argued that economic weakness stemmed from over-expenditure on the 
welfare state.
12
 More recently one economic historian has argued that perceptions of 
relative economic decline were greatly exaggerated and that much of the literature 
was not based on persuasive economic evidence.
13
 But although the British economy 
continued to grow in absolute terms it lagged behind its competitors and its 
international ranking (in terms of GDP) dropped from second, behind the USA, in 
1950 to fifth, behind US, Japan, Germany and France, in 1973.
14
 Ministers and 
officials struggled to grapple with the underlying weaknesses of the British economy: 
low growth and poor productivity, outdated and declining industries, coupled with 
rising inflation, increasing unemployment and a problematic balance of payments, 
which was exacerbated by the end of the Bretton Woods postwar regime of fixed 
exchange rates in the early 1970s.  
 
The example of Western European economies, particularly the West German model, 
which appeared to combine high levels of growth and low unemployment and 
extensive co-operation between government, industry and trade unions, exerted a 
powerful influence on ministers and officials through influential commentators such 
as David Watt (Political Editor, Financial Times) and Peter Jenkins (Political 
Commentator and Policy Editor, Guardian). While an evaluation of the possible 
causes of relative economic decline is outside the scope of this thesis it was an 
important element in the mindset of the participants of the two crises. The ambition 
to reverse decline lay behind Heath’s twin major goals of entry into the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and reform of the trade unions. While for the NUM the 
resentment at being at the sharp end of a declining industry, coal, which had 
contracted substantially during the 1960s, was a significant factor behind its 
intransigent stance during the disputes of 1972 and 1974.  
                                                 
12
 Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, (London: Sutton, 1972); The Audit 
of War, (London: Macmillan, 1986); The Lost Victory, (London: Macmillan, 1995). 
13
 Jim Tomlinson, 'Economic 'Decline' in Post-War Britain', in A Companion to 
Contemporary Britain, 1939-2000, ed. Paul Addison and Harriet Jones (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005). 
14
 Hugh Pemberton, 'The Transformation of the Economy', Ibid., p. 198. 
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The second theme is the perception of rising trade union power. The fraught 
relationship between the government and the unions was a feature of the political, 
social and economic landscape of the 1970s and a significant element in both crises. 
By the end of the 1960s the Trades Union Congress (TUC) had been described by 
Harold Wilson as an estate of the realm.
15
 A decade later the power and influence of 
trade unions was one of the major issues in British politics.
16
 Writing in 1980 
Barnes
17
 and Reid claimed that three successive prime ministers had been prevented 
by their industrial and political power from pursing policies they declared essential to 
the national interest.
18
  
 
Trade union participation in the wartime Coalition Government 1940-45 had marked 
the start of a sometimes close, but frequently uneasy, relationship with both 
Conservative and Labour governments which had, to a greater or lesser extent, 
sought their co-operation in support of incomes policies to control inflation. 
Governments had also engaged in some measure of consultation on general 
economic issues and a number of tripartite bodies, such as the National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC) where government, industry and the unions were 
represented, had been established during the 1960s. This tripartite relationship, 
particularly that between government and unions, came under increasing strain from 
the late 1960s for a number of reasons, one of which was the growing prevalence of 
strikes, particularly unofficial ones, which were not sanctioned by the official union 
leadership.
19
  
 
Heath perceived the obstructive power of trade unions and particularly the 
prevalence of unofficial strikes as one of the elements of economic decline and a 
                                                 
15
 Robert Taylor, The Fifth Estate: Britain's Unions in the Seventies, revised ed. 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 71. 
16
 Ibid., p. 449. 
17
 Sir Denis Barnes was Permanent Secretary, Department of Employment 1968-73 
so one can assume that this perspective was one he developed through experience. 
18
 Denis Barnes and Eileen Reid, Governments and Trade Unions: The British 
Experience, 1964-79 (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. x. 
19
 Gerald A Dorfman, Government versus Trade Unionism in British Politics since 
1968 (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 1-7; Eric Wigham, Strikes and the Government 
1893-1981, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 133-5. 
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serious obstacle to achieving growth. The 1970 Conservative manifesto A Better 
Tomorrow had pledged to introduce a legal framework which would strengthen the 
official leadership of trade unions against action by irresponsible minorities so that, 
‘strikes become the means of last resort, not of first resort’.20 The government argued 
that the Industrial Relations Act 1972 gave trade unions both positive rights as well 
as setting clear limits to their powers, but it met with bitter and effective resistance 
from the union movement.
21
 The Heath Government then made an unsuccessful 
attempt to draw the TUC into a tripartite attempt to manage prices and incomes. 
Although this failed and Heath resorted to a statutory incomes policy he continued to 
strive for union co-operation and held lengthy meetings with both the TUC and the 
miners’ leaders throughout the 1973-4 dispute.22  
 
The economic, social and political role of the trade union movement and the reasons 
for its zenith during the 1970s is a wide subject beyond the range of this thesis. 
Therefore, it does not examine in detail issues such as the origins and 
implementation of the Industrial Relations Act, whether or not the trade unions were 
the causes or the victims of inflation, the nature of the relationship between 
individual unions and the TUC and between the union leadership and the rank and 
file of the membership. These issues are touched on but discussed only in so far as 
they were directly relevant to the management of the crises. The main focus is on the 
way in which ministers and officials saw trade unions simultaneously as adversaries 
and necessary partners in the battle to contain inflation and on the role played by 
NUM in the crises of 1972 and 1974. The original contribution of this thesis lies in 
its exposition of the way in which fear of the ability of strikes to paralyse a modern 
industrial economy proved the catalyst for major developments in the machinery of 
government to manage civil emergencies.  
 
Overload on both the machinery of government and on ministers and officials who 
operated it is the third major theme. This was perceptively analysed by Anthony 
                                                 
20
 F W S Craig, ed., British General Election Manifestos 1959-1987, 3rd ed. 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990), pp. 119-20. 
21
 Peter Jenkins, Battle of Downing Street (London: C. Knight, 1970); Michael 
Moran, Politics of Industrial Relations: The Origins, Life and Death of the 1971 
Industrial Relations Act (London: Macmillan, 1977). 
22
 Barnes and Reid, Governments and Trade Unions, pp. 163-70. 
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King, in the mid-1970s, who argued that Britain had become harder to govern 
because the range of problems for which the government had become responsible 
had increased at the same time as its ability to manage them had decreased. The 
economic problems of the modern state had become increasingly intractable because 
of the increased inter-dependency of economic relationships, both domestic and 
international. Governments now felt responsible for every area of national life but 
could not possibly fulfil all the expectations held of them: ‘Politicians used to decide, 
or at least believe that they were deciding. In the 1970s they merely grope.’23  
 
Heath was fully alive to the problems of overload on the Cabinet before he came into 
office and was determined to address it through reforms to the machinery of 
government: by creating fewer and larger Whitehall departments and strengthening 
the centre of government. This thesis will examine the manner in which, despite 
these reforms, the crises of 1972 and 1974 placed enormous strains on the structures 
of Cabinet Committees and the Cabinet. During the 1972 miners’ strike the long 
established Ministerial (E) and Official Emergencies Committees (EO), under the 
aegis of the Home Office, virtually collapsed under pressure. This was followed by a 
major secret review of contingency planning and the establishment of the new Civil 
Contingencies Unit (CCU), a mixed committee of ministers and officials based in the 
Cabinet Office and serviced by its Overseas and Defence Secretariat, which also had 
responsibility for oversight of the plans for transition to nuclear war.
24
 This thesis 
will analyse how well the CCU prepared for a second miners’ dispute and the extent 
to which its effectiveness and its limits were demonstrated during the three-day 
week.  
 
A sense of powerlessness in the face of insuperable problems was a recurring theme 
of the ministerial memoirs and diaries.
25
 The diaries of Sir Ronald McIntosh (Deputy 
Secretary, Department of Employment 1970-72, Deputy Secretary Treasury 1972-3, 
Director General National Economic Development Office (NEDO) 1973-7) show 
                                                 
23
 Anthony King, 'Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s', Political Studies 
vol. 22, no. 2-3, 1975, p. 288. 
24
 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945, 
revised ed. (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 84.  
25
 One example is Jim Prior, A Balance of Power (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), 
p. 72. 
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that the same sentiment was shared by officials at critical junctures such as after the 
oil price rise of October 1973 and the three-day week in 1974.
26
 The recently 
released files in the National Archives have added to knowledge of the inter-action 
between ministers and advisers as they grappled with multiple problems and the 
intolerable burdens it placed on some such as Sir William Armstrong (Head of the 
Home Civil Service 1968-74) and Lord Rothschild (Director General of the Central 
Policy Review Staff and First Permanent Under Secretary Cabinet Office 1971-4). 
 
A further theme is the general sense of anxiety about whether Britain was becoming 
ungovernable, which pervaded the decade and is reflected in the titles of numerous 
contemporary and retrospective accounts.
27
 This anxiety was multi-faceted and 
focussed on different phenomena, often determined by the political standpoint of the 
individual. A detailed examination of its multiple causes and some of its cultural 
manifestations, such as punk rock, have been covered elsewhere but are manifestly 
outside the scope of this thesis.
28
 But there was a growing anxiety among the 
governing classes, which was reflected and intensified by commentators in the 
media, about whether Britain was becoming increasingly ungovernable.  
 
Physical violence, largely absent since the end of the second world war, became an 
element in British politics after the anti-Vietnam War and student demonstrations of 
the late 1960s, which persisted into the 1970s. The troubles in Northern Ireland led to 
acts of terrorism, mainly by the Provisional IRA, on mainland Britain and politicians 
were also the targets of bombing campaigns by the anarchists of the Angry 
Brigade.
29
 This led one contemporary author to view the years from 1971 to 1977 as 
‘by British standards exceptionally violent years’.30 The fear that democratic society 
might break apart in chaos was a significant theme in the diaries of Cecil King 
                                                 
26
 Ronald McIntosh, Challenge to Democracy: Politics, Trade Union Power and 
Economic Failure in the 1970s (London: Politico's, 2006), pp. 5-24. 
27
 Richard Clutterbuck, Britain in Agony: The Growth of Political Violence (London: 
Faber, 1978); Beer, Britain Against Itself; Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall; 
Beckett, When the Lights Went Out. 
28
 Howard Sounes, Seventies: The Sights, Sounds and Ideas of a Brilliant Decade 
(London: Simon and Schuster, 2006); Alwyn W Turner, Crisis? What Crisis? Britain 
in the 1970s? (London: Aurum, 2008). 
29
 Clutterbuck, Britain in Agony, pp. 146-151. 
30
 Ibid., p. 19. 
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(Proprietor of Mirror Group Newspapers) and Ronald McIntosh written from two 
very different perspectives. They both recorded predictions of ‘authoritarian rule’ 
prevalent among the lunching clubs of Pall Mall.
31
  
 
Academic writers on ungovernability attributed its causes to various aspects of the 
political system. Finer argued that the ‘first past the post’ electoral system produced 
a system of adversary politics, which magnified the differences between political 
parties, which engaged in opposition for its own sake, rather than reinforced the 
centre ground.
32
 Beer echoed the theme of powerlessness and argued that the stable 
democracy based on the two-party system had disintegrated in the late 1960s to give 
way to the ‘self-defeating politics of the 1970s’, which had resulted in an absence of 
any clear sense of direction.
33
  
 
This theme elucidates the mindset of ministers and officials in the management of the 
crises, but this thesis has examined only those specific aspects of it which relate to 
the two crises studied here. For Heath and his Cabinet, fears of ungovernability 
focussed on what they regarded as subversive elements in the trade unions, whom 
they suspected, particularly after the mass secondary picketing during the first 
miners’ strike, were bent on using industrial disputes to bring down the government. 
The files in the National Archives are heavily redacted in this area but are 
complemented by Andrew’s official history of the Security Service (MI5), based on 
access to its files. Andrew’s main contention is that anxiety about subversion in 
industry originated mostly from ministers and that officials and the Security Service 
attempted to exercise a restraining influence on politicians.
34
  
 
Anxiety about ungovernability and the state of the economy reinforced the fifth 
theme: a growing sense of apprehension that a ‘postwar consensus’ was under 
increasing strain. The view that the Second World War had forged a new agenda for 
                                                 
31
 Cecil King, The Cecil King Diary, 1970-1974 (London: Cape, 1975), pp. 315, 325, 
344; McIntosh, Challenge to Democracy, p. 24.     
32
 Samuel E Finer, Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform (London: Anthony 
Wigram, 1975), pp. 3-32. 
33
 Beer, Britain Against Itself, p. 2. 
34
 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 
(London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 587-599. 
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domestic reform, and that the Beveridge Report of 1942
35
 and the Employment 
White Paper of 1944
36
 marked the origins of a new consensus at the top of British 
politics in favour of the expansion of the role of the state in order to prevent a return 
to the social and economic conditions of the 1930s, was first articulated by Addison 
in 1975.
37
 When Addison first elaborated the thesis there was a growing sense of 
polarisation in British politics and a strong, felt contrast between the 1970s political 
context of strikes, inflation and laments of decline and ungovernability compared to 
the relatively high degree of political consensus and social stability of the 1940s and 
1950s. This view was later challenged by Pimlott who argued that the ‘postwar 
consensus’ was a mirage which faded the more closely it was inspected and that 
there were substantial differences between the political parties throughout the 1940s 
and 1950s.
38
 This ignited a frequently polemical debate and a substantial body of 
literature during the 1980s and 1990s.
39
    
 
The period 1970-74 also saw the beginnings of the progressive breakdown of the 
consensus view of economic policy-making which had prevailed since the 1950s. A 
high and stable level of employment was the primary goal of economic policy and 
the general view was that this could be maintained by a combination of public 
expenditure, fiscal policy (often termed ‘Keynesian demand management’) and some 
form of incomes policy. The assumption that there was a trade-off between growth in 
earnings and the level of employment had been expressed in economic theory by the 
Phillips curve.
40
 This was extremely influential during the 1960s but towards the end 
                                                 
35
 Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services, Cmd 6404 (London: HMSO 1942). 
36
 Employment Policy, Cmd 6537 (London: HMSO, 1944). 
37
 Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War, 
revised ed. (London: Pimlico, 1994).  
38
 Ben Pimlott, 'The myth of consensus', in The Making of Britain: echoes of 
greatness, ed. Lesley M Smith (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1988). 
39
 Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, Consensus Politics from Attlee to Major, 
second ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Paul Addison, 'British historians and the 
debate over the "post-war consensus"', British Studies, University of Austin at Texas, 
1996; Harriet Jones and Michael Kandiah, eds., The Myth of Consensus: New Views 
on British History, 1945-64 (Basingstoke: Macmillan and Institute of Contemporary 
British History, 1996). 
40
 A W Philips, ‘The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of 
Money Wages in the United Kingdom 1861-1957’, Economica, November 1958.  
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of the decade the relationship began to break down.
41
 As Heath ruefully noted later in 
his memoirs, ‘inflation and unemployment continued to defy the textbooks by rising 
together’.42 While this thesis recognises that the notion of the ‘postwar consensus’ 
has been a vigorously contested one among historians it will examine the manner in 
which its values influenced the responses of ministers and officials to the crises and 
draw out the implications of these for our understanding of the debate around its 
fracture. 
 
Secondary Published Sources 
This thesis has drawn on the wide range of secondary literature on the period. The 
general tenor of the works on the Heath Government is that it tried valiantly to 
address Britain’s long-standing economic problems but was fatally undermined 
domestically by its complicated industrial relations legislation and a rigid statutory 
incomes policy, and internationally by the quadrupling of the oil price rise in 1973. 
With the exception of the achievement of entry into the EEC and perhaps power-
sharing in Northern Ireland, it has been viewed as an honourable failure. Heath has 
been perceived as a managerial figure who, while he had a vision of Britain’s future, 
lacked sufficient political and communication skills.  
 
Ramsden analysed the detailed work of policy revision in the Conservative Party in 
opposition between 1964 and 1970 and argued that while the policy on trade union 
reform was worked out in detail, the wider issue of general economic management, 
particularly on incomes policy, was fudged. The shift in policy in 1972, the so-called 
U-turn, towards intervention in industry and a statutory incomes policy, strained 
party loyalties.
43
 He maintained that the programme in 1970 was over-ambitious for 
one parliament, over-burdened ministers and resulted in exhaustion.
44
 Ramsden’s 
view was that there was a fundamental tension in the approach to economic policy 
                                                 
41
 William Keegan and Rupert Pennant-Rea, Who Runs the Economy? Control and 
Influence in British Economic Policy (London: Temple Smith, 1979), p. 188; Chris 
Wrigley, British Trade Unions since 1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), pp. 61-2.  
42
 Edward Heath, The Course of my Life: The Autobiography of Edward Heath 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1998), p. 343. 
43
 John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy: The Conservative 
Research Department Since 1929 (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 233-85. 
44
 Ibid., p. 290. 
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between supporters of the free market and a more dirigiste tendency, and that to a 
large extent the seeds of Tory disarray between 1970 and 1974 and Heath’s own 
downfall were sown by 1970, although Heath’s own character and personal 
dominance over his cabinet also contributed to the government’s eventual defeat.45  
 
In one of the first general accounts Whitehead perceived the decade as one of 
pessimism and anxiety shared by both the left and the right, against an economic 
background of retrenchment.
46
 He saw Heath as a problem solver determined above 
all to achieve economic growth; his two main goals of membership of the EEC and 
reform of the trade union movement were the twin aspects of his desire to modernise 
Britain.
47
 This work was based on extensive interviews with former ministers, civil 
servants and trade unionists carried out for the Channel 4 television series of the 
same name, on which I was one of the researchers and conducted many of the 
interviews. Many of the participants spoke frankly, with the freshness of recent 
memory, and these interviews have been cited widely in all subsequent accounts.
48
 
 
The same pessimism also permeated Morgan’s perspective which saw Heath’s as 
unambiguously a government of failure so that after 1979, even more than Labour 
under Wilson, it became the yardstick to avoid.
49
 The chapter title ‘The Heath 
Experiment’ indicated that he saw it as a radical break with the Wilson Government 
and he laid great emphasis on the change in policy direction in 1972.
50
 Marquand, by 
contrast, saw Heath ‘as a nearly great and wholly tragic figure, whose downfall 
testified to his virtues rather than his faults’ whose defeat in 1974 was a disaster not 
only for himself but for the nation and for the values of democratic accommodation 
and inclusion.
51
  
 
                                                 
45
 John Ramsden, The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975 (London: 
Longman, 1996), pp. 319-82. 
46
 Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall, p. xiii. 
47
 Ibid., pp. 70-98. 
48
 The Writing on the Wall, Channel 4 Television, October - November 1985.  
49
 Kenneth O Morgan, Britain Since 1945: The People's Peace, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 318. 
50
 Ibid., pp. 317-57. 
51
 David Marquand, Britain Since 1918: The Strange Career of British Democracy 
(London: Phoenix, 2009), pp. xii, 256. 
  16 
In his biography Campbell maintained that Heath tried to find a middle way between 
the tradition of interventionism, inherited from Macmillan, and the emerging free 
market doctrines which would be implemented by Thatcher. But the strain of one-
nation Toryism was dominant and he never fully believed in the anti-statist rhetoric 
of the 1970 manifesto and Selsdon Park. He argued that Heath was exceptionally 
unlucky in that both international and domestic factors conspired to derail his 
government, but his own personality also played a major part in failing to persuade 
the electorate in 1974.
52
 Clarke saw Heath as Tweedledee to Wilson’s Tweedledum: 
men with a similar class and educational background but of very different character 
and outlook, who disliked and despised each other.
53
 The Heath Government 
promised a break with the interventionist polices of the 1960s, particularly incomes 
policy, but Heath was less troubled by accusations of U-turns than by the economic 
problems he faced.
54
 Hennessy argued that although Heath wanted to modernise 
Britain he believed in the mixed economy and the welfare state and never intended a 
break with the postwar settlement.
55
  
 
Beckett’s account focussed on the lived experience of ordinary citizens and argued 
that while the dominant perspective was one of economic failure unemployment was 
relatively low, compared to the 1980s and after, and living standards improved.
56
 
Sandbrook saw the Heath Government as an honourable failure, derailed by 
circumstances, which was eventually vindicated on many issues: Europe, power-
sharing in Northern Ireland, the need to reform industrial relations, tackle wage 
inflation and modernise industry.
57
 In his authorised biography, with access to 
Heath’s papers, Ziegler emphasised Heath’s distance from his party and the extent to 
which his characteristic dismissal of all criticism antagonised his own 
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backbenchers.
58
 Subsequent histories of the Heath Government have drawn heavily 
on the oral testimony of former ministers, officials and trade unionists in two 
extremely valuable witness seminars conducted by the Institute for Contemporary 
British History, which, among other issues, examined in detail the relationship with 
the trade unions.
59
 Ball and Seldon have also edited a useful collection of essays.
60
  
 
The extent to which Heath was inclined to favour bureaucratic solutions to problems 
and was too reliant on the civil service at the expense of political advice is a constant 
theme in all studies of his government.
61
 Heath’s major Whitehall reforms have been 
covered in a number of works. There is an early analysis of their effectiveness in 
Heclo and Wildavsky.
62
 Pollitt conducted a range of interviews with officials and 
ministers and concluded that the autumn of 1970 was the high watermark of Heath’s 
interest in the machinery of government.
63
  
 
The broadest studies of Heath’s reforms to the machinery of government, which have 
been heavily drawn on by all subsequent authors, were by Hennessy. He stressed 
Heath’s belief in a rational and strategic approach to the business of government and 
his desire to strengthen the central capability of the machine, but argued that the 
effectiveness of his reforms were undermined by successive crises.
64
 He wanted a 
sharper and more focussed system of Cabinet government and his machinery of 
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government reforms were intrinsically important to his vision of modernisation and 
reform.
65
  
 
The Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) is the aspect of Heath’s reforms which has 
attracted the most attention. Blackstone and Plowden charted its history from its 
inception to its demise in 1983 and judged that its work on energy and forecast of the 
rise in the oil price in the autumn of 1973 established its credibility in Whitehall.
66
 
Historians have generally agreed on the importance of the CPRS work in this area 
and laid great emphasis on Rothschild’s foresight and judged it to be the most 
effective of Heath’s reforms.67 Davis has drawn on the files in the National Archives 
to provide a detailed account of the plans for machinery of government reform drawn 
up by the Conservatives in opposition. He has analysed the effectiveness of the 
CPRS’s role in policy analysis as well as its attempt to foresee crises through the 
Early Warning System (EWS) and argued that Rothschild’s advice could have 
provided Heath with a solution to the crisis of 1974.
68
 
 
This thesis has drawn on the recently released papers which add to the extent of our 
knowledge in this area and shed interesting new light on the roles of Sir Burke Trend 
(Cabinet Secretary 1963-73), John Hunt (Second Permanent Secretary Cabinet 
Office 1972-3, Cabinet Secretary 1973-79) and Robert Armstrong (Prime Minister’s 
Principal Private Secretary 1970-75). This thesis will argue that Rothschild and the 
CPRS were not as uniquely prescient in foreseeing the oil price rise as has often been 
supposed. The files in the National Archives also throw an interesting light on 
Rothschild’s contributions to possible solutions to the crisis in the winter of 1973-4 
and demonstrate that by the early months of January 1974 the strain of events had 
clearly taken a toll on his judgement.  
 
Lack of access to the official records has meant that previous accounts of the 
Whitehall machinery for emergency planning have been incomplete. The existence 
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of the Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU) was kept extremely secret and was first 
revealed in 1976 in the Sunday Times.
69
 The first account of its origins, structure and 
methods of operation was in Jeffery and Hennessy’s detailed account of the history of 
contingency planning and the management of major industrial disputes. This also 
contained the first mention of Hunt’s secret review of emergency planning and the 
first account of any substance of the role of the CCU during the three-day week, 
which emphasised its success in prolonging the endurance of essential services.
70
 All 
subsequent accounts have been largely based on this work. Davis has a compressed 
account of the CCU but does not discuss the reform of the system in any detail.
71
 In 
his official history of the Civil Service Lowe does not mention the CCU.
72
 
 
This thesis has drawn on the recently released papers in the archives to provide a 
more comprehensive and detailed picture of the origins and operation of the CCU. 
Jeffery and Hennessy analysed the role of the Emergencies Committee in handling 
the 1972 strike and raised the question of whether the main problem was the 
inadequacy of the machinery or the relationship between Heath and Maudling. This 
thesis will argue that that it was the former and that Heath was well aware of its 
flaws before the 1972 strike. It will argue that Heath’s first abortive attempt to 
reform the system of contingency planning before 1972, hitherto undocumented, was 
significant in that it laid the foundations for the subsequent reforms. It will evaluate 
its role and effectiveness during the 1974 crisis and argue that its experience 
demonstrated that contingency planning was not a substitute for a political strategy. 
 
There is a vast historiography on the trade unions, ranging from general histories to 
specialised economic studies. Many of these cover a wide time span and do not treat 
the crises of 1972 and 1974 in any detail. In many of the works which do cover the 
Heath Government and its relationship with the trade unions the main focus is on the 
Industrial Relations Act. The factors behind the increased militancy of trade unions 
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and the higher incidence of strikes in the late 1960s are examined in a number of 
works. Jackson et al maintained that the increased incidence of taxation on lower 
incomes undermined money wage increases during the mid-1960s and so stimulated 
higher wage claims and a greater incidence of strikes. Workers were forced into 
disputes simply to keep up their real after-tax earnings.
73
 Cronin argued that the rise 
in prices which followed the devaluation of 1967 was a major cause of the strike 
wave of 1968-72.
74
 Phelps Brown viewed the outbreak of trade union militancy and 
strikes across all countries in the western world as a manifestation of the impatience 
of a new and younger generation brought up in an era of full employment.
75
 
 
The collapse of the Wilson Government’s 1968 attempt to reform the trade unions 
through legislation and its defeat by a combination of the TUC and the Parliamentary 
Labour Party have generally been perceived as an ignominious failure, with adverse 
consequences for both Wilson and Heath. Several writers have taken the view that 
this failure enhanced the power of the trade unions and made them determined to 
oppose Heath’s legislation, which was in turn defeated by, and also increased, union 
intransigence.
76
 Wigham viewed Wilson as surrendering to, and Heath as being 
vanquished by, the trade union movement.  He depicted the Heath Government as at 
war with the unions for three and a half years over both industrial relations and 
incomes policy, with the latter ultimately the more destructive.
77
 Several authors 
have stressed that Heath essentially misunderstood the nature of the trade unions and 
that his attempts to draw them into co-operation in the running of the economy were 
fundamentally misguided.
78
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In analysing the relationship between the government and the trade unions some 
commentators have stressed the power of the latter. Barnes and Reid criticised the 
trade unions non-co-operation with the Industrial Relations Act and insistence on 
inflationary wage increases but also acknowledged that aspects of the legislation and 
the inflexibility of the government’s incomes polices played a considerable part in 
the poor relations with the unions.
79
 Robert Taylor put the contrary view that trade 
unions were not truly powerful in that they possessed only the negative power to 
obstruct and were unable to achieve their central goal of long-term full 
employment.
80
 Recent studies of Heath’s relationship with the trade unions have 
tended to stress his attempts to reach agreements with them rather than his conflicts. 
Most notably Robert Taylor has argued that Heath was essentially a conciliator but a 
combination of naivety and inflexibility meant that he failed to recognise that the 
trade unions were neither structurally nor ideologically capable of delivering the kind 
of agreement he wanted, which would help transform UK into a European social 
market economy.
81
   
 
Although recent historians such as Sandbrook have emphasised Heath’s efforts to 
reach an agreement with the unions after 1972 it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that the government was convinced that it had to do something radical about 
unofficial strikes and the anarchy of industrial relations, with or without union co-
operation.
82
 From the perspective of thirty years later, after the Thatcher reforms and 
the decline of manufacturing industry, it is understandable that more weight should 
be given to the view that trade unions were not really as powerful as they once 
appeared. But the papers in the National Archives underline ministerial and official 
apprehension at the tremendous negative power of the unions in the early 1970s and 
their fear of the threat posed by industrial action to essential services and the normal 
life of the nation. This thesis will argue that from the autumn of 1970 there was a 
definite sense among ministers and officials that they needed to win a major battle on 
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public sector pay and a distinct element of anticipation of a confrontation fed into the 
preparations for contingency planning.  
 
Most histories of the 1972 strike have given great prominence to the dramatic 
confrontation between massed pickets and the police at the Saltley Road gates to the 
coke storage depot at the headquarters of the Midlands Regional Gas Board in 
Birmingham.
83
 In this they have followed one of the earliest accounts by 
Clutterbuck, which was dominated by a long description of the ‘Battle of Saltley’. 
But although Saltley was undeniably significant politically, as will be explained, it 
did not directly affect the outcome the strike and the focus on Saltley has tended to 
deflect attention from other aspects of the crisis. 
 
There is some disagreement between those historians who have seen the 1972 strike 
as a mainly industrial dispute and those who emphasised the political element of 
defeat for an elected government by the force of mass pickets. Phillips, in a case 
study of the picketing of the Longannet power station on the Firth of Forth in 
Scotland, where a number of pickets were arrested, argued strongly that it was a 
straightforward industrial dispute and that too much emphasis has been placed by 
historians on violence and disorder.
84
 While Morgan argued that the 1972 strike was 
a powerful impetus to militant direct action for trade unionists and for those on the 
left who advocated potentially violent extra parliamentary action and judged that it 
‘gravely weakened what was left of the post-war social consensus’.85 This thesis will 
argue that the political and the industrial elements were inextricably linked. 
 
 All historians have agreed that the main determining factor in the course of the strike 
was the effectiveness of the secondary picketing by the NUM at the power stations, 
which took the government by surprise. Robert Taylor argued that the NUM 
leadership was far from confident of victory and Heath could have won if he had 
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used troops to force through convoys of lorries into the power stations.
86
 This thesis 
has found that this judgement is not substantiated by the evidence in the government 
files. Taylor also argued that the support of public opinion and assistance from other 
unions was crucial to the success of the picketing and the miners’ leaders were 
surprised at the government’s delay in declaring a state of emergency. He judged that 
the strike, ‘dealt a devastating blow to Heath’s government, from which many 
believe it never really recovered’.87  
 
Whitehead’s account was significant for a number of interviews on which later 
historians have drawn extensively.
88
 In particular the admission by Robert Carr 
(Employment Secretary 1970-72, Home Secretary 1972-74) that the government did 
not know the miners and fatally underestimated them has been emphasised by all 
subsequent historians.
89
 The files in the National Archives show that the 
government’s disarray in the face of the picketing was as great, if not greater, than 
has been supposed. But while it was undoubtedly true that the mass picketing was a 
shock for the government, the emphasis on surprise has to be qualified in the light of 
new evidence that there were several warnings that a miners’ strike was a real 
possibility. All accounts of the 1972 strike have cited the assertion by Brendon 
Sewill (Special Assistant to the Chancellor of the Exchequer 1970-4) that there was 
panic in the corridors of Whitehall.
90
 While his hyperbolic language is somewhat 
exaggerated the recently released files have revealed in full just how near the country 
was to the end of coal-fired electricity generation and the deployment of troops to 
deliver coal into the power stations. 
 
A number of recent histories have had access to the files in the National Archives but 
the use made of them has been limited and has left a number of gaps. Andrew 
Taylor’s history of the NUM, which contained a detailed narrative of the 1972 strike, 
was based extensively on the NUM records and the first to be able to make use of the 
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papers in the National Archives.
91
 He argued, correctly, that the crucial factor in the 
NUM’s victory was the support from other unions, which made the picketing of the 
power stations so effective, and that a number of myths have gathered around 
Saltley, which was not typical of the strike and did not affect the outcome, but he did 
not discuss the role of the Emergencies Committee in detail or the implications of the 
end of coal-fired electricity.
92
  
 
Neither Beckett nor Sandbrook have made great use of the files in the National 
Archives. Beckett’s long and vivid description of the picketing at Saltley dominated 
his account.
93
 Sandbrook’s largely narrative account emphasised the complacency of 
the government and the press, who thought the miners would lose.
94
 It has not drawn 
on the archives to any great extent and did not discuss either the reasons for the delay 
in the state of emergency or the role of the Emergencies Committee. The 
government’s handling of the strike, particularly the delay over declaring a state of 
emergency and the hesitation in setting up a court of inquiry, has been generally 
criticised by historians.
95
 This thesis has drawn on the files in the National Archives 
to shed new light on the way in which the government’s decision-taking at key 
moments was determined by its overwhelming determination to hold down pay, not 
just in the coal industry, but in other contemporaneous disputes, as well as the 
manner in which its handling of the strike was affected by the structure of the civil 
service machinery for managing emergencies.  
 
The first detailed account of the Heath government’s handling of the 1974 crisis was 
by Fay and Young. They emphasised ministers’ exhaustion at the end of the 
government and considered that Heath was too close to his civil service advisers, 
insufficiently political and badly misjudged the timing of the election.
96
 Serious 
misjudgements in the handling of the crisis has been the line followed by all 
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subsequent historians. Dorfman criticised Heath for perceiving the miners’ strike as a 
political challenge rather than an industrial dispute and judged that Heath missed 
crucial opportunities to settle the dispute.
97
 The general thrust of Whitehead’s 
argument, based extensively on interviews with many of the participants, was that 
Heath fatally over-estimated the ability of Joe Gormley (President NUM 1971-82) to 
deliver a settlement and then proved to be too inflexible and made a series of serious 
miscalculations.
98
 Morgan also judged that Heath made a series of blunders and 
missed opportunities to settle the dispute and mistakenly believed that extremists 
were trying to overthrow the elected government for purely political purposes.
99
  
 
Robert Taylor stressed that Heath was wrong to rely on Gormley and had poor 
intelligence about the NUM.
100
 While he disagreed that the brutal exercise of trade 
union power broke the Heath government he also recognised that this view haunted 
senior Conservatives until the defeat of the NUM in the 1984-5 miners’ strike.101 In 
his detailed analysis of the handling of the miners’ pay claim, the three-day week and 
the election campaign Campbell argued that Stage 3 might have been successful had 
not the oil crisis strengthened the miners’ hand and formed a lethal combination 
which wrecked the government. He also criticised Heath for becoming too involved 
in the miners’ dispute and an over-rigid adherence to the incomes policy.102 Andrew 
Taylor judged that after 1972 both Heath and Gormley wanted to avoid another strike 
but the combination of the internal politics of the NUM and the oil crisis led to the 
confrontation.
103
 Sandbrook’s verdict was that there was a basic inconsistency in that 
Heath refused to listen to advice either to give in to the miners or to whip up national 
outrage at their selfishness.
104
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Historians have condemned Heath’s long hesitation over whether or not to call an 
early election and speculated that he might well have won had he chosen a slightly 
earlier date.
105
 Campbell discussed it in detail but was uncertain whether or not he 
could have won.
106
 Ramsden judged that the government adopted a confused stance 
which was neither sufficiently confrontational nor conciliatory, he was strongly 
critical of the delay and thought that the election defeat was the product of an 
absence of a clear strategy, effective tactics and communication throughout the 
period of government not just the campaign.
107
 Fay and Young’s account of the 
detailed handling of the crisis has influenced strongly all subsequent authors. They 
identified the secret meeting in July 1973 in the garden of No 10 between Heath and 
Gormley as the source of a crucial error of judgement.
108
 This is based on Gormley’s 
assertion that he told Heath that a payment for unsocial hours would be enough to 
satisfy the miners and that Heath made a gross error in writing this provision into the 
general guidelines for Stage 3, instead of keeping it in reserve as special treatment 
for the miners.
109
 All subsequent historians have cited Gormley’s version of this 
argument but none of them have examined the record of the meeting in the National 
Archives which presents a rather different picture. 
 
The underlying implication in some of the accounts is that the early declaration of a 
state of emergency, while the coal stocks were high, followed by the move to the 
three-day week were to some extent unnecessary and counter-productive. Whitehead 
judged the former ‘precipitate’, while Campbell believed both were to some extent 
due to party political considerations.
110
 This thesis will examine the charge that the 
state of emergency and the three-day week were premature over-reactions to the 
miners’ dispute and the oil crisis and will argue that the dominant factor in ministers’ 
minds was the fear of exacerbating a number of other disputes which also threatened 
the electricity supply. While these disputes have been mentioned in passing by 
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several historians, with the exception of Ledger and Sallis they have not been given 
sufficient weight.
111
 
 
All accounts of the second miners’ dispute have argued that Heath missed several 
opportunities to settle it. Fay and Young cited Rothschild’s prediction of the oil price 
rise and his argument that the changed comparability between the price of oil and 
that of coal offered the government a valid reason to break Stage 3 in favour of the 
miners.
112
 Several historians have emphasised this but a number have mistakenly 
argued that Rothschild’s advice was rejected out of hand because of personal 
differences with Heath.
113
 The files in the National Archives show that while 
Rothschild had indeed predicted an oil price rise it was for reasons to do with 
shortage of supply not the Middle East War and that the economic assumptions of his 
case were also disputed by Heath and his officials. 
 
All the secondary accounts have drawn heavily on Gormley’s version which 
contained some significant omissions and is not wholly reliable. This reliance has led 
to some confusion and mistakes, particularly over Gormley’s assertion that extra 
payments for ‘bathing and waiting’ would have settled the strike if Harold Wilson 
(Leader of the Opposition 1970-74) had not scuppered it.
114
 Historians have 
generally relied on Gormley’s narrative although some have rightly been more 
sceptical that it was the solution which he claimed.
115
 Fay and Young argued that 
Heath should have accepted the TUC offer that if the miners were made a special 
case they would encourage all other unions to settle within Stage 3.
116
 This has been 
discussed in detail and several historians have laid great stress on the possibility that 
                                                 
111
 Jeffery and Hennessy, States of Emergency, p. 239; Taylor, Trade Union 
Question, p. 209; Ledger and Sallis, Crisis Management in the Power Industry, pp. 
59-71. 
112
 Fay and Young, The Fall of Heath, pp. 17-18. 
113
 Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall, p. 103; Campbell, Edward Heath, pp. 324, 
567-69; Ramsden, Winds of Change, p. 368; Beckett, When the Lights Went Out, p. 
129. Clarke, Hope and Glory, pp. 337-38. 
114
 Gormley, Battered Cherub, pp. 132-35. 
115
 Fay and Young, The Fall of Heath, pp. 18-19; Whitehead, The Writing on the 
Wall, p. 16; Taylor, Trade Union Question, p. 211. 
116
 Fay and Young, The Fall of Heath, pp. 20-22. 
  28 
this offered Heath a way out of the impasse.
117
 Others however were more doubtful 
as to whether or not it could have worked.
118
 The files in the National Archives shed 
more light on the government’s consideration of ‘bathing and waiting’, the TUC 
offer, and the ‘oil card’. This thesis will examine to what extent any of these were 
valid solutions and argue that all of them were more problematical than is frequently 
assumed.  
 
The files in the National Archives have been available for some recent historians but 
the use made of them has been patchy. While Andrew Taylor drew on them for his 
account of 1972 they appeared too late for his treatment of 1974 which was based on 
the NUM records but also relied heavily on the secondary sources, which are 
sometimes in conflict.
119
 Beckett drew on a selection of files from the National 
Archive for his vivid account of the three-day week which focussed mainly on the 
impact on ordinary citizens.
120
 Sandbrook has made some use of the Cabinet Minutes 
but his account is based mainly on the secondary sources.
121
  
 
This thesis will argue that the effect of the reforms to contingency planning put in 
place after the first strike meant that the problems faced during the three-day week 
were different in character to those during the crisis of 1972. Another area where the 
files shed an interesting new light is on the state of the economy during the three-day 
week. Campbell and Sandbrook have argued that this did not have serious economic 
consequences, while Beckett has rightly questioned the myth about the enhanced 
productivity of British business.
122
 This thesis will argue that the papers in the 
National Archives show that the real position of the British economy was much 
worse than has been generally supposed. This accounted in large part for the 
government’s deep reluctance to pay the miners more money. It also made it 
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impossible to sit out the strike, despite the level of the coal stocks, and was thus a 
major factor behind the final decision to call the general election.    
 
Primary Published Primary Sources 
The main primary published source for this thesis has been the memoirs and diaries 
of the period, which include those written by Conservative ministers and advisers, 
trade union leaders and others. The most detailed and informative first-hand account 
of the Heath Government was by Douglas Hurd (Prime Minister’s Political Secretary 
1970-74) based on his contemporaneous diary.
123
 Hurd argued that the Heath 
Government was a brave attempt to tackle Britain’s economic problems but was 
broken by the brutal exercise of trade union power. Hurd was the first to identify the 
weakness in the civil service machinery for handling emergencies in the autumn of 
1970 and also criticised the inadequacy of officials’ strategic advice. He 
acknowledged that the government became bogged down in the handling of public 
sector pay disputes and that the outcome of the 1972 strike was a disaster for the 
government.
124
 Hurd’s coverage of the Heath Government in his later memoirs was 
less detailed and largely based on the earlier book, although he was more explicitly 
condemnatory of Maudling’s inadequacies as Home Secretary.125  
 
All political memoirs are written with the benefit of hindsight and since many of the 
members of Heath’s Cabinet went on to hold office in the Conservative Governments 
of 1979-97, which repudiated most of what he stood for, particularly his attempts to 
negotiate with the trade unions, it is perhaps not surprising that their experiences 
during the 1970s were treated relatively briefly and with a strong flavouring of 
‘nostra culpa’. Reginald Maudling (Home Secretary1970-2), Anthony Barber 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer 1970-4), Lord Hailsham (Lord Chancellor 1970-74), 
William Whitelaw (Lord President of the Council 1970-2, Northern Ireland 1972-3, 
Employment 1973-4), Lord Carrington (Defence 1970-4, Energy 1974, Chairman of 
the Conservative Party 1972-4), Peter Walker (Environment Secretary 1970-2, Trade 
and Industry 1972-4), James Prior (Agriculture 1970-2, Lord President of the 
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Council 1972-4, Chairman of the CCU 1973-4), Geoffrey Howe (Solicitor General 
1970-2, Consumer Affairs 1972-4) and Peter Rawlinson (Attorney General 1970-74) 
all produced memoirs.
126
 The most relevant are those by Whitelaw, Carrington and 
Prior. 
 
Most of his colleagues were sympathetic to Heath’s attempts to deal with intractable 
problems; their general tendency was to blame the intransigence of the trade unions 
coupled with the difficulties in the world economy for the fate of the government. 
The exception was Margaret Thatcher (Education Secretary 1970-74) who recorded 
her visceral dislike of the government’s compromises.127 Several ministers testified 
to their deep apprehension about the human cost and social and political 
consequences of rising unemployment.
128
 They recorded their admiration for Heath’s 
clarity of vision and honesty of purpose but admitted that his style could frequently 
be brusque and intimidating.
129
 Heath’s own memoirs stressed his conviction of the 
importance of achieving economic growth, their tone was highly self-justificatory; he 
blamed his inheritance from the Wilson government for most of his government’s 
problems and admitted to no mistakes.
130
  
 
The ministerial memoirs are notably brief on the 1972 miners’ strike. Maudling gave 
only a brief account but revealed that he had to resist pressure from his colleagues to 
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send in the army.
131
 Prior argued that the traumatic experience in 1972 played a large 
part in determining the government’s reaction to the subsequent miners’ overtime 
ban in 1973.
132
 Carrington viewed it as a damaging blow to the morale of the 
Conservative Party.
133
 Heath blamed the miners’ grievances on the policies of the 
Wilson Government and argued rather disingenuously that the government always 
regarded them as a special case, a claim which is not borne out by the files in the 
National Archives. He viewed the massed pickets as a direct challenge to the rule of 
law and made no admission of any failures in the handling of the dispute.
134
  
 
The memoirs contained fuller accounts of the 1974 strike, which reflected the 
division of opinion within the government as to whether there should have been a 
settlement with the miners or an earlier general election. Whitelaw recorded that he 
believed that the oil price rise could have justified making the miners a special case, 
but he was unable to persuade his colleagues. He was strongly opposed to an election 
and felt out of step with his colleagues and Parliamentary Party.
135
 Heath’s own 
memoirs were robustly defensive of his handling of the crisis. He blamed the NCB 
for offering too much too soon and argued that the miners were politically motivated. 
He regarded both the state of emergency and the three-day week as entirely 
necessary and he defended both the delay in calling the election and the eventual 
decision to hold it.
136
  
 
Prior referred only briefly and unrevealingly to his role as Chairman of the CCU 
during the three-day week.
137
 He argued that by the autumn of 1973 the government 
had boxed itself in with the statutory incomes policy and the experience of 1972 
made a second surrender to the miners impossible. With hindsight he later regarded 
the TUC offer as a possible way out, but remained convinced that the delay in calling 
the election was the crucial mistake.
138
 Carrington did not believe the TUC offer was 
a way out. He was a strong advocate for an early election and thought that while 
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Heath delayed for too long it was still right to have held the election.
139
 Walker 
regarded the TUC offer to make the miners’ a special case as blatantly dishonest and 
bogus and also favoured an early election.
140
 Hurd dismissed both ‘bathing and 
waiting’ and the TUC offer as flimsy proposals and he doubted the miners could 
have been made a special case in any way that was acceptable to Conservative 
supporters. He was a strong advocate of an early election and believed the crisis 
could only have been avoided by abandoning the incomes policy, which would have 
been disastrous.
141
  
 
On the trade union side Gormley argued strongly that the miners had a just cause in 
both disputes. His account of the 1972 strike conveyed the sense that the miners’ 
leaders were feeling their way through the strike and were surprised by the extent of 
public support.
142
 Gormley was adamant that the second dispute was an industrial 
and not a political one and claimed he had shown Heath a way to avoid it.
143
 
Gormley’s recollections have formed many of the secondary accounts of both 
disputes but he glided over the divisions within the NUM Executive and his failures 
to persuade it to his more moderate point of view. The interrogation of the files in the 
National Archives have revealed a number of inconsistencies and omissions, which 
are indicated in the relevant chapters.   
 
Other union leaders also argued that Heath made serious mistakes in his handling of 
the 1974 strike. Jack Jones (General Secretary Transport and General Workers’ 
Union 1969-78) commended Heath’s efforts to reach an understanding with the 
unions, but he also argued that the miners should have been made a special case in 
1974 and that Heath missed several opportunities to settle the dispute.
144
 Frank 
Chapple (General Secretary Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and 
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Plumbing Union 1966-84) also thought that Heath’s refusal to accept the TUC offer 
was his biggest error.
145
 
 
Two recently published contemporaneous diaries provided some revealing insights 
into the climate of opinion and the events of the crisis of 1974. The diaries of Sir 
Ronald McIntosh conveyed the sense of exhaustion and pessimism among senior 
officials who were unable to see any way out of Britain’s deep economic problems in 
the autumn of 1973. McIntosh was convinced that the TUC offer was a real solution 
to the miners’ dispute and criticised Heath for being too obdurate too accept it.146 
The published papers of Hugo Young (Chief Leader Writer and Political Editor 
Sunday Times) contained the records of his frank interviews with Heath’s ministerial 
colleagues, political and official advisers and union leaders and revealed the identity 
of many of the anonymous sources cited in The Fall of Heath.
147
  
 
Elements of the press have also been consulted, but for the subject of this thesis it is 
often noteworthy for the absence of coverage of the inner workings of the 
government machinery.  
 
Primary Unpublished Sources 
The main primary unpublished source for this thesis has been the recently released 
files in the National Archives. The records of the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) 
and the Cabinet Office (CAB) have provided a rich source of new evidence, not 
available to the authors of most of the secondary accounts, of operations at the heart 
of central government. These have been supplemented by the relevant files from 
other government departments including the Treasury, the Home Office, Defence, 
Trade and Industry and Employment. This thesis has also drawn on material from a 
number of other archives, namely those of the Conservative Party, the TUC and the 
NUM. It has also conducted a number of interviews, chiefly with former civil 
servants who were involved in the two crises. 
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Research Questions 
In analysing the range of factors which influenced how the Heath government 
handled the two crises this thesis will address a number of research questions:  
 
Were they inevitable or could they have been avoided if the government’s strategic 
and tactical aims had been different. Was the government’s handling of the crises 
marred by tactical misjudgements? 
 
How intractable were the multiple nature of the economic problems which the 
government faced?  
 
How far did these problems account for ‘overload’ and how much of it was due to 
the government’s own over-reach?  
 
To what extent was the handling of the crises affected by competing policy 
objectives during the crises, for example, on obtaining membership of the EEC 
during the miners’ strike in 1972 and managing the problems of Northern Ireland in 
1972 and 1973? 
 
What part was played by weaknesses in the machinery of government? Were there 
significant events-related reforms, which improved the handling of subsequent 
crises?  
 
What role was played by Heath as Prime Minister in the handling of the crises? How 
did his character, past experiences, style of government and his relationship with his 
colleagues affect the management of the crises? How well did other ministers 
manage events? 
 
Was Heath over-reliant on civil service advice and was political advice crowded out? 
Did officials provide adequate advice and guidance through the minefields during 
both crises?   
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How much of a factor was the cumulative physical and mental exhaustion of both 
ministers and officials, which came from dealing with successive crises?  
 
To what extent was there a lack of foresight, a culpable failure to understand the 
problems or an adherence to outdated frames of reference by individuals? 
 
Structure  
Chapter 1, ‘Creaking and groaning’, examines Heath’s first attempts to reform the 
system for dealing with civil emergencies and the reasons for its failure. 
 
Chapter 2, ‘We must be prepared’, analyses the origins of the first conflict with the 
miners and evaluates the Emergencies Committees’ initial handling of the dispute. 
 
Chapter 3, ‘A victory for violence’, looks at the government’s handling of the 
prospect of the end of coal-fired electricity generation and its preparations for the use 
of troops on the eve of the Wilberforce Settlement.  
 
Chapter 4, ‘Bayonets and power stations’, covers the measures taken within the 
Cabinet Office to anticipate potential crises, traces the reform of the system for 
managing emergencies and the establishment of the Civil Contingencies Unit.  
 
Chapter 5, ‘A “red-meat” settlement or a special case’, analyses the causes of the 
second dispute with the miners, the early declaration of the state of emergency and 
the three-day week. 
 
Chapter 6, ‘Honour and party unity’, examines the role of the CCU in the 
government’s management of the three-day week, the effect on the economy and the 
reasons for the February 1974 election.  
 
The Conclusion will draw out the implications of the new material in the archives for 
our understanding of government in the early 1970s and the debates over the long-
running themes of British postwar history and politics. 
 
 
  36 
Argument in brief 
The focus of this thesis is the manner in which the two crises strained the structures 
and relationships at the heart of central government and the policy choices made by 
ministers and officials in the face of problems as they appeared to them at the time. It 
examines the manner in which ministers and officials operated the machinery of 
government for contingency planning, the extent to which the machinery proved 
adequate to the task and how the experience of the crises shaped developments in 
that machinery. It is thus both a political and an administrative history and does not 
attempt to be an overall analysis of economic policy making during the 1970s. This 
thesis has made use of the recently released papers in the National Archives to 
expand the core of knowledge, confirm some established judgements, modify others, 
as well as to correct some misinterpretations. 
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Chapter 1  Creaking and groaning 
 
The Heath Government and Britain in the 1970s  
The Heath Government was forced to declare five states of national emergency in 
four years, all because of major strikes which threatened essential services yet it 
came into office determined to address Britain’s fundamental economic problems 
and both ministers and historians regarded it as one of the best-prepared Oppositions 
in the second half of the twentieth century.
1
 The two major crises of 1972 and 1974 
which resulted from the disputes with the NUM can only be understood against the 
background of the economic problems of the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly 
attempts to reform industrial relations. The Industrial Relations Act has been well 
documented by historians, and here it is only outlined to provide the political 
context.
2
 But to date almost nothing has been written about Heath’s early attempts to 
strengthen the system of contingency planning before the 1972 miners’ strike.3 This 
was driven both by apprehension about the effects of strikes on essential services and 
fears of subversion in the unions. This thesis will argue that it should be considered 
as the hidden and secret face of the public reforms both to the machinery of central 
government and the legislation to curb trade union power.  
 
The Conservatives’ convincing victory in the 1970 election, when they won 330 
seats and 46% of the vote to Labour’s 287 seats and 43% of the vote had not been 
predicted by the opinion polls and came as a surprise to the press, and even to some 
of Heath’s colleagues.4 Heath alone had appeared convinced of victory and felt 
vindicated by the result, so he drew the conclusion that his own judgement was more 
reliable than that of experts. ‘I knew that my instincts had been a better guide to the 
result than the supposed science of the opinion pollsters.’5 It bolstered his self-belief, 
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made him less likely to listen to unpalatable advice and reinforced the dominant 
position of Heath over the other members of his Cabinet.
6
  
 
Iain Macleod (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1970) died after only a few weeks in 
office. Robert Armstrong (Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary 1970-74) 
stressed the significance of Macleod’s death not only for Heath personally but for the 
government as a whole. ‘Macleod had it in him to be a very good Chancellor and was 
the orator which Heath never really was. He was an absolutely key figure in the 
Conservative government and his death in July 1970 was a terrible blow and was 
never really made good.’7 Sir Douglas Allen (Treasury Permanent Secretary 1968-
74) judged that the death of Macleod, coupled with Heath’s wariness of the Treasury 
because of its doubts about the economic benefits of entry into the EEC, led to a 
concentration of economic policy making in No 10.
8
 One commentator asserted that 
many insiders thought that there was an ad hoc top economic policy run by two men, 
Heath and Sir William Armstrong.
9
  
 
Macleod’s replacement was Anthony Barber (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1970-74) 
an able tax lawyer but not a formidable character nor an extrovert politician. Heath 
was not close to Reginald Maudling (Home Secretary 1970-72) who was one of his 
defeated rivals for the party leadership in 1965 and a big figure in the Conservative 
Party as Chancellor of the Exchequer 1962-4. Robert Armstrong, who had also been 
Maudling’s private secretary, recalled that, ‘He was one of the most intelligent men I 
ever met, but he was a lazy man and cruised on his intelligence, and got away with it 
most of the time.’10 Maudling’s main interest was criminal policy and he did not 
have sufficient grip on two main areas of his responsibilities which were to prove a 
source of major stress for the government: Northern Ireland and industrial unrest.  
 
Robert Carr (Employment Secretary 1970-1972) was a conciliatory figure but not a 
charismatic politician and his main energies were occupied with the enormous task 
of overseeing the drafting, parliamentary passage and implementation of the 
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controversial Industrial Relations Act.
11
 John Davies (Trade and Industry Secretary 
1970-2) was a former businessman who never mastered the House of Commons.
12
 
The new Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which was responsible for the 
coal industry, covered a vast area and during 1971 and the early months of 1972 
Davies’ attention was absorbed by the political fallout from collapse of several key 
industrial firms.
13
 The character and preoccupations of Barber, Maudling, Carr and 
Davies, and their subordinate relationship with Heath, were to prove significant 
weaknesses in the government’s handling of both the miners’ strikes.  
 
The Conservative manifesto for the 1970 general election, A Better Tomorrow, was 
the product of a detailed policy review in opposition.
14
 It gave a high priority to the 
control of inflation, ‘the need to curb inflation will come first’, but, although it firmly 
ruled out a formal prices and incomes policy, ‘We utterly reject the philosophy of 
compulsory wage control’, it was not specific about how it would control inflation.15 
The aim of trade union reform was to improve relations between workers and 
management and strengthen the official leadership of trade unions.
16
 The manifesto 
also aimed to reduce the role of the state in industry to foster an economic climate 
which would reward enterprise and efficiency, but at the same time promised to 
increase public investment in infrastructure and regional development and pledged 
not to tolerate increasing unemployment.
17
  
 
The extent to which the 1970 manifesto embodied the principles of the free market, 
which were later abandoned in the so-called ‘U-turns’ in 1972 on industrial policy 
and the implementation of a statutory prices and incomes policy has been debated  
both by Conservative politicians and by historians. Some have argued that it was a 
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betrayal while others have argued that the underlying purposes were consistent.
18
 A 
close reading of the 1970 manifesto provides material for both sides of the argument, 
but Ramsden has argued persuasively that the policy review in opposition failed to 
tackle fundamental differences of approach on economic policy between free-
marketers and those who believed in greater state intervention.
19
 
 
This was particularly true in the field of incomes policy where the paper on pay and 
price inflation was placed at the end of the agenda at the Selsdon Park Conference 
which discussed policy priorities in January 1970, so it was never adequately 
discussed and that the manifesto pledge was couched in more categorical terms than 
the leadership believed.
20
 According to Peter Walker (Environment Secretary 1970-
72, Trade and Industry 1972-74) Iain Macleod had argued in private that although 
there might need to be an incomes policy eventually this could be explained in the 
light of changed circumstances and it was essential to be clear one way or another in 
the manifesto.
21
  
 
The serious consequence of the internal contradictions in economic policy was that 
too much weight was placed on trade union reform as the only answer to deal with 
inflation.
22
 Robert Taylor has argued that it was at the Selsdon Park Conference that 
the shadow cabinet began to recognise that they could face a confrontation with the 
unions over industrial relations reform. Carr suggested that they needed someone in a 
major sector to take a strike and not wilt and there needed to be some contingency 
planning. But Heath intervened and said it was better not to talk about it, even 
Cabinets did not.
23
  
 
Nor had the Party’s industrial policy been worked out in detail. A review of 
nationalised industries was carried out in opposition by Nicholas Ridley (Junior 
Minister DTI 1970-72) who produced a radical report which recommended some 
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measure of de-nationalisation. But both Heath and Keith Joseph (Chief Conservative 
Spokesman on Industry) were wary of such a stance. Much more effort went into a 
review of taxation with the aim of reducing burdens on business and creating a 
climate in which entrepreneurs could flourish.
24
 Brendon Sewill later argued that 
despite the rhetoric in the manifesto, ‘The lame duck philosophy – that inefficient 
firms should be allowed to go bust – had a comparatively small place in our thinking 
in opposition, was never mentioned at the 1970 Selsdon Park meeting and achieved 
headlines only with John Davies’s speech in October 1970.’25 Davies, was a strong 
proponent of the free market, whose views were exemplified in his so-called ‘lame 
ducks’ speech when he stated, ‘We believe that the essential need of the country is to 
gear its policies to the great majority of people, who are not lame ducks, who do not 
need a hand, who are quite capable of looking after their own interests and only 
demand to be allowed to do so.’26  
 
The Heath Government’s economic inheritance in 1970 was mixed but the outlook 
both domestically and internationally was about to deteriorate. The Labour 
government’s final budget in the spring of 1970 had been fiscally tight and the 
balance of payments had moved into the black but inflationary pressures were 
building up. In the second quarter of 1970 hourly wage rates rose by 9.4% and 
consumer prices by 5.3%.
27
 Economists have disagreed about the causes of inflation 
in the early 1970s. One school of thought has emphasised that rising costs were 
driven by a combination of factors, which included growing pressure from trade 
unions during the 1960s for higher real wages as well as rising commodity prices.
28
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Between 1970 and 1974 the Heath Government faced an international boom in all 
commodity prices, not just oil.
29
 
 
The Heath Government’s relaxation of exchange controls in 1971 and the decision to 
allow the pound to float in June 1972 was another factor which contributed to an 
increase in inflation.
30
 The floating currency also made it very difficult either to 
control or predict the level of sterling.
31
 The OPEC oil price rise hike in 1973 
boosted world inflation still further and in Britain its disastrous effects were 
compounded when it triggered the cost of living threshold agreements in Stage 3 of 
the Heath Government’s statutory incomes policy. These were retained by the 
incoming Labour Government in 1974, so that inflation rose from 9% in 1973 to 
reach a peak of 26.9 % in the autumn of 1975.
32
  
 
An alternative explanation of the causes of inflation, that it came from printing too 
much money, was propounded by Milton Friedman and the Chicago school of 
monetarist economists from the late 1960s. Monetarists argued for tighter control of 
the money supply and this view became increasingly popular among opinion formers 
in the financial markets in the mid-1970s. In Britain it was supported and 
disseminated by two influential commentators, Samuel Brittan (Economic 
Commentator Financial Times) and Peter Jay (Economics Editor, The Times), who 
both argued that greater attention needed to be paid to monetary targets. But 
monetary targets were only feasible after the development of cash limits in 1975 and 
were first publicly announced in the summer of 1976, when they became a 
significant element in economic policy.
33
 During the period of the Heath 
Government the belief that monetarism was a realistic basis for practical politics as 
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distinct from an academic theory was still in the future but it was the experience of 
1970-74 which later boosted its credibility in the eyes of some of its adherents.
34
  
 
But although monetarism itself was very much in embryo, free-market ideas were 
advocated by research institutes such as the Institute for Economic Affairs and the 
Centre for Policy Studies and espoused by some influential Conservative politicians, 
including Enoch Powell (MP Wolverhampton South West 1950-74), Keith Joseph 
(Secretary of State for Social Services 1970-74) and Nicholas Ridley.
35
 This 
provided one of several grounds for fissure between Heath and the free-market right 
wing elements in his own party, particularly after the ‘U-turns’ in 1972.36  
 
Another source of division was the introduction of the statutory incomes policy in 
1972. Since the Second World War incomes policies, both statutory and voluntary, 
had been the generally accepted method of holding down inflationary wage demands. 
Both Conservative and Labour governments had tried them with varying degrees of 
success and statutory policies in particular ran counter to trade unions deeply held 
belief in free collective bargaining.
37
 The Conservative Government of Harold 
Macmillan (Prime Minister 1957-63) had instituted a ‘pay pause’ in 1961. At the 
same time it had attempted to gain the co-operation of the TUC by consulting both 
sides of industry on national economic planning and set up the National Economic 
Development Office (NEDO) and its accompanying Council (NEDC) on which both 
industry and trade unions were represented.
38
 The Wilson Governments (1964-70) 
initially tried to secure stable prices on a voluntary basis and set up the National 
Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI), but this voluntary approach collapsed in the 
economic crisis of July 1966 and a statutory policy was then applied which played a 
large part in trade union resentment at the policies of the Wilson Government.
39
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The aim behind institutions such as NEDO, NBPI and the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation (IRC) was that they would both raise the level of growth by planning the 
economy and relieving bottlenecks on the supply side and administer incomes 
policies to ensure that higher growth was not dissipated through inflation. The 
establishment of these tripartite institutions which brought government and both 
sides of industry together, was the culmination of a process which began after the 
First World War, was boosted by trade union participation in government during the 
Second World War and reached its apotheosis in the 1970s, when it began to break 
down.
40
 They were a vital part of what has been termed the ‘Keynesian plus’ 
approach to the economy which dominated the 1960s and 1970s.
41
 As Sir William 
Armstrong described it after he had left office,  
We, while I was in the Treasury, had a framework of the economy basically 
neo-Keynesian. We asked the questions which we asked ministers to decide 
arising out of that framework and it would have been enormously difficult for 
any minister to change the framework...I think we chose that framework 
because we thought it was the best one going.
42
 
 
The Heath Government not only had to deal with inflation but also rising 
unemployment. Fears about the political and social consequences of unemployment 
lay behind the decisions to rescue two large firms in financial difficulties in an 
apparent reversal of the government’s ‘lame ducks’ policy. Rolls Royce was 
nationalised in February 1971 and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders was bailed out in 
February 1972 after a work-in led by the shop stewards. Sir David McNee (Chief 
Constable of Glasgow) warned the government that he would need extra manpower 
to contain the social disorder which would come from mass unemployment in 
Scotland if the shipyards closed.
43
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Although economists and historians have disagreed over the extent to which the 
Conservative Government’s own policies contributed to inflation there has been 
unanimous agreement that during the 1970s the British economy was in serious 
trouble.
44
 The Heath Government’s economic policy was later castigated by its 
critics as a fatal combination of a statutory incomes policy, which brought it into 
conflict with the trade unions, and an expansionary financial policy, which boosted 
inflation.
45
 But it was not clear at the time that the stable conditions of the 1950s and 
1960s were at an end and there was no consensus among economists in the early 
1970s that the conventional instruments of incomes policies and government 
intervention were no longer effective or what new direction economic policy needed 
to take. 
 
Trade union reform 
The overall aim of the Heath government’s economic policy was to remedy the ills 
of low investment and poor productivity to achieve growth and so halt and reverse 
relative decline. The debate on ‘decline’ centred both on economic performance and 
on the loss of military and political power and prestige, particularly after the Suez 
crisis of 1956. This thesis does not attempt to address the possible causes of relative 
economic decline since as one economic historian has noted these are legion: 
The list of explanations which have been advanced during the past forty years 
to explain Britain’s failure to match her competitors is truly vast. It includes a 
divisive class system, an innate cultural hostility to industrialisation, the 
domination of government and industry by the financial interests of the City 
of London, lack of venture capital, excessive taxation, too much government 
spending, too little planning, insufficient expenditure on education and 
training, an adversarial two-party electoral system, restrictive labour practices 
and over-manning, incompetent managers and obstructive trade unions.
46
  
 
Tomlinson has argued that ‘declinism’ was taken for granted across the political 
spectrum from the 1960s and motivated both the Wilson and Heath Governments in 
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their attempts to modernise Britain.
47
 It was typified by the alleged remark of Sir 
William Armstrong that the role of the senior civil service was, ‘the orderly 
management of decline’.48 As Robert Armstrong described it:  
Up to 1970 the problem seemed one of the management of decline, one of the 
reasons for European entry was to stop that. William Armstrong was deeply 
rooted in that sense that the main problem for the British government was 
managing decline. Heath disliked that very much although he had great 
confidence in William over counter-inflation policy. He wanted to create a 
new role for Britain as part of Europe.
49
  
 
To achieve growth the government believed it was essential to deal with the serious 
and growing problem of industrial disputes. As Carr put it, ‘Wherever you looked in 
Britain we were an old country in desperate need of physical renewal. We could only 
do this if we could get economic growth, and the Industrial Relations Bill fitted into 
this pattern, because we believed we would not succeed in getting growth going 
[without it].’50  
 
The number of strikes (not including those in coalmining) had almost doubled 
between 1960 and 1968, and the number of working days lost increased from just 
over three million to over four and a half million.
51
 One of the biggest problems was 
perceived to be the growth of unofficial disputes at the shop-floor level, which 
accounted for a large proportion of working days lost.
52
 The Labour Government of 
Harold Wilson (Prime Minister 1964-70) had tried and failed to address the problems 
of unofficial strikes and inter-union disputes. In early 1965 it had set up a Royal 
Commission on Trades Unions chaired by Lord Donovan (Lord of Appeal in 
Ordinary 1964-71), which did not report until June 1968, by which time ‘waiting for 
Donovan’ had become a political catch-phrase.53  
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The Donovan Report concluded that the answer lay in self-regulation by the trade 
unions, and it rejected proposals for legislative reform.
54
 The Report was greeted 
with some disappointment.
55
 It also looked too late because a few weeks before 
Donovan was published the Conservative Party had rushed out the results of its 
policy review on trade unions.
56
 This was the subject of immensely detailed work 
and proposed a new legal framework for trade unions, which would make 
agreements between unions and employers legally enforceable by new industrial 
courts and enforce secret ballots before strikes. Workers would have the legal right to 
join a trade union but also the right not to be forced to join a ‘closed shop’.57 Wilson 
and Barbara Castle (Employment and Productivity Secretary 1967-70) were both 
alarmed by a wave of unofficial strikes and stung by the popularity of the 
Conservatives’ proposals. In January 1969 the Labour Government produced a White 
Paper In Place of Strife which proposed several measures which would strengthen 
the role of trade unions and reinforce the authority of union leaders over the 
members. But it would also have introduced a ‘conciliation pause’ before any 
unofficial strike and compelled unions to hold secret ballots of their members before 
an official strike.
58
  
 
In April 1969 an Industrial Relations Bill based on In Place of Strife gave every 
worker the right to belong to a trade union. It also gave the Secretary of State 
legislative powers, backed up by financial sanctions, to impose a settlement on 
unofficial inter-union disputes, to order a twenty-eight-day ‘conciliation pause’ if 
there was a threat of an unofficial strike which posed a serious threat to the economy, 
and to order a strike ballot if there was the prospect of an official strike which posed 
a serious threat to the economy or the national interest. It met with increasing 
opposition, based mainly on an atavistic dislike of legislation in the area of industrial 
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relations, within the trade union movement, the Parliamentary Labour Party and the 
Cabinet, where the leading opponent was James Callaghan (Home Secretary, 1967-
70). Wilson and Castle were forced to drop their legislative proposals in favour of a 
‘solemn and binding’ agreement with the TUC to strengthen its own procedures for 
resolving inter-union disputes and unconstitutional strikes. ‘Solomon Binding’ 
became a term of ridicule, damaged the reputation of the Labour Government and 
contributed to its general election defeat in 1970.
59
  
 
The Conservative government was determined to push through trade union reform 
and the ideas had been so well-worked out in opposition that the government saw no 
need for a long process of negotiation with the TUC. A consultative document which 
embodied its proposal was published within a few weeks of taking office and Carr 
made it clear that the main principles were non-negotiable. Somewhat to his surprise 
Carr found that the officials in the Department of Employment, who had worked on 
Castle’s Bill, were enthusiastic about the Conservatives’ proposals.60  These included 
Barnes, who according to Sir Geoffrey Howe (Solicitor General 1970-72), 
proclaimed himself to be not just a hawk but an eagle on the need for reform.
61
 They 
were rapidly, too rapidly, translated into legislative proposals and Howe complained 
later that the ‘law with a human face’ which they had aimed for had been turned into 
over-complicated legislation by the Parliamentary draftsmen.
62
 The Industrial 
Relations Bill, published in early December 1970, was so complex that Carr later 
admitted that although he was one of its main authors he needed extensive briefing to 
understand the purpose of its many clauses.
63
  
 
The Industrial Relations Bill aimed to reduce the number of strikes by making 
collective agreements between employers and unions legally binding unless 
specifically agreed by both parties. It established a National Industrial Relations 
Court (NIRC) as a branch of the High Court, with which recognised unions would 
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have to register in order to be immune from civil suits for damages. The NIRC would 
regulate a new code of practice which would outlaw unfair industrial practices and if 
registered unions contravened it they would forfeit their legal immunity to 
prosecution. The NIRC also had the power to enforce a sixty day ‘cooling-off’ period 
before unofficial strikes. It also instituted a requirement to hold a secret ballot before 
strike action.
64
  
 
The Conservative Party had few close links with the unions and ministers had gained 
the impression in private meetings with union leaders before the election that 
although the TUC would oppose the proposals on principle, once they became law 
they would be accepted.
65
 Although Carr later conceded that the government tried to 
do too much at once, he argued that at the time there appeared to be good reasons for 
attempting a wide-ranging reform which would settle the issue for the foreseeable 
future.
66
 The Bill met with determined opposition from Wilson and the Labour Party, 
although several of its proposals were identical to those of In Place of Strife, as well 
as from the unions. But after mass demonstrations and a bitter parliamentary battle it 
became law in August 1971, although several of its provisions did not come into 
effect until 1972. However, the unions, bolstered by their earlier victory over Wilson 
and Castle, continued to oppose the Act and undermined it by removing themselves 
from the official register. This rendered them liable to prosecution and provoked a 
series of legal confrontations, which culminated in the arrest and imprisonment of 
three dock workers in July 1972, accompanied by widespread protests.
67
  
 
Heath and his colleagues regarded their proposals as, ‘rational, sensible and 
essentially modest’, and because they had been explicit about them in the manifesto 
they were convinced they had an electoral mandate.
68
 But the Act was a legally 
complex and over-ambitious measure which eventually proved unworkable in 
practice. It also led to a wave of strikes in protest, one estimate was that over three 
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million working days were lost.
69
 Most importantly it soured relations between the 
government and the unions and intensified antagonism over the increasing number of 
pay disputes in the public sector, which were a persistent problem during the 
government’s term of office. It thus exacerbated the problem of strikes which it was 
designed to solve. Between 1969  and 1973 the total number of stoppages rose by 
87%, the number of workers involved by 22% and the total of working days lost by 
244%, compared to the period 1960-68.
70
 While most of them were disputes over the 
level of wages there was also a wave of political strike activity never seen before in 
the UK, mainly against the Industrial Relations Act with the remainder a protest 
against the statutory incomes policy.
71
  
 
Industrial unrest 
Although the manifesto had specifically set itself against a compulsory incomes 
policy the government soon decided on a policy of pay restraint in the public sector, 
which included the nationalised industries. The aim was to limit pay rises to 1% less 
than the preceding one and to refuse to allow wage increases to be passed on in price 
rises in the hope that this policy of ‘norm minus one’ (N-1) would be followed in the 
private sector and lead to a gradual reduction in wage inflation. But it was 
completely voluntary and depended entirely on government exhortation, with no 
sanctions if employers failed to observe it. It also ran counter to the main objective of 
trade union leaders to achieve the same gains for their members as other unions and 
was deeply resented by them.
72
   
 
The government was faced with increasing industrial conflict over pay from the time 
it took office in June 1970. A national dock strike forced it to declare its first state of 
emergency in July 1970. After an inquiry the strike was eventually settled with a pay 
award worth 7%. A five-week strike by local authority manual workers, which 
included dustmen, was settled at the beginning of November by an independent 
inquiry which awarded them 14.5%. This pattern of strikes, eventually settled at high 
levels by independent arbitrators repeated itself with a power workers strike in 
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December 1970 and a twelve-week strike by post office workers which ended, 
unusually, with a low settlement and victory for the government in March 1971.
73
  
 
The problem of strikes was an issue which the government took very seriously. In 
October 1970 Sir Burke Trend (Cabinet Secretary 1963-73) sent Heath a paper, ‘The 
Prospects of Industrial Unrest’.74 This had been produced for what Trend described 
as, ‘a small working party on “Subversion at Home”, which attempts to keep an eye 
on subversive activities, whether by right wing or left wing organisations, on the 
domestic front’. According to Trend, it met regularly and consisted of representatives 
from the Foreign Office, Home Office, Employment and Productivity, Education and 
Science and the Security Service (MI5).
75
 This group would appear to be the Official 
Committee on Subversion at Home established in 1969.
76
 Trend warned Heath that 
the paper, ‘doesn’t make very cheerful reading; and if it is a reliable forecast – as its 
predecessors in this series usually have been – we are probably in for a long, hard 
winter on the industrial front’.77  
 
The paper was a balanced analysis of the factors which might produce increased 
industrial unrest. It pointed out that as a result of the growth of individual plant 
bargaining trade union leaders had lost control of their rank and file, which they 
could only reassert by outflanking the militants and pushing for excessive wage 
claims. Even the most militant union leaders accepted that inflationary settlements 
could not continue, but although no union leader wished their own union to be in the 
forefront of the battle, a new lower rate would only be accepted after a decisive 
confrontation. It analysed the activities of the Communist Party and Trotskyite 
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groups in a number of industries and found their role to be limited. But it also warned 
that it was difficult to judge whether opposition to the industrial relations legalisation 
would be so intense that there was a real risk of strike action being taken for political 
ends. It concluded with the stark warning; ‘Industrial peace – even relative and 
partial – can only be bought at the price of further industrial conflict.’78  
 
Heath took the issues of industrial disruption and the potentially destructive role of 
political extremists extremely seriously and the paper clearly made an impact on him, 
as his handwritten comments on Trend’s note showed. 
I am not at all satisfied that officials have worked out for ministers both 
strategy and tactics as well as the mobilisation of resources to deal with this 
situation. At present we are barely muddling through ad hoc. Can we now 
tackle this thoroughly and get Ministers and Departments working to an 
agreed plan. There is no time to be lost.
79
  
 
Trend proposed that a small group of senior ministers should be set up to examine 
potential cases of industrial unrest, which could disrupt essential public services or 
supplies of vital commodities. Its task was to prepare a general strategy and ensure 
that contingency planning was in place, and it should be supported by a small group 
of senior officials.
80
 Heath’s response was positive and stressed the need for urgency, 
he wrote on the paper 
Agreed. The official group to work out the strategy and present it to Ministers 
is most important. It needs careful thought which cannot be provided by a 
Ministerial Committee. I hope they can get on with it quickly. I would like to 
see the strategy set out on paper as soon as possible.
81
  
 
The Ministerial Committee on Industrial Unrest was known as GEN 19 and the 
Official Committee as GEN 20.
82
 Although the issues with which they were 
concerned were primarily economic and industrial the Home Office was the lead 
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department and GEN 19
83
 was chaired by Maudling and GEN 20 by Sir Philip Allen 
(Permanent Secretary, Home Office 1966-72).
84
 According to Andrew the Whitehall 
response was unenthusiastic and Allen argued that it was not possible to foresee 
disruption with enough precision to make meaningful plans to deal with it.
85
 This 
was a sensitive area fraught with difficulties but one senior Cabinet Office official 
made it clear that Heath attached great urgency to devising a strategy to enable the 
government to cope with strikes which threatened essential services, and that at some 
point a stand would have to be taken and wage claims resisted.  
We should be able to identify the confrontations which are crucial and the 
points at which the maximum Government effort should be concentrated and 
how at these points the Government’s resources should be deployed. We 
should identify also the battles that cannot be won when we should 
deliberately seek to avoid a confrontation.
86
  
 
The group clearly had access to the product of intelligence organisations including 
the Security Service (MI5) and the Special Branch
87
 and was attended by a 
representative from MI5.
88
 The highly sensitive nature of the work and the 
involvement of MI5 meant that the very existence of both the ministerial and the 
official groups were kept secret.
89
 ‘It would be very damaging if it were publicly 
represented that the Government had set up special machinery to work out plans for 
strike-breaking, and naturally the strategy itself is of the highest secrecy.’90 GEN 20 
met three times during November 1970 and surveyed the pay negotiations due to 
come to a head during the next few months. It analysed the extent to which strike 
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action would cause serious disturbance to the economy or the public and attempted to 
identify subversive influences in industry.
91
 
 
By mid-November 1970 Heath and his senior ministers were extremely worried by 
rising wage rates and struggled to find an effective strategy to deal with inflation. 
Heath convened a wide-ranging discussion with Barber and a small group of senior 
officials at Chequers. He asked why the old relationship between the growth in 
incomes and the level of unemployment (the Phillips curve) was breaking down, 
whether deflation could work and what would be involved in standing up to a strike. 
Barber warned that unless something was done about inflation there would be a 
balance of payments deficit before the end of 1971 and a crisis of confidence before 
that. Since deflation would result in a massive and unacceptable increase in 
unemployment and there was no merit in statutory control of prices and incomes he 
concluded, ‘the Government must stand up to a strike, perhaps to more than one 
strike, in the public sector and be seen to be allowing the consequence of 
management to work through to bankruptcy in one or two striking cases.’ While 
Heath saw the attraction of standing up to a strike in the public sector he was not yet 
convinced that the government would be able to see through a firm stand on the 
electricity workers’ pay claim which was then looming.92  
 
This sense of doubt that the currently accepted economic wisdom was still valid was 
clearly evident at a high-level meeting of ministers and senior civil servants to 
discuss inflation a couple of days later. Ministers were convinced that the balance of 
industrial power had swung in favour of workers who were prepared to press for high 
claims at the risk of damaging the national economy and that the monopoly power of 
the trade unions had become so strong that the temptation was for employers to give 
in and raise prices.
93
 Heath instructed that detailed plans should be drawn up to deal 
with a possible national electricity strike but ministers were well aware that the 
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country could not stand a strike of more than a few days in that, or other essential 
services such as gas and the water supply.
94
  
 
By the end of November 1970 the drafting of the Industrial Relations Bill, which was 
the public aspect of the government’s policy for redressing the balance of power in 
industry, was well-advanced. But in private ministers had become increasingly 
anxious about inflation and there was a growing conviction that they would need to 
face down a major strike in the public sector, but the confrontation would have to be 
chosen extremely carefully. To deal with the inter-linked problems of pay, strikes 
and inflation the government machinery in this area was restructured and became 
increasingly complex.
95
  GEN 19 became the Ministerial Committee on Pay 
Negotiations, chaired by Maudling,
96
 and GEN 20 became the Official Committee on 
Industrial Disputes,  chaired by Sir Philip Allen.
97
 A Sub-Committee on Pay 
Negotiations, a small mixed committee of ministers and officials, chaired by Robert 
Carr, was set up,
98
 and so was an Official Committee on Inflation, chaired by Sir 
Douglas Allen.
99
 The Official Committee on Pay (PO)
100
 was chaired by Sir Ronald 
McIntosh (Deputy Secretary, Department of Employment 1970-72, Treasury 1972-
3). (See Figure 1, p 56).  
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Figure 1. Structure of Cabinet Committees dealing with problems of industrial 
unrest in November 1970. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E   Ministerial Emergencies Committee 
EO   Official Emergencies Committee 
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Heath’s fears about the unpreparedness of the governmental machinery for dealing 
with major strikes were borne out by a work-to-rule by power station workers in 
December 1970. This resulted in widespread electricity cuts, with some large 
industries halted or slowed down, shops forced to close early and homes without 
electricity for hours at a time.
101
 The government hesitated for several days but the 
severity of the electricity shortage meant it was obliged to declare its second state of 
emergency on Saturday 12 December.
102
  
 
At one point during the dispute Maudling asked the Security Service to engage in a 
covert listening operation against the unions involved. Anthony Simkins (Deputy 
Director General MI5) was reluctant to do this and argued that this was in breach of 
the Charter since the unions could not properly be considered subversive 
organisations and the proposal was dropped.
103
 Heath wrote later that the electricity 
dispute ‘provided an opportunity for making the stand we all sought’ so long as the 
country could withstand a complete shutdown by the electricity workers.
104
 But the 
vulnerability of the electricity industry to any industrial action was brought home to 
the government during the work-to-rule. The dispute was eventually settled by 
referring it to a court of inquiry chaired by Lord Wilberforce, (Lord of Appeal in 
Ordinary 1964-82) which awarded a pay rise which the government presented as 
10% but most other assessments put at between 15 and 18%.
105
 
During the dispute Douglas Hurd  noted in his diary, ‘Cold and the electricity go-
slow hits harder and quicker than expected...It is clear that all the weeks of planning 
in the civil service have totally failed to cope with what is happening in the 
electricity dispute: and all the pressures are to surrender.’ In a note to Heath Hurd 
stressed the need, ‘to examine again the practical side of contingency planning for 
mitigating the effects of any future disputes. This did not look impressive this time, 
and some things which were said at the outset to be impossible (e.g. warnings of 
cuts) are now being done. (Surely the Official Committee is too large, and you need a 
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small group of officials under an energetic minister, not holding too many 
meetings).’106  
 
The Official Committee on Emergencies (EO) was responsible for contingency 
planning and the management of civil emergencies where essential services were 
threatened. It had its origins in the Supply and Transport Organisation established in 
1919 to deal with the wave of industrial unrest after the First World War and made 
permanent by the Emergency Powers Act 1920.
107
 After the Second World War it 
was reconstituted in 1947 under the aegis of the Home Office as the Emergencies 
Committee with a broader remit to cope with natural disasters such as floods as well 
as industrial disputes which threatened the life of the nation.
108
 Its terms of reference 
under the amended Emergency Powers Act 1964 were, ‘To co-ordinate preparation 
of plans for providing and maintaining in an emergency supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community: in an emergency to co-ordinate action for this 
purpose and to report to the Ministerial Committee on Emergencies.’109  
 
It was chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Home Office and since its 
membership included officials from any departments affected by an emergency it 
was large and unwieldy.  EO was responsible for contingency planning for 
everything from major floods to strikes but by the early 1970s industrial relations had 
become increasingly fraught and complex and the leading role of the Home Office in 
an area of industrial and economic policy, a role which reflected both its wide remit 
and traditional position of power in Whitehall, had become an historical anomaly. 
The Official Committee reported to the Ministerial Emergencies Committee (E), 
which was chaired by the Home Secretary, Maudling, whose position in government 
reflected his seniority within the Conservative Party. As Hurd put it, ‘Part of the 
problem was that Maudling didn’t have a grip on anything, part of the Irish problem 
too. You had a man who was shrewd and idle, everybody liked him but he didn’t 
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have a grip, yet he was too important to be shoved aside. He was a big beast so he 
had a political stature which he no longer deserved.’110   
 
First attempts at reform 
Jeffery and Hennessy believed that Hurd’s warning on the weaknesses of the system 
of contingency planning went unheeded.
111
 But Heath was already concerned about 
the level of preparedness to deal with strikes even before the inadequate handling of 
the electricity dispute, and this led directly to further action in this area. Robert 
Armstrong informed Trend that Heath now wanted the arrangements for dealing with 
industrial emergencies to be examined as a matter of the utmost urgency. He 
particularly wanted the case for a small project team of officials, chaired by a very 
senior civil servant, with the capacity to devote a considerable amount of time, 
thought and energy to the work, to be examined.
112
 
This proposal for a central project team was an encroachment upon the Home 
Office’s traditional territory and it was clearly resented by Sir Philip Allen who 
drafted a long and defensive rebuttal. The original document in the National 
Archives has dismissive comments written in the margins in what appears to be 
Heath’s handwriting. Next to Allen’s argument that both the Departments of the 
Environment and Trade and Industry had maintained operations rooms during the 
strike, is written, ‘almost useless’, and when Allen defended his assertion that the 
police would prefer to be in touch with the Home Office rather than with a central 
operations room, with, ‘This may sound absurd...’, the caustic comment, ‘It is.’ was 
scrawled.
113
  
Trend was enthusiastic about the proposal for a central operations room which 
should be staffed twenty four hours a day, preferably by retired army staff officers, 
and be ready to deal with any emergency, whether an Act of God or the work of man. 
But he was much less sympathetic to the creation of a central project team and he 
proposed instead that the Emergencies Committee should be sharpened up. Trend’s 
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judgement was that ‘although the machinery had creaked and groaned a bit’, it had 
stood up to the electricity emergency pretty well. ‘There is always going to be some 
creaking and groaning, if only because emergencies are by their nature, 
unforeseeable things and have to be played by ear.’114 
This was deeply inimical to Heath’s firm belief that the handling of industrial 
disputes could be improved. His desire to reform the system for dealing with 
emergencies reflected his long-standing conviction of the importance of machinery 
of government. Machinery of government reform was a subject which engrossed him 
and he was convinced that ministers spent too much time on daily matters and not 
enough on strategic thinking.
115
 Much of the policy review in opposition had been 
devoted to the question of how to rationalise the civil service, reduce the burden on 
ministers, strengthen the heart of central government and improve its capability for 
analysis and policy formulation.
116
 The result was the White Paper, The 
Reorganisation of Central Government, which proclaimed ‘This administration 
believes that government has been attempting to do too much. This has placed an 
excessive burden on industry, and on the people of the country as a whole, and has 
also overloaded the government machine itself.’117  
During the autumn of 1970 Heath had pressed ahead with a number of major 
reforms. Some administrative tasks were delegated to executive agencies, a number 
of smaller departments were amalgamated and two new large ministries, Trade and 
Industry (DTI) and Environment (DoE), were created. These super-ministries were 
designed to streamline decision-taking within departments so that inter-departmental 
tensions would be removed from Cabinet discussions which could then focus on 
more strategic matters.
118
 But they were to prove too big to be run effectively by one 
Cabinet Minister who had to manage a large team of six or seven junior ministers, 
delegate effectively but retain overall responsibility.
119
 A new system for analysing 
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and assessing central government programmes to ensure value for money known as 
Programme Analysis Review (PAR) was established in March 1971.
120
 But 
departmental ministers were unenthusiastic about having their programmes vetted in 
this way and it proved to be a time-consuming burden.
121
  
The most radical and innovative reform was the establishment of the Central Policy 
Review Staff (CPRS), designed to ensure that all ministers were fully aware of the 
strategic implications of policy decisions, as well as all the alternative courses of 
action,  and so better able to establish clear priorities. The ideas behind it were 
developed in opposition when the emphasis had been on strengthening the Prime 
Minister’s office. The original proposal had been that it should be in No 10 but Trend 
had opposed this and when it was established in February 1971 it was based in the 
Cabinet Office and designed to service the government as a whole, not just the Prime 
Minister. Trend had also objected to it being called the ‘Think Tank’, although this 
was how it became known colloquially.
122
 It was established under the direction of 
the colourful maverick Lord (Victor) Rothschild (Director General and First 
Permanent Under-Secretary, Cabinet Office 1971-74). Rothschild had served in 
military intelligence during the Second World War, had a brilliant career as a 
scientist in government service and recently retired as Head of Research at Royal 
Dutch Shell.
123
  
Heath later described the CPRS as probably the most important and effective reform 
of his reforms to the machinery of government. ‘It was allowed, even encouraged, if 
not to think the unthinkable, then at least to express the uncomfortable...What we 
heard was not always welcome or popular, but the discipline of hearing it was very 
salutary.’124 Rothschild was not convinced about the various witty ways of 
describing the Think Tank such as ‘sabotaging the smooth working of the Whitehall 
machine’ or ‘thinking the unthinkable’. ‘From the start, it seemed to me that our job 
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was to analyse problems and proposals and for that we needed excellent analytical 
brains: so that was what I tried to get.’125  
 
The CPRS consisted of a small mixed team of mainly young civil servants and 
outsiders. Its terms of reference were to analyse selected major policy issues, help 
ministers develop a collective strategy to achieve their major objectives, assess the 
compatibility of government’s action or non-action with this strategy. Its role was to 
identify and brief the Cabinet and Ministerial Committees on selected policy issues 
and to help select PAR programmes and analyse the results.
126
 As Hurd described it, 
‘Lord Rothschild roamed like a condottiere through Whitehall, laying an ambush 
here, there breaching some crumbling fortress which had outlived its usefulness’. 
The CPRS made regular presentations to the Cabinet at Chequers. ‘Their analysis 
was elegant but ruthless. They made no allowances for political pressures. They 
assumed the highest standards of intellectual consistency. They rubbed Ministers’ 
noses in the future.’127   
 
One project, directly related to the future, which the CPRS undertook in the late 
spring of 1971, was an attempt to establish an Early Warning System (EWS) for 
ministers. The aim behind this was to provide advance notice of possible crises 
which might occur so that contingency plans could be put in place.
128
 In the late 
spring and early summer of 1971 Robin Butler (Treasury Official seconded to CPRS 
1971-72, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister 1972-5) was in charge of drawing 
up a wide-ranging schedule of possible issues and events which might pose a 
problem. But this involved the CPRS in an enormous amount of work and not all 
departments, particularly the Treasury, were co-operative. Sir Douglas Allen 
protested to Rothschild, that the proposed machinery was not suitable for some of the 
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highly sensitive economic problems with which the Treasury dealt, that Trend was 
across the issues and could inform you ‘when he feels it appropriate’.129  
Heath’s response to Trend’s objections to a central team in the Cabinet Office to plan 
for civil emergencies was distinct irritation, as his handwritten comment on Trend’s 
note showed. ‘This just is not good enough. Every major emergency so far I have had 
to take over myself: that certainly means that a central project team could organise 
effectively.’130 Heath’s relationship with Trend had elements of tension and this was 
one such moment.
131
 Robert Armstrong’s view was that, ‘Heath had great respect for 
Burke Trend, as who could not, because he was a very, very good civil servant and 
highly intelligent and a very agreeable man’.  
But as Armstrong explained:  
Trend was not a European, he was an Atlanticist, for him the relationship 
with the United States was key...he was also very much a Commonwealth 
man. Those two things mattered to him much more than Europe.  
Heath was aware of Trend’s views on Europe and that,  
coloured their relationship. I think that was why my own role became 
important because I was pro-European. I got on very well with Burke and he 
was a very good friend, but I think Heath did come to rely on me in a way 
that perhaps in another system he would have been relying more on Trend. 
There were those who thought I was getting above myself, as it were. I tried 
not to but I found myself dealing with permanent secretaries almost as an 
equal really. 
The other element, according to Armstrong was that Heath saw Trend as old-
fashioned in matters of machinery of government since Trend was, ‘very conscious 
of the dangers of over-concentration at the centre and the way it leaches 
responsibility away from departmental ministers.’132 While Trend was in favour of a 
permanent operations centre he was reluctant to support the proposal for a central 
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project team based in the Cabinet Office and argued that it would be more effective 
and more economical to retain the Emergencies Committee.
133
  
 
Armstrong appeared to be sceptical about Trend’s compromise. ‘One tends to be 
suspicious of these proposals which are a happy combination of everybody’s ideas, 
that they will in fact meet nobody’s objectives.’ But since the matter was now urgent 
Armstrong suggested that the proposal should be accepted, albeit ‘on trial’ and 
‘subject to ruthless revision’.134 Heath accepted this advice reluctantly and 
acquiesced in Trend’s proposal that the review of the Emergencies Organisation 
should be carried out by the Official Committee on Industrial Disputes.
135
 Since this 
was also chaired by Sir Philip Allen it was not surprising that it decisively rejected 
the idea of a central operations room replacing the various departmental operations 
rooms which already existed.
136
  
The review of departmental plans for handling civil emergencies was carried out by 
T G Weiler (Assistant Secretary, Home Office), who produced two reports in the 
spring and early summer of 1971. It is a reminder of just how basic communications 
were in the early 1970s that the first report made such necessary recommendations 
for improvements as direct telephone lines for key staff and an inter-departmental 
telephone directory for use once Whitehall exchanges had closed down for the 
night.
137
 The second Weiler Report surveyed the state of pay negotiations in those 
key industries and services essential to daily life and analysed the probable effect of 
any industrial action. It found the level of staffing to deal with emergencies to be 
adequate if not lavish.
138
  
It also stressed the inescapable fact, a recurrent theme in all attempts to strengthen 
contingency planning, that while preparations could be made to mitigate the worst 
effects of a major strike it was completely unrealistic to expect that services could be 
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maintained at anything like a normal level.
139
 Presciently it noted that the pay 
negotiations in the coal industry could break down as early as mid-September 1971 
and it would not be possible to use troops or volunteers to maintain coal production. 
In the event of a miners’ strike the steel industry and coal-fired electricity generating 
stations which produced 70% of electricity supplies would be brought to a standstill 
once they had used available stocks.
140
  
 
The Weiler reviews were completed by June 1971 to the satisfaction of the top 
echelons of the Home Office.
141
 They marked a significant stage in the evolution of 
the system of emergency planning and in some respects, such as their emphasis on 
the importance of communications, laid the foundations of the modern system which 
exists to the present day. They also did valuable groundwork in their survey of the 
key industries which were vulnerable to strike action. It has previously been thought 
that the first such comprehensive survey was undertaken after the 1972 miners’ 
strike
142
 but the Weiler reviews preceded this and their work would be acknowledged 
and utilised by Hunt in the major review which took place a year later.  
 
But while they produced some tangible minor improvements they left the Home 
Office Emergencies Organisation and the practice of separate departmental 
operations rooms intact. The Weiler reviews also engendered a dangerous sense of 
complacency in the Home Office that the system for dealing with emergencies had 
been improved more than turned out to be the case. Maudling reported to Heath that, 
‘the importance which we have attached to the need for proper contingency planning 
is beginning to pay dividends’, and that government departments and public 
authorities, ‘now seem to be fully alive to the issues’. A single word, ‘Good’, 
handwritten on the note, was Heath’s terse response.143  
 
Heath’s attempt, during the first year of his government, to sharpen up and 
modernise the Whitehall system of contingency planning by establishing a central 
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unit in the Cabinet Office dovetailed with his other measures to rationalise and 
improve the structures of central government. It was also designed to strengthen the 
government’s hand in dealing with the trade unions and reinforce its overall strategy 
on industrial relations. But whereas the Whitehall reforms and the Industrial 
Relations Act were public the attempts to improve contingency planning for 
industrial emergencies were kept highly secret.    
 
But by the summer of 1971 Heath’s aim of establishing a centralised system for 
managing emergencies had been defeated by a combination of Trend’s bureaucratic 
conservatism and the Home Office’s determination to defend its traditional territorial 
interests. Trend had hankered after a central operations room but while prepared to 
concede on this he warned that Heath should keep a watchful eye on how future 
emergencies were handled since, ‘After all the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating.’144 This was to prove prophetic: the attempts at reform ran into the sand just 
as the government faced the biggest threat yet to both its pay policy and ability to 
guarantee essential services from the NUM. 
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Chapter 2 We must be prepared 
 
The strike forewarned 
Although the 1972 miners’ strike is widely acknowledged as a major event the main 
focus of historians has been on the impact of the defeat on the government’s political 
standing and the consequences of the strike. This is because it marked a change in 
the relationship between the government and trade unions; namely the attempt to 
reach a tripartite agreement on wages and prices, and when that failed, it led to a 
statutory prices and incomes policy.
1
 It has also partly been seen as a watershed 
because it occurred shortly before the Budget in March 1972 and the Industry Act 
which have been widely characterised as a U-turn in economic policy.
2
 In examining 
the reasons for the government’s failure in its handling of the strike this thesis will 
query why the government failed to avert the strike and why it appeared to be so 
inactive for the first month. It will analyse the factors which contributed to the 
government’s defeat and ask to what extent it was a straightforward industrial 
dispute and whether its political effect has been exaggerated.  
 
All accounts of the strike have stressed the significance of the mobile picketing of 
the power stations. Clutterbuck had a detailed description, based on an interview 
with Arthur Scargill (member of the Barnsley Area Strike Committee NUM 
Yorkshire Region) of the direction of the flying pickets from the operations room of 
the Yorkshire Area Headquarters of the NUM in Barnsley.
3
 While Clutterbuck 
acknowledged the strike was principally about pay he also argued that it was by 
British standards ‘unusually violent’.4 Robert Taylor also focussed on the 
organisation of the mobile picketing by the Yorkshire miners, which brought the 
power stations to a halt and  argued that help from other unions was crucial to the 
miners’ victory.5   
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Campbell’s verdict was that the government’s defeat stemmed from the twin 
misjudgements of the miners’ mood and the level of the coal stocks and that the 
delay in the state of emergency stemmed from a mixture of complacency, a desire 
not to over-react and a failure of co-ordination between government departments.
6
 
Andrew Taylor has drawn on the NUM’s records and the files in the National 
Archives to examine the causes of the strike and the manner in which the 
government handled its relations with the NUM.
7
 But the question still remains as to 
why the government’s overall strategy during the strike was so poor, a question 
which is all the more pertinent since the issue of how to deal with strikes was one 
which had preoccupied Heath from the autumn of 1970. The official records shed 
new light on this issue, particularly on the constraining effects of the government 
machinery.  
 
The implicit argument in previous accounts has been that the strike took the 
government by surprise, which largely explained the poor way in which it was 
handled.
8
 In his memoirs Heath explained, ‘What we did not anticipate was the 
spasm of militancy from a union which had been relatively quiet for so long, and the 
tactics which it was willing to adopt.’9 But the papers in the National Archives show 
that there were clear warnings that a miners’ strike was a possibility and the 
government and the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) had built up the 
coal stocks in preparation. There are also clear indications that the government was 
consciously prepared to take a stand against a major strike in the public sector as part 
of its overall strategy to curtail the power of the trade unions and reduce inflation.   
 
All previous accounts have cited Carr’s lament 
Our judgement turned out to be wrong. There was no doubt about it, our 
intelligence about the strength of opinion with the miners’ union generally 
was not as good as it should have been. The miners really do walk on their 
own…We just didn’t know the miners. They hadn’t been to St James’s 
Square, the old home of the Ministry of Labour, for nearly fifty years.
10
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But the miners’ strike was not a bolt-from-the-blue and there is clear evidence in the 
National Archives that by 21 October, when the NUM decided to ballot its members 
for a strike, there had been warnings from a number of sources that industrial action 
by the miners was a real possibility and that ministers, including Heath, were aware 
of this. 
 
The NUM was traditionally regarded a moderate union and it had co-operated with 
the National Coal Board (NCB) in the rationalisation of the coal industry during the 
1960s; between 1957 and 1972 the size of the workforce fell considerably from over 
700,000 to less than 390,000 and the number of pits from over 800 to under 300.
11
 
During that period productivity had increased considerably and the old system of 
payment based on piecework had been reformed, but as a consequence of the 
National Power Loading Agreement (NPLA) the pay of the highest earning miners at 
the coal face had dropped. In 1960 the miners were third in the industrial earnings 
league, but by 1970 they were in twelfth position.
12
 
 
Several factors worked against the organisation of any national strikes. The NUM 
was organised on a regional structure based on the coalfields, with a strong tradition 
of localism and fragmentation between different types of workers in the industry. It 
was also politically split between the moderate areas of Durham and Lancashire and 
the more militant areas of Yorkshire, Scotland and South Wales.
13
 Most importantly 
Rule 43 of the NUM required a very high threshold of a two-thirds vote in favour in 
a national ballot before a strike could be called. There had been no national strike in 
the coal industry since the General Strike of 1926 and the memory of that defeat had 
scarred the miners’ leaders and made them wary of a repetition.14 But although there 
had been no national strike the coal-mining industry had a tradition of short, sporadic 
and regional unofficial stoppages.
15
 Between 1946 and 1973 coal mining accounted 
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for 45% of all stoppages, 18% of all workers involved and 18% of days lost in 
industrial disputes.
16
  
 
By 1971 resentment at the loss of earnings and the rundown of the industry had 
engendered a mood of frustration, which was articulated in militant rhetoric by the 
new leadership of the union. Lawrence Daly (General Secretary NUM 1968-84), 
argued strongly that the miners had been too moderate for their own good.
17
 While 
the President, Gormley, although regarded as a moderate, was also determined to 
reverse the decline in wages and declared that, ‘I am not going to be a miners’ leader 
if I cannot claim a bigger minimum wage for the lads who go underground than the 
lads carting dustbins round the streets of London are getting. We have been 
acquiescing for too long.’18 Militancy was also exacerbated during the first six 
months of 1971 by trade union resentment towards the Industrial Relations Bill 
which was then the subject of a bitterly contentious Parliamentary passage, 
accompanied by mass demonstrations.
19
  
 
This attitude had resulted in a number of unofficial strikes for higher pay during the 
winters of 1969 and 1970 in the Yorkshire coalfield, where the tactic of sending 
pickets from one area further afield to increase the numbers at key points, known as 
‘flying pickets’ was used.20 In the autumn of 1970 55% of the membership of the 
NUM had voted in favour of a strike in a national ballot. At the NUM annual 
conference in July 1971, in a highly significant move at Gormley’s instigation, Rule 
43 was changed so that any future strike ballot would only require a reduced 55% 
majority in favour.
21
 The conference also voted to seek very large pay increases of £8 
a week for surface workers, to bring their minimum wage to £26, £9 for underground 
workers to bring their minimum wage to £28 a week, and £5 for face workers to 
bring their minimum wage to £35 a week.
22
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The implications of the new militancy for the NUM’s pay claim was not lost on the 
Coal Board and it was discussed by ministers and officials at several meetings during 
the summer and early autumn of 1971. Although the pay negotiations were 
ostensibly between the NUM and the NCB the latter was severely circumscribed by 
the government’s policy of holding down public sector wages in the second half of 
1971 to below 8% (the level of N-1).
23
 The NCB warned that an attempt to hold an 
increase to 8% could well precipitate an unofficial strike.
24
 Officials also noted that 
the miners’ earnings in recent years had lagged behind other industries and they had 
good productivity record, which would enable the NUM to present a strong case if 
their claim went to arbitration, and recommended that the NCB should be allowed to 
offer an average increase of 7.5%.
25
  
 
At this point it was assumed that while the miners’ leaders were likely to settle for 
arbitration, if it came to the point it would be easier to withstand a strike than in 
previous years.  Since the aim was a settlement of not more than 7.5% and the 
pressure during the negotiations would be intense, ‘the DTI should for the time being 
avoid giving the NCB any impression that an increase of more than 7 per cent (plus 
the 1 ½% under the NPLA) would be acceptable to the Government’.26 Accordingly 
ministers decided that the NCB should be restricted to 7%.
27
 According to Trend’s 
later post mortem on the dispute, at this meeting, ‘It was understood between 
Ministers privately that we had a further ½ % up our sleeves which we would be 
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ready to give away later.’28 But this knowledge was kept from Derek Ezra (Chairman 
NCB 1971-82).  
 
At the end of September Sir John Eden (Minister for Industry 1970-72) warned his 
colleagues that Ezra was unhappy at opening negotiations with such a low offer that 
it could lead to an immediate breakdown in negotiations and an official strike. Ezra 
might ask for a formal instruction not to exceed the pay norm which would 
embarrass the government by revealing a gulf between it and the NCB and mean a 
direct confrontation between the government and NUM. While a firm stand might 
secure a settlement with the miners it could also result in a national strike. Eden 
concluded that although the risks of standing firm were very great he was prepared to 
run them, but he advised that Ezra should be allowed the extra ½% margin.
29
  
 
However, ministers were reluctant to allow Ezra latitude to offer more than an initial 
7% since they feared that this would inevitably lead to a higher settlement, which 
would exceed the pay norm. The most they were prepared to do was to agree that if 
the NUM indicated they would settle at 7.5% then Ezra was authorised to accept 
their offer and clinch a settlement.
30
 As Eden pointed out explicitly a few months 
later, ‘The decision was reached in the full knowledge that the NCB would have 
preferred to aim for a settlement costing about 8% and that the limit set could mean a 
national official strike.’31  
 
The danger that circumscribing the NCB too strictly might lead to a strike was made 
absolutely clear to Heath even before the negotiations between the NCB and the 
NUM began. Eden warned him that to settle with the miners at 8% would undermine 
the government’s policy of minimising wage claims but while it might be possible to 
secure a settlement at 7% it could also lead to an uncontrolled spate of unofficial 
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strikes or even an official strike. ‘We could probably stand a complete stoppage of 
four to six weeks with difficulty but without major disruption of the economy; 
distributed stocks of coal are high. But the economic and political consequences of a 
more prolonged stoppage are incalculable and clearly serious for the coal industry.’32  
 
There is anecdotal evidence that the strike was expected in the diary of Cecil King 
(Proprietor of Mirror Group Newspapers) who lunched with Alf Robens (Chairman 
of the Coal Board 1961-71) in the aftermath of the strike.  King noted that, ‘Before 
he left the Coal Board Robens had warned big coal consumers that a strike was 
coming and urged them to stock up, which most of them did.’33 Ledger and Sallis 
noted that the coal stocks had been built up by the autumn of 1971 but that the 
danger was not thought to be such to warrant massive and uneconomic precautionary 
measures.
34
 This is corroborated by the evidence in the National Archives that 
contingency planning against the possibility of a national strike which could result in 
the loss of production for up to eight weeks had taken place within the DTI since the 
beginning of 1971.
35
 So that by early August it was noted that, ‘Coal stocks were 
now higher than in the previous autumn and, although a miners’ strike would be 
uncomfortable, if it occurred we were somewhat better placed to withstand it.’36 But 
although stocks were high at the power stations and at large industrial plants stocks 
were much lower at smaller firms and institutional buildings where there was no 
facility to store them. It was simply not practicable to create central reserve stocks 
because of the cost and time of acquiring land and laying concrete bases.
37
  
 
This contingency work by the DTI had also been fed into the CPRS Early Warning 
System. The first EWS schedule was completed in the summer of 1971 and covered 
the whole waterfront of government policy. It was so wide-ranging as to be almost 
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useless but it is interesting that under the heading of ‘Prices and industrial relations 
for the last quarter of 1971, it included, ‘Coal: possible strike, if prolonged, could 
cause widespread shortages.’38 Robin Butler later acknowledged that the EWS had 
been virtually no use at all, ‘It was very difficult to get departments to be frank about 
what their fears were. If things weren’t happening government departments crossed 
their fingers and hoped they wouldn’t.’ Nor did the mention of a possible coal strike 
in the autumn of 1971 register with him at the time.
39
 But while the possibility of a 
coal strike was not given any particular emphasis it is one more indication that the 
difficulties of achieving a pay settlement in the coal industry within the 
government’s norm were recognised by officials in the summer of 1971.  
 
By mid-October the comfortable assumption was that electricity supply would not be 
seriously affected unless a strike lasted for more than two months. Coal stocks had 
been built up away from pit heads as much as possible; the power stations held nine 
and a half weeks supply and general industry four and a half weeks. A scheme had 
been worked out for domestic consumers to reduce consumption and give priority to 
the sick and aged.
40
 At the end of December Allen reassured ministers that 
preparations for the distribution of coal had been carefully worked out and there was 
no need for an early proclamation of a state of emergency. But he also sounded a 
cautionary note,  
It is obviously difficult to predict the likely duration of a strike. The National 
Coal Board considers that the apparent unwillingness of the NUM to commit 
its substantial financial reserves to strike pay and the severe drop in income 
that would be sustained by the miners make it unlikely that the strike would 
go on longer than for about 3 weeks. But we have had no experience of a 
national strike since 1926 and we cannot be sure that this forecast would not 
prove to be too optimistic.
41
  
 
The warning was certainly there between the lines if ministers had cared to read it. 
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The early pay negotiations 
The department responsible for the coal industry was the vast new DTI and during 
the second half of 1971 Davies was preoccupied with the industrial collapse of 
several well known firms, including Rolls Royce and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. He 
left dealings with the NCB very much to the junior minister, Sir John Eden, but 
neither Davies nor Eden were very highly regarded and Cecil King’s diary recorded 
frequent lunches with senior industrialists, civil servants and influential MPs where 
this was reflected.
42
 Gossip had it that Eden had been given the post only because he 
was a nephew of Sir Anthony Eden (Prime Minister 1955-57).
43
 A close reading of 
the papers in the National Archives supports the view that Eden’s role amounted to 
little more than that of liaison officer between the NCB and the complex network of 
Cabinet committees which formulated the government’s strategy on pay in the public 
sector. 
 
General responsibility for enforcing the pay policy of N-1 lay with the Ministerial 
Steering Committee on Pay Negotiations (P), chaired by Maudling, who was now 
past the zenith of his career. Many of the critical discussions on the details of 
individual claims took place in the Ministerial Sub-Committee on Pay Negotiations 
(P (P)), chaired by Robert Carr. This group was supported by the Official Committee 
on Pay Negotiations (PO), chaired by Ronald McIntosh (Deputy Secretary, DE). By 
the autumn of 1971 there were signs that N-1 had been effective in moderating the 
increase in wages in the public sector, although not in the private sector.
44
 Terence 
Higgins (Treasury Minister 1970-72 and a member of the sub-Committee on Pay), 
recalled later, ‘I had a graph in my office which showed its success.’45 However, the 
government faced claims not only from the miners but other public sector workers; 
NHS craftsmen, gas, electricity and water workers. The miners’ claim was not 
discussed on its own merits but in terms of its effect on these other claims and the 
overall policy.  
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The pay negotiations between the NCB and the NUM did not proceed well from the 
beginning. On 12 October, as Ezra had warned, the NUM rejected the NCB’s 
opening offer of 6½% as derisory and refused to regard 7% as a basis for 
discussion.
46
 The NUM called a national delegate conference for 21 October, where 
Daly made the case for a pay increase based on the miners’ productivity record, 
recruitment needs and comparability with other industries. But he also used strong 
rhetoric to emphasise the political aspect of the strike. The NUM was 
in the vanguard, because a whole number of other Unions large and small are 
awaiting the outcome of the Miners’ struggle and the Miners’ settlement...on 
the basis of our struggle I believe it is possible to create a broad unity in the 
Trade Union movement that will smash Conservative economic policy and 
help to pave the way for the defeat of the Tory Government and return a 
Labour Government which will introduce economic policies that can receive 
the full support of the Trade Union Movement.
47
 
 
The conference voted in favour of an overtime ban from 1 November and to hold a 
ballot for a national strike, but this rhetoric masked considerable uncertainty among 
the NUM Executive which was not a monolithic body. Gormley later recorded his 
unease at  Daly’s rhetoric.48 The NUM Executive knew that coal stocks were high 
and that any refusal to do safety work would alienate public sympathy and split the 
workforce. They were also uncertain on the timing of any action; they needed to run 
down the stocks but were uncertain whether psychologically it would be better to 
take action as soon as possible or to wait until after Christmas.
49
  
 
There was a long standing rivalry that was both regional and political between Daly, 
Gormley and Mick McGahey (President of the Scottish NUM and a member of the 
Communist Party).
50
 McGahey was well known for his militant views and was under 
surveillance by the Security Service, who had tapped his telephone but found his 
impenetrable Scottish accent difficult to understand.
51
 There were also differences 
between the militants and the moderates on the NUM Executive as to what they 
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would settle for. Although the NUM claim was for increases between £5 and £9 a 
week Gormley later claimed that shortly after 12 October he warned Ezra at a social 
occasion that an increase of £3.50 a week would be enough to get a majority on the 
NUM Executive, but if his warning was not heeded it would get harder and more 
expensive to settle the dispute the longer it went on. This left Ezra considerably 
shaken.
52
  
 
There is no reason to doubt this anecdote although Gormley’s memoirs are not totally 
reliable and his role in both the 1972 and the 1974 dispute was ambivalent at certain 
key points. He had a reputation as a moderate but he had to manage militant 
members of the executive and bolster his base in the union. Ministers believed that 
he wanted to accept the NCB final offer in January but his advice was rejected by the 
NUM Executive, but Gormley made no mention of this in his memoirs.
53
 Forty years 
later additional questions over his role were raised when a former Special Branch 
undercover officer alleged that Gormley was in touch with Special Branch 
throughout this period and in the autumn of 1971 informed them there would be 
definitely be a strike.
54
 Even if true this did not necessarily constitute a betrayal of 
the union since it was entirely consistent with his efforts to convince the NCB and 
the government that the miners’ pay claim had to be taken seriously. But it was also 
consonant with his wheeler-dealer character and his desire to limit the influence of 
Daly and McGahey, as he admitted, ‘You can’t be too careful in negotiations and 
sometimes it pays to be a bit secretive, even with your own side.’55  
 
The NUM’s reputation as a moderate union had led ministers to disregard all 
warnings that a strike was likely. Even as late as 2 December, the day the ballot was 
announced, Carr maintained that support for the strike was concentrated in the 
traditionally more militant coalfields and a national strike might still be avoided, and 
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that even if it did take place the coal stocks were in any case high.
56
 This attitude was 
justified to some extent by the extremely close result of the NUM ballot, which was 
58.8% in favour of a strike with 41.2% against. This just cleared the hurdle of 55%, 
which had only been in place since July 1971 and would not have been sufficient 
under the old rules. On 9 December the NUM Executive called a national strike to 
begin on 9 January 1972. 
 
Gormley was suspicious that the NCB were constrained by the government’s 
policy.
57
  But just how tightly circumscribed Ezra was by ministers, who were fully 
aware that they were heading for a strike, is now clear from the papers in the 
National Archives. At the beginning of December Ezra had argued strongly for 
making the miners a slightly higher offer based on an increased productivity deal but, 
‘In accordance with the line previously agreed with his colleagues the Minister 
[Eden] told Mr Ezra that any settlement whether productivity based or not which 
could not be contained within the limit of about 7 ½ per cent agreed in October was 
unacceptable. Mr Ezra did not consider a settlement could be reached within that 
limit.’58 This paragraph was marked with an X for Heath’s attention by one of the 
private secretaries at No 10 who wrote, ‘I think we have to stick on X even though it 
will probably mean a strike.’ Heath’s handwritten comment on the same day was 
terse and to the point. ‘Yes’ (against ‘sticking on X’) and, ‘We must be prepared’.59 
 
Ezra held several meetings with the NUM in December and early January in which 
he made revised and slightly higher offers but ministers allowed him very little 
leeway. He proposed re-jigging the pay deal in favour of the lower paid in the hope 
that this would appeal to the NUM.
60
 The Sub-Committee on Pay (P (P)) were 
initially reluctant to allow him to make this offer but on 21 December the main Pay 
Committee (P) decided to allow him to go ahead but only on condition that the NUM 
Executive agreed to remain neutral and to ballot their members on it. If they refused 
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it was be withdrawn.
61
 On 21 December the NCB met the full NUM Executive and 
put forward a slightly revised package, which included a bonus scheme linked to 
productivity improvements, but the NUM refused to put it to their members.  
 
In early January the Coal Board made its final increased offer which was publicly 
described as 7.9% but which the Sub-Committee on Pay (P (P)) admitted in private 
might have been worth considerably more because of the element of productivity 
bonus.
62
 This was again rejected by the NUM, which also refused the NCB’s request 
that the claim should go to independent arbitration. So on ministers’ instructions, and 
much against Ezra’s wishes, the NCB withdrew the offer when the strike began and 
reverted to their original offer of 7.1%.
63
 This removal of these slightly increased 
offers was seen by the NUM as needlessly aggressive and confrontational and 
infuriated Gormley.
64
   
 
Ezra was increasingly anxious about the prospect of a strike and tried hard to avert it, 
but his advice was disregarded. He explained later, ‘It was made very clear to us that 
we had to stick to the government guidelines...whichever way we tried we couldn’t 
get anything that was remotely within the government’s guidelines.’65 Robens 
remarked later that Ezra was less resistant to ministerial directions on pay policy than 
he, Robens, had been.
66
 The papers in the National Archives show clearly that Carr, 
Davies and Heath were well aware that Ezra was inclined to settle but were 
determined to keep him in line, 
his [Ezra’s] handling of the negotiations leading up to the strike makes one 
doubt whether his heart is in negotiating a settlement that would be 
acceptable to the Government. We shall need strong nerves to come out of 
this dispute successfully but there is a great deal to play for and I am sure we 
should spare no effort to ensure that the NCB keep closely to the Government 
line. 
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A copy of this was sent to Heath, who wrote on it, ‘I agree’.67  
 
It is too simplistic to say that the government simply misjudged the mood of the 
miners. During the run-up to the strike both senior officials and ministers, including 
Heath, were well aware of the risks, but it was a gamble they thought worth taking in 
defence of the pay policy which they saw as a crucial element of their overall 
economic strategy. Barnes advised Carr that the NCB’s offer had gone to the limit 
and that any further increase would ruin the government’s wages policy. The 
government should be prepared for a strike of at least a month and probably six 
weeks but this would be well worth it, since if the strike were settled at the level of 
the NCB’s offer the next year’s wage round could be held down to 5 or 6%, and on 
the inflationary front the government could achieve 100% success. Barnes’ strong 
advice to Carr was to avoid referring the miners’ claim to any outside arbitrators, 
since the government would then lose control, and that Carr should take as little 
action as possible after the strike started. He acknowledged that there were risks to 
this strategy. ‘But however serious the risks, the stakes are so high that they are 
worth taking.’68 Carr passed this on to the Prime Minister with the covering note, ‘I 
entirely agree with this advice.’69 The handwritten question on the memo from one of 
the private secretaries was ‘Prime Minister, Do you agree with this tough line?’ 
Heath simply wrote on it, ‘Agreed’.70 
 
Heath later wrote that the government was well aware that the miners had made huge 
improvements in productivity and that the real value of their pay relative to other 
workers had fallen and that it privately regarded them as a special case from the 
start.
71
 But this is hindsight. The first recognition by the Cabinet that the miners 
might be a special case was not until 27 January.
72
 When the strike began on 9 
January the government’s main concern was the effect it would have on the current 
pay negotiations in the electricity, gas and water industries.
73
 Its overriding objective 
                                                 
67
 TNA: PRO, PREM 15/984, Barber to Davies, 18 January 1972. 
68
 Ibid., ‘Coalmining’, Barnes to Carr, 6 January 1972 
69
 Ibid., Carr to Heath, 6 January 1972. 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 350. 
72
 TNA: PRO, CAB 128/50, CM 72, 4
th
 Conclusions, Minute 4, 27 January 1972. 
73
 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3556, P P 72, 1
st
 Meeting, 12 January 1972. 
  81 
was to achieve a settlement which would not cost more than had been on offer before 
the strike began.
74
  
 
The miners’ strategy 
According to one source Gormley feared the ballot margin was too close for a 
successful strike, but although initially reluctant then became determined to win.
75
 In 
his memoirs Gormley acknowledged that the small majority for a strike made it 
imperative to keep it as short as possible.
76
 The decisive factor in the NUM’s 
eventual victory was the development of ‘picketing away from home’ or ‘flying 
picketing’ and the way in which it was applied, not just at the pits and NCB premises 
such as offices and stocking yards, but at ports and especially the power stations. 
Large numbers of miners were bussed away from their local pits to concentrate 
numbers of mass pickets at vulnerable points. It was the extent and effectiveness of 
this, rather than the actual strike, which took the government, the NCB and the 
CEGB by surprise and they were unable to come up with any action to counter it.  
 
Arthur Scargill (member of the Barnsley Area Strike Committee in the NUM’s 
Yorkshire region) always claimed that the tactic of flying picketing was developed 
by the Yorkshire area of the NUM rather than by the NUM Executive in London.
77
 
He claimed that at the beginning of the strike the national leadership ‘hadn’t a 
clue’.78 The Yorkshire area NUM was responsible for picketing across East Anglia 
and Robert Taylor has cited evidence in the NUM’s records which show that it was 
Scargill who argued that the pickets should not be spread across all the power 
stations but that mass pickets should be concentrated at vulnerable installations in 
turn.
79
 Andrew Taylor also drew on the NUM records for a detailed account of the 
picketing organised by the Yorkshire miners.
80
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But the most significant factor in the success of the picketing was the sympathetic 
co-operation of other unions. As early as October the NUM Executive had decided to 
approach the TUC and other unions for support in the event of a strike.
81
 Dorfman 
asserted that Vic Feather (General Secretary Trades Union Congress 1969-73) 
doubted whether the strike could be successful and was anxious not to jeopardise the 
moves towards tripartite discussions on the economy which were then beginning.
82
 
After the strike the Security Service reported that at an early stage the TUC refused 
the NUM’s request to convene a meeting of transport unions to discuss sympathetic 
action. Gormley openly criticised the TUC and this prompted Feather to reassure him 
that the unions would respect the miners’ picket lines.83 On 10 January, at a TUC 
special meeting to discuss the strike, where neither Daly nor Gormley were present, 
it was agreed that members of other unions would not cross official picket lines so it 
was important that the NUM should place these not only at the pits but at ‘other 
places from which coal might be collected’.84  
  
This would seem to suggest that the secondary picketing was not solely the idea of 
Scargill but came about from a combination of factors. This decision by the TUC 
General Council to issue an instruction to other unions not to cross the miners’ picket 
lines, wherever they were, proved critical. On 11 January Daly sent out an instruction 
to the area secretaries of the NUM to place pickets at ‘coal stock yard, open cast 
sites, Docks and Power Stations’.85 On 12 January the instructions to pickets stated 
that ‘The aim of the NUM picket is to prevent the movement of coal and alternative 
fuels between power stations, coal depots and other coal consumers.’ Since other 
unions had been instructed not to pass picket lines these ‘should therefore be placed 
at strategic rail and road access points to prevent the movement of coal or alternative 
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fuels’. It stressed that picketing should be peaceful and other workers not 
transporting fuel should be allowed to enter plants.
86
 Andrew Taylor described this as 
one of the most important documents in post-war British politics.
87
 This is perhaps a 
little exaggerated but it had a decisive effect on the course of the strike.  
 
This instruction was interpreted widely by other unions so TGWU lorry drivers 
refused to drive supplies through picket lines at docks and power stations.  ASLEF 
(Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen) advised its members that 
the point where a railway line entered a power station should be regarded as a 
notional picket line, so when the NUM hung a banner with, ‘Miner’s [sic] picket line, 
Don’t pass’, from the parapet of a bridge on the railway line from the port of Thames 
Haven in Essex, train drivers refused to go under it.
88
 A Thames pleasure steamer, 
the Skylark, was rigged up with posters by members of the Kent NUM which 
proclaimed it to be an NUM picket boat and a loud-hailer called on passing ships not 
to unload imported coal or oil. This enabled dockers and power workers to refuse to 
handle fuel which they could claim had passed through an official NUM picket 
line.
89
  
 
The picketing at the power stations proved to be even more effective than the NUM 
had hoped because it stopped vital supplies of lighting-up oil and hydrogen, not just 
coal, from getting into the power stations. Lighting-up oil was particularly important 
because it had to be burnt during start-up and low-load operations as well as 
continuously in those power stations which used low quality coal. Shortages of this 
commodity meant that power stations could only be used for part of each day and 
made it more difficult to conserve stocks of coal.
90
 Two weeks into the strike the 
picketing had disrupted deliveries of lighting-up oil to the power stations to such an 
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extent that Sir Stanley Brown (Chairman of the CEGB 1965-72) warned Eden that 
electricity cuts could be necessary within a week.
91
  
 
During the first weeks of the strike the picketing was sporadic and unpredictable and 
accompanied by a certain amount of violence. Pickets and lorry drivers clashed at a 
cement company depot in Kent and abuse was hurled at female office staff by pickets 
in Doncaster.
92
 The police were frequently outnumbered by large crowds of pickets,  
shoving and pushing and throwing stones at lorries which tried to enter power 
stations and in several cases the police tried to maintain order by asking the CEGB to 
stop deliveries into the power stations.
93
 Injuries were usually minor but on 3 
February one miner was killed by a lorry driving through a picket line at Keadby in 
North Yorkshire. Although Andrew Taylor has speculated that this incident may 
have been a significant factor which led to state of emergency there is no evidence in 
the National Archives that it was ever discussed in this context.
94
 The declaration of 
the state of emergency came a week later and was because rota restrictions on 
electricity could not be implemented without it. 
 
Some commentators have stressed that the violence was minimal and once the 
confrontations were over relations between the police and the pickets was generally 
good.
95
 This was certainly true compared to the violent battles between the police 
and the miners which marked the 1984 strike, but in 1972 the large numbers taking 
part in the picketing was a relatively new phenomenon which caused considerable 
consternation. Ledger and Sallis have described the reality of the picket line which 
involved ‘catcalling, stone-throwing and, above all pushing and shoving’. It was 
sometimes a ritual and sometimes more serious, the numbers of pickets fluctuated 
rapidly and confrontations could start and end quickly.
96
 Pickets also prevented 
safety maintenance from being carried out in some places which meant there was a 
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danger that pits would deteriorate to a point where they could not reopen.
97
 There 
were also rumours that Trotskyist groups were manipulating the miners.
98
 These 
aspects of the picketing bolstered ministerial suspicions that that the miners’ pay 
dispute was being used by subversive groups to undermine the government.  
 
Throughout the dispute Heath viewed the NUM Executive as split between sensible 
moderates such as Gormley and ‘hot-headed extremists such as the communist Mick 
McGahey’.99 Andrew Taylor has argued that McGahey was not prominent in the 
1972 strike and that Heath may have confused 1972 with 1974.
100
 But the records in 
the National Archives show that the Security Service had reported that McGahey had 
asked the Communist Party leader of the power workers unofficial ‘Combine’ to 
black coal already within the power stations and not just coal which was being 
brought in. Although it also made clear that Jack Jones, leader of the TGWU, had 
instructed that this should not be done.
101
 Between 1964 and 1968 the Soviet Union 
regarded Jones as an agent and he was under surveillance by the Security Service for 
a year from October 1970. It found no evidence of a Soviet connection and 
concluded that the realities of his position as leader of the largest trade union in the 
county weighed more heavily with him than any influence from the Communist 
Party.
102
 Trend asked the Security Service to keep a sharp watch on whether there 
was any subversive activity involved in the picketing.
103
 The Security Service had 
also bugged the headquarters of the Communist Party of Great Britain in King Street 
and were aware that Bert Ramelson (Industrial Organiser of the Communist Party) 
was in touch with both McGahey and Daly.
104
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The government was also nervous about student involvement in the miners’ strike.105 
This was only a few years after the student unrest and large scale demonstrations of 
the late 1960s and increasingly ill-tempered confrontations between the authorities 
and disaffected radical interest groups were increasingly common. After the 
demonstration in March 1968 by 25,000 young people against the Vietnam War in 
Grosvenor Square, which ended in scenes of chaotic violence, the Security Service 
had carried out an assessment of the threat from extremists groups which might 
oppose a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.
106
 This was fed into a study for the 
Chiefs of Staff which included a paragraph on the ‘politicising’ of the National 
Union of Students (NUS) and a note that the CP considered that eight members of 
the NUS Executive were amenable to its policies.
107
 Although some students, notably 
from Essex University, did join the picket lines in some places there is no evidence 
in the National Archives that the Security Service considered that the mass pickets 
were orchestrated by far-left groups.  
 
The picketing was successful for a number of reasons. One was that it effectively 
circumvented the law and the government was both legally and practically unable to 
counter it. There were complaints from the Coal Board, coal merchants and from 
industry that the police did not do enough to enforce the law and control the 
pickets.
108
 At the outset Gormley had been nervous that the Industrial Relations Act 
would be used against the NUM.
109
 But the parts of the Industrial Relations Act 
which dealt with ‘unfair practices’ and picketing did not come into force until 28 
February and that any breaches of the law were a matter for civil not criminal action 
and it would be up to injured parties to take legal action for damages in a civil suit.
110
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The law allowed peaceful picketing at workplaces, even at those not involved 
directly in a dispute like the power stations, i.e. ‘secondary picketing’.111 Sir Peter 
Rawlinson (Attorney General 1970-74) made it clear to the Cabinet that picketing 
was only unlawful if it broke the criminal law by using intimidation. Preventing the 
use of coal held by third parties had been interpreted by the courts to be ‘indirect’ as 
opposed to ‘direct’ action to breach a legal contract.112  
 
Intimidation was illegal (and it certainly occurred in some places) but ministers were 
also frustrated by the actions of the police whom they thought were more concerned 
to maintain public order rather than stop the picketing. But the police had a duty to 
show strict impartiality between the pickets and those who wished to work and it was 
the responsibility of the senior police officer on the ground to decide how best to deal 
with the situation.
113
 Throughout the strike the Cabinet continued to chafe against the 
limitations of the law on picketing and was deeply frustrated at being unable to find 
any way round them.
114
 Allen recalled that, ministers were, ‘pretty spineless and 
confused – it was a novel situation for them. Ministers wanted something to be done 
but they did not have a clear grasp of the law on picketing and the powers of the 
police.’115 
 
Another factor which assisted the picketing was that although the NUM did not give 
strike pay it paid the cost of overnight lodgings of pickets away from home directly 
to the landlady and also paid £2 out of pocket expenses to the pickets themselves. 
Ministers were considerably irritated that the Supplementary Benefits Commission 
decided that it would disregard £1.25 of this amount when making social security 
payments to the families of striking miners.
116
 Ministers also considered whether 
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they could stop social security benefits to the families of striking miners but again 
found the legal and political obstacles insuperable. 
 
Officials noted at the time that the miners also proved more adept than the 
government at public relations. They exercised considerable ingenuity in 
synchronising the picketing with the arrival of press, radio and TV reporters and 
cameramen.
117
 The government meanwhile was unable to publicise any of its 
successes at circumventing the pickets for fear of exacerbating the picketing, so the 
impression given by the press was one of unimpeded victories for the militants.
118
 
More critically the miners also began to win over the public to their side, including, it 
would seem, at least some Whitehall officials. One television programme, live from 
the Blaen Rhondda social club,
119
 obviously made a deep impression on one of the 
authors of the daily Coal Strike Report, who admiringly described 
the earnest and passionate speeches of the miners themselves, presenting, in 
(probably) their best clothes, an excellent image of intelligent, estimable, self-
respecting citizens, parents of teachers and other professional people, with a 
good case.
120
  
 
By contrast, on the same programme Ezra was forced to admit he did not know the 
price of a pound of butter and made what King described as ‘a disastrous 
showing’.121   
 
All the government’s preparations for a miners’ strike had focussed on building up 
the coal stocks, but the two month ban on overtime had already eroded these even 
before the actual strike began.
122
 Although the power stations still held seven weeks 
supply of coal the NUM’s picketing tactics rendered much of that unusable and its 
general strategy was to stop all movement of coal, except for priority groups such as 
hospitals, old-age pensioners and schools. It was above all the picketing at the power 
stations which proved critical; throughout the dispute many power stations still held 
supplies of coal which they were unable to burn because they lacked other vital 
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supplies and it was this which undermined their capacity to produce electricity. The 
success of the picketing took the miners themselves by surprise; even Scargill 
admitted that at first he did not understand the significance of lighting-up oil for the 
power stations.
123
 The NUM’s strategy was not fully formed at the outset but 
developed rapidly as the strike progressed and the picketing intensified so that it had 
already drastically curtailed the power stations’ ability to access the coal stocks by 10 
February and the major confrontation at Saltley.  
 
The government’s strategy 
The government’s strategy, on the other hand, developed slowly and always 
struggled to catch up with the miners. Its stance once the strike began on 9 January 
can be divided into roughly three phases. The first phase was essentially a 
continuation of its attitude before the strike began; that any pay settlement with the 
miners should be within the limits of its unofficial pay policy and cost no more than 
the NCB’s final offer in early January. During the second phase, from the end of 
January until the declaration of a state of emergency on 9 February, the government 
belatedly recognised that the miners had good grounds to be considered a special 
case and both ministers and officials were increasingly anxious about the effects of 
the picketing on power supplies, but there was no change of approach. The 
government remained reluctant to declare a state of emergency and to refer the 
dispute to any form of independent inquiry. During the third ‘emergency’ phase of 
the strike, the rapidly escalating threat to electricity supplies meant the government’s 
overriding priority switched from achieving a low pay settlement to getting the 
miners back to work at any cost. It was forced to reverse its previous position, 
declare a state of emergency and set up a court of inquiry. 
 
During the first phase of the strike the overriding aim to hold the line in defence of 
the unofficial pay norm was reinforced by the pending negotiations in the gas and 
electricity industries.
124
 Ministers were steadfastly opposed to an independent court 
of inquiry since the previous experiences with these was that they usually resulted in 
pay rises well above the employers’ initial offer, over which the government had no 
control. A local authority manual workers dispute in autumn of 1970 had been settled 
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by an independent with a pay award of 14.5%. The electricity workers dispute at the 
end of 1970, which had resulted in a state of emergency, had been settled by a court 
of inquiry led by Lord Wilberforce, which had awarded pay rises of between 15 and 
18%. The only exception had been the post office workers dispute, which was settled 
with a 9% increase when the claim was between 15 and 20%.
125
  
 
The government’s initial reaction to the miners’ strike was to distance itself from the 
dispute in public and leave its day-to-day handling to the NCB and it did little more 
than make a low key appeal to the public to conserve coal.
126
 In private ministers 
were aware that they might eventually need to act but agreed that any concessions 
should not be won too easily.
127
 The inherent difficulties in this strategy of publicly 
maintaining its distance from the dispute while privately exercising tight control over 
the NCB’s room for manoeuvre soon became apparent when Feather publicly 
exhorted Carr to intervene. Carr told the Cabinet that he felt obliged to go through 
the motions of meeting both the NCB and the NUM.
128
 But since the government 
was still determined not to change its position this only made it look ineffectual.  
 
Campbell has commented briefly on the failure of co-ordination between government 
departments.
129
 But the full extent to which responsibility for managing the different 
aspects of the strike was spread across government departments and a cumbersome 
and labyrinthine structure of inter-departmental ministerial and official committees 
has only been revealed by the files in the National Archives. (See Figure 2, p. 91). As 
the sponsoring department for the electricity and the coal industries the DTI had  
operational control of the strike. Although it set up a duty room (which operated for 
twelve hours a day from 8am to 8pm) in practice this did little more than produce a 
daily ‘Coal Strike Report’ which pulled together reports on the level of coal stocks 
and picketing incidents after they had occurred. Although the DTI at both ministerial 
and official level was in touch with both Ezra and Sir Stanley Brown neither Davies 
nor Eden played a major part in formulating the government’s strategy towards the 
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negotiations between the NCB and the NUM. The Department of Employment saw 
itself as the guardian of the government’s pay policy and the ministerial and official 
committees on pay, which were its responsibility, saw any settlement above the norm 
as likely to open the floodgates to a rush of higher claims. This formed the basis for 
the hard-line approach which Barnes and the DE took throughout the strike.  
 
Figure 2. Structure of responsibility of Cabinet Committees for handling the 
1972 miners’ strike. 
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Heath’s earlier attempts to overhaul the system for managing civil emergencies had 
foundered, so responsibility for contingency planning and the central day-to-day 
running of any civil emergency still lay with the unreconstructed Committees on 
Emergencies. The disengaged Maudling still chaired the Ministerial Committee (E) 
and Sir Philip Allen the Official Committee (EO). As Hurd put it, ‘Maudling just 
wanted to handle particular crises with the least possible bother.’130 As the strike 
progressed EO expanded and became so large and unwieldy it was forced to re-
locate. Sir Philip Allen freely admitted that the Official Committee was too big and 
‘people came just to find out what was happening’, and although he protested at this 
he did so only mildly.
131
  
 
EO got off to a shaky start and never seemed to be entirely in command; the Home 
Office had no system of its own for finding out was happening on the ground but had 
to rely on the Department of Employment and the DTI, which had regional offices. 
EO received only patchy information from the Coal Board and the police and at the 
beginning of the strike it was perturbed at press reports that the miners intended to 
prevent the use of coal stocks held at the power stations, which would mean that they 
would need to revise their estimate of the likely effects of the strike.
132
 A few days 
later ‘a clear picture of the nature, extent and effectiveness of picketing was not yet 
available’.133 This phrase was a constant refrain during the early part of the strike.  
 
Ministerial and official optimism that the coal stocks would last longer than the 
miners’ resolve appeared at first to be justified. By the end of the first week, 
according to the daily ‘Coal Strike Report’, the picketing was only sporadic; coal 
was getting through to hospitals and most schools and drivers had not boycotted the 
power stations unless pickets were actually present at the gates.
134
 But over the next 
week a more apprehensive tone, a forerunner of things to come, had crept into the 
reports, the picketing was, ‘much more widespread and continuous than expected’.135 
This was another repetitive refrain during the first weeks of the strike. By the end of 
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the second week of the strike the mood was still relatively sanguine and Trend 
reported to the Prime Minister that the coal stocks were still holding up, partly due to 
the mild weather.
136
 How out of touch this was with the effects of the picketing was 
revealed when only two days later Sir Stanley Brown warned Eden that power cuts 
would be necessary within days.
137
 By 21 January the picketing was widespread and 
7,000 workers had been laid off or were on short time.
138
  
 
The other main factor which accounted for the government’s failure to devise any  
strategy to deal with the miners was, as Hurd has argued, because two other major 
issues; Europe and Northern Ireland claimed ministers’ attention. ‘So as usual 
everything was happening at once.’139 The Treaty of Accession to join the European 
Economic Community (EEC) was signed on 22 January and it had to be ratified by 
Parliament. For the next month, as the dispute with the miners became more serious, 
the European legislation was the subject of a bitter Parliamentary battle. A 
substantial minority of Conservative backbench MPs were adamantly opposed to it 
and the Labour Opposition fought the bill line by line.
140
 Both issues came to a head 
at the same time. After three days of acrimonious debate the final crucial vote on 
Europe, which the government won only narrowly by eight votes, took place on 17 
February. Emotionally and politically Europe was Heath’s priority and he made the 
final speech in the debate the evening before the Wilberforce Inquiry reported and at 
the height of the crisis over electricity.  
 
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1971 civil unrest in Northern Ireland, which 
was still the responsibility of the Home Office, turned into violence after the 
introduction of internment without trial of terrorist suspects. On 30 January, as the 
picketing grew in intensity, thirteen unarmed civil rights marchers were shot and 
killed by the army on ‘Bloody Sunday’ in Londonderry, which led to the abolition of 
the Northern Ireland government at Stormont and the imposition of direct rule. Allen 
recalled that morning after morning both he and Maudling were attending meetings 
at No 10 on Northern Ireland. It is illustrative of Heath’s strained relationship with 
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Maudling that he could not bring himself to tell him that he was removing Northern 
Ireland from the Home Office remit and instructed Allen to inform him instead. 
Allen admitted he did not relish the handling of the miners’ strike and acknowledged 
that he should have taken it more seriously at the beginning, and it was, ‘not my 
finest hour’.141 Distracted as they were by Northern Ireland, neither Maudling nor the 
Home Office had a sufficient grip on the miners’ strike.  
 
Ministers were also anxious that unemployment was rising inexorably. Howe later 
recalled the panic-driven atmosphere during the autumn of 1971 when money was 
poured into ventures like the bankrupt UCS in order to keep unemployment down.
142
 
It was a both a political and a psychological blow for Heath and a generation of 
Conservative politicians, for whom the depression of the 1930s had been a formative 
experience, when on 20 January the unadjusted figure for unemployment had passed 
the then politically explosive figure of one million.
143
 There were rowdy scenes in 
the House of Commons and the Speaker was forced to suspend the sitting to shouts 
of ‘Heath out’.144 A few days later Heath was taunted by Wilson that he was ‘the first 
dole queue millionaire’ since Neville Chamberlain (Prime Minister 1937-40 and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer 1931-37 at the height of the slump).
145
 Prior testified 
that Heath was very shaken by this and it had a marked effect on his wish to reflate 
the economy.
146
  
 
Campbell commented that the first two months of 1972 ‘must rate as the most 
dreadful short period of concentrated stress ever endured by a British Government in 
peacetime – at any rate before the autumn of 1992’.147 But the collapse of the pound 
out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism on ‘Black Wednesday’, 16 September 1992, 
pales into insignificance beside the multiplicity of political and economic problems 
which the Heath Government faced. The combination of failing industries, rising 
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unemployment, the miners dispute, legislation on the EEC and violent unrest in 
Northern Ireland all placed an enormous strain on ministers.   
 
The government’s strategy, although it could hardly be dignified by that term, was 
flawed from the outset and it was then very slow to take on board the extent and 
effects of the picketing. As Hurd argued at the time, by staying in the background the 
government allowed the NUM a virtual monopoly of the media and failed to explain 
its case.
148
 These failings were partly because of the dominance of other issues but 
also the result of the complex structure of committees which meant that the strike 
was dealt with in a piecemeal manner. Just before the start of the strike there was an 
attempt to set up a ministerial group to deal with it but it met only once.
149
 It is not 
clear why this group was abandoned but it could be simply because it was also 
chaired by Maudling and its membership was almost identical to the Ministerial 
Committee on Emergencies. The result was that the only forum which considered the 
strike in all its aspects was the Cabinet and in January 1972 the miners’ strike was 
only one of a number of acutely difficult issues which it faced. 
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Chapter 3 A victory for violence or a special case 
 
Delay over the emergency 
Even after it recognised the seriousness of the effects of picketing on the power 
stations the government failed to act decisively and declare a state of emergency 
which would have conserved the coal stocks. Gormley thought the delay was odd 
and others have also been critical of the failure to make an early declaration.
1
 But 
historians have not analysed the reasons for the delay, which, as the files in the 
National Archives show, was due largely to the fear of exacerbating other pay 
disputes as well as antagonising the miners still further. The records also reveal that 
there were substantial differences between ministers and officials over when to 
declare a state of emergency and the decision-making process was characterised by 
hesitation and confusion. 
 
A state of emergency was legally necessary because the CEGB was under a statutory 
obligation to provide power and could not implement a system of planned electricity 
cuts on a rota basis simply to conserve its supplies of coal. Power cuts were only 
permitted under the ‘force majeure’ and ‘emergency’ provisions of the Electric 
Lighting (Clauses) Act 1899 and the Electricity Supply Regulations 1937 if the 
system was overloaded. The Electricity Boards could only be relieved of their 
statutory obligations to provide supplies and maintain voltage by the government 
declaring a state of emergency and making appropriate regulations under the 
Emergency Powers Act 1920.
2
 
 
By the last week in January, according to one official at No 10, the declaration of a 
state of emergency was a ‘live issue’.3 But for almost the next two weeks ministers 
and officials at all levels of government agonised over the timing. When the Official 
Committee (EO) met on 25 January it recognised that the strike was now likely to 
                                                 
1
 Gormley, Battered Cherub, p. 105; Jeffery and Hennessy, States of Emergency, p. 
234; Taylor, Trade Union Question, p. 198; Ledger and Sallis, Crisis Management in 
the Power Industry, p. 56. 
2
 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3486, ‘Electricity Supply: Effect of Coal Miners’ Strike and 
Need to Control Consumption: Memorandum by the Department of Trade and 
Industry’, EO 72 4, 24 January 1972.  
3
 TNA: PRO, PREM 15/984, Gregson (No 10) to Heath, 26 January 1972.  
  97 
last for between six and eight weeks, when a month earlier it had estimated it would 
not continue for more than three weeks.
4
 Even after it ended there would be a further 
two weeks before coal supplies would be back to normal. Supplies were still getting 
through to priority domestic consumers, such as the sick and elderly, and to hospitals 
but some areas were much less well placed than others. Difficulties with industrial 
coal stocks were expected within the week and the CEGB had warned the DTI that 
substantial power cuts would be needed within days. Although the level of coal 
stocks had declined it was now clear that they would have to proclaim a state of 
emergency, not because the power stations had run out of coal, but because the 
picketing had prevented other vital supplies from getting through and made it 
impossible to utilise what stocks there were.
5
  
 
The next day Allen warned the Ministerial Committee on Emergencies (E) that there 
would need to be electricity cuts within days, but ministers faced a dilemma; they 
were acutely aware that the earlier restrictions were imposed, the longer coal supplies 
would last. However they were worried that the public had as yet experienced little 
hardship as a result of the strike and were not psychologically prepared for electricity 
rationing. Moreover a state of emergency would ratchet up public and press demands 
for the government to intervene in the dispute, and this they were not ready to do.
6
 
Although the gas workers had settled their pay claim within the government’s norm 
the electricity workers had not and ministers feared that a state of emergency might 
provoke them to take industrial action which would exacerbate the power shortage.  
 
On 27 January Carr told the Cabinet that he now recognised that the miners had some 
justification for feeling their pay had lagged behind other workers. He now felt he 
would have to intervene in the dispute, but he did not want to do this before the 
negotiations with the electricity workers were settled. For the first time the Cabinet 
discussed a declaration of a state of emergency, but worried that it might be seen by 
the miners as both provocative and a sign that they were winning.
7
 Trend also 
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advised delay, ‘Emergency action now might lead the miners to think that they were 
winning and it would be better to play it cool a little longer, until actual shortages or 
substantial power cuts make it politic to change tack.’8  
 
But the weekend of the 29 and 30 January was an extremely difficult one for the 
government. Not only was it the weekend of ‘Bloody Sunday’ in Londonderry but 
the weather was very cold, electricity load shedding began and extensive picketing 
succeeded in closing Thorpe Marsh power station in Yorkshire.
9
 The CEGB issued a 
public warning that power cuts were likely during the following week and the 
position of domestic priority consumers had become serious.
10
 EO, which had now 
expanded to an unwieldy group of thirty six officials, debated at length whether it 
was more important to preserve the coal stocks or to avoid inflaming the picketing 
and finally concluded that a state of emergency should be proclaimed on Friday 4 
February to come into effect on Monday 7 February.
11
   
 
But E hesitated and held a protracted debate about the timing; while an earlier 
declaration would preserve the dwindling supply of coal ministers feared the public 
was still not prepared to accept a state of emergency as necessary. A further 
complication was that they expected the negotiations in the electricity industry to be 
settled by 7 February. Carr then planned a conciliation attempt with the miners and 
was anxious that the declaration of a state of emergency should not coincide with 
this. E was clearly divided but finally rejected EO’s advice and deferred a decision 
on the state of emergency. They decided to put their trust in the forecast of milder 
weather over the next two weeks and hoped that the NUM would become more co-
operative in ensuring that coal supplies were available to priority consumers.
12
  
 
These arguments were aired at the Cabinet meeting the following day. While the 
Cabinet minutes merely noted that the factors which governed the timing of the state 
of emergency were ‘finely balanced’13 Trend’s post mortem analysis of the dispute 
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revealed that it was John Davies who ‘voiced his concern about the risks entailed in 
deferring a proclamation and introducing electricity restrictions until the following 
week’.14 As a result of Davies’ intervention E met again that evening and in another 
agonised and protracted discussion revisited the arguments of the day before. Finally, 
fear of jeopardising the negotiations with the electricity workers and the worry that 
public opinion was not yet prepared won the day. E decided to stick to its original 
decision to reject EO’s advice for an early proclamation of a state of emergency on 4 
February.
15
  
 
By the time EO met again on Monday 7 February the supply of electricity had 
seriously deteriorated and unscheduled power cuts were likely at any time. 20,000 
workers had now been laid off because of the strike and there was an additional 
anxiety that the strike might spread to road tanker drivers.
16
 The next day E finally 
recognised that the time for delay was over and recommended that a state of 
emergency should be proclaimed to come into effect from midnight on Wednesday 9 
February. This banned the use of electricity for floodlighting and advertising but E 
rejected advice from EO that there should also be restrictions on the use of electricity 
for domestic heating, since this was too draconian for the public to accept and 
impossible to enforce in practice.
17
 By the time the state of emergency was declared 
the effects of the strike had penetrated to the heart of the Whitehall machine 
responsible for its management. As one official responsible for producing the daily 
‘Coal Strike Report’ wrote, ‘The strike has really begun to take effect now – this is 
being typed under emergency lighting and cannot be duplicated until the blackout is 
over!’18  
 
The Cabinet meeting on 27 January marked a belated recognition that the miners’ 
case was justified and an awareness that the picketing posed a real threat to the 
supply of electricity. But the dominant factor in ministers’ minds was still the effect 
the declaration of a state of emergency would have on its pay policy and it did not 
                                                 
14
 TNA: PRO, PREM 15/986, Trend to Armstrong, ‘The Emergency’, p. 4, 9 March 
1972.   
15
 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3485, E 72, 5
th
 Meeting, 3
rd
 February 1972. 
16
 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3486, EO 72, 8
th
 Meeting, 7
th
 February 1972.  
17
 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3485, E 72, 6
th
 Meeting, 8 February 1972. 
18
 TNA: PRO, PREM 15/985, ‘Coal Strike Report, 10 February 1972’. 
  100 
inaugurate any major change in strategy or in its public stance. Part of the 
explanation was that ministers were distracted by the events in Northern Ireland. As 
Robert Armstrong recalled, ‘Bloody Sunday was a major ingredient in what was 
happening. Maudling was interested in criminal policy but not much interested in 
Northern Ireland. He had to be but he wasn’t by instinct.’19  
 
However the files show that much of the responsibility for the delay lay in the 
confusion and hesitation, and the divisions between them, which marked the 
discussions of E and EO. It is clear from the records in the National Archives that 
both EO and E were very slow to understand what was happening with the picketing 
on the ground and then to react to it. EO was too large and unwieldy to move quickly 
and the split structure of the Official and the Ministerial Committees militated 
against the integration of factual knowledge and practical advice with political 
judgement and decision taking. The delay in the state of emergency meant that the 
coal stocks were eroded more rapidly than necessary and meant that during the final 
negotiations with the miners the country was on the brink of running out of 
electricity and the government had no option but to give in.   
 
Road to surrender 
Once the decision to declare a state of emergency was taken Heath appears to have 
realised the inadequacy of the Emergencies Committee since he set up an ad hoc 
Ministerial Committee on the Coal Miners’ Pay Dispute (GEN 78). It was chaired by 
Heath and its members included Maudling, Barber, Carrington, Whitelaw, Carr and 
Davies.
20
 GEN 78 finally brought together the two inter-locked issues of the miners’ 
pay claim and the deteriorating position in the electricity supply. It met every day 
during the final critical week of the strike and effectively superseded the Ministerial 
Committee on Emergencies. The record of its first meeting on the evening of 
Wednesday 9 February at No 10 reveals how sombre the tone of the discussion was 
as ministers, advised by Trend and Barnes, discussed their extremely limited options 
for dealing with the strike.
21
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By this stage picketing had immobilised a large part of the coal stocks so that 
although 6.1 million tons remained only 3.8 million tons of these were usable. This 
was a significant drop from a week earlier and the CEGB had warned that even with 
immediate action to reduce demand three quarters of the power stations could be 
brought to a virtual standstill within two weeks.
22
 The government’s preparations for 
a miners’ strike had concentrated on building up the coal stocks, it had not envisaged 
a scenario whereby coal was plentiful but inaccessible and its priority was now to 
halt the picketing and get the miners back to work. 
 
Formal negotiations between the NCB and the NUM were broken off when the strike 
began. Although Carr had felt obliged by Feather to hold separate meetings with the 
leadership of the NCB and the NUM there had been no change in the government’s 
position that any settlement must be within its pay norm.
23
 Ezra’s view, which he 
made clear to Carr, was that the NCB’s withdrawal of its final offer, at the 
government’s insistence, had hardened the NUM’s attitude and he now thought the 
dispute would have to be settled by the Department of Employment.
24
   
 
For its part the NUM made it clear that they regarded themselves as a special case 
and would not return to work without a settlement which recognised this and even if 
a court of inquiry were set up they would not agree to accept its findings in 
advance.
25
 There was some unease among trade union leaders that the NUM was not 
carrying out safety work at the pits but the TUC General Council backed the miners’ 
claim.
26
 Carr held a private meeting with Feather, which they both agreed not to give 
to the press, where Feather warned Carr that the miners were indeed a special case 
and the government would have to find a way of giving them more money because 
the longer the strike went on the harder attitudes would become.
27
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These meetings appear to have modified Carr’s attitude towards the miners’ pay 
claim since on 27 January Carr told the Cabinet that the NUM’s intransigent attitude 
reflected the feeling among many miners that they had steadily lost ground in 
comparison with other workers and that it was indeed true that the ending of piece-
work had left the face-workers with lower earnings than they had received ten years 
earlier.
28
 This was highly significant since it marked the first realisation at Cabinet 
level that the miners had valid reasons to be considered a special case, although this 
had been acknowledged by the Pay Committees in the summer of 1971.
29
  
 
But for the next ten days the government made no significant move; the electricity 
workers claim was still pending and, as Trend’s post-strike analysis recorded, 
ministers and officials were split on the best way forward.
30
 The NCB was now 
convinced that only a substantial cash offer of at least £3 a week for the lowest paid 
workers would secure a settlement but officials in both the Treasury and DE viewed 
this as a significant retreat on pay policy.
31
 Although ministers now recognised the 
miners were a special case they were divided over whether it would be better to have 
an independent court of inquiry or for the government to lead the attempt at 
conciliation. Carr refused to acknowledge that a re-balanced offer was necessarily a 
defeat for the pay policy and was personally reluctant to set up a court of inquiry.
32
    
 
On 7 February the electricity workers settled for a pay increase of 7.8%, which was 
both within the government’s norm and also removed a major threat to power 
supplies. By now the press was calling for Carr to intervene and on 9 February he 
made the NUM an offer rebalanced in favour of the lower paid face workers, which 
would last for eighteen months.
33
 But bolstered by the success of the picketing the 
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miners’ attitude had hardened and Gormley told Carr that a settlement which would 
have been possible a month ago was no longer viable, that neither a court of inquiry 
nor arbitration would by themselves solve the dispute and, ‘They needed an awful lot 
more money to settle.’34   
 
On the evening of 9 February Carr reported to the first meeting of GEN 78 that 
although the NUM were due to meet the NCB that evening there was no likelihood 
that it would lead anywhere and the miners ‘were confident of their strength and 
remained unyielding’. Carr put forward three options: to allow the talks to break 
down; to appoint a court of inquiry; or he himself could attempt to mediate in the 
dispute, which was the course he favoured. But his colleagues were unconvinced that 
conciliation by Carr would be successful and he was over-ruled. Instead they decided 
that a revised offer, an immediate cash increase of £3 a week with a minimum 
earnings guarantee of £22 a week in return for an eighteen month settlement, should 
be placed on the table that evening. Once the miners rejected it, as they certainly 
would, a court of inquiry should be set up to report as quickly as possible. The 
miners were not to be informed that a court of inquiry was in the offing but Carr 
should ‘make it known’ that the government had made the miners a generous offer so 
that their intransigence would become plain to the public. By adopting this rather 
devious stratagem of unattributable briefing to the press the government hoped that 
public sympathy for the miners would be eroded by the effect of the restrictions on 
electricity.
35
  
 
But the strategy backfired. Gormley later claimed that at this stage some members of 
the NUM Executive were in favour of settling but that he urged them not to in the 
belief they could now get more money.
36
 Gormley claimed that Carr called him in 
and asked him to return to work on the basis of the NCB offer, with the promise that 
if the court of inquiry offered more it could be backdated. But Carr had told the press 
that an increase in wages would increase the price of coal and have an adverse effect 
on the economy, which angered the Executive which agreed there would be no 
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provisional return to work.
37
 The meetings between Carr and the NUM ended in a 
complete breakdown, with the NUM’s ‘absolute minimum’ demand coming to an 
increase of 25%.
38
 Carr told Gormley he did not want to appoint a court of inquiry 
but the gap between the two sides was immense and the nation would expect him to 
act, while Gormley responded that a court of inquiry would not get his members back 
to work.
39
  
 
The same hesitations and divisions between ministers and different committees 
which had characterised the discussions over when to declare a state of emergency 
also marked the slow change in ministerial attitudes towards the miners’ pay claim. 
Before 9 February action on the miners’ pay claim was determined by its effect on 
the overall pay policy and only when other claims were settled did the government 
move to act. The offer of 9-10 February would almost certainly have averted the 
strike if it had been made earlier in October or even in December, but the miners had 
now lost a month’s pay and even a moderate like Gormley was now irritated by what 
he perceived to be the NCB’s foot-dragging attitude in the negotiations and 
determined to fight on, as he later recorded, ‘by then I was becoming a bit bloody-
minded’.40    
 
There was a fatal delay in recognising the seriousness of the strike and setting up 
adequate machinery to deal with it. GEN 78 finally brought together the inter-linked 
issues of the electricity supply and the miners’ pay claim and attempted to formulate 
a strategy to handle them together but by then it was too late. At the first meeting of 
GEN 78 the government recognised that above all it had to get the miners back to 
work but by then the miners’ intransigence was such that the pay offer was no longer 
acceptable. The government’s strategy of distancing itself from the dispute had failed 
and it was left with no other option than to set up a court of inquiry which it had 
hitherto refused to contemplate. It had now abandoned the two pillars of its strategy, 
if it could be dignified by such a term. The first meeting of GEN 78 marked the 
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moment the government surrendered in private, but it was about to be on the 
receiving end of a much more public defeat.  
 
Humiliation 
On 10 February the weaknesses of the government’s position became glaringly 
obvious to the public for the first time. The state of emergency came into effect and 
rota cuts in electricity rapidly became widespread; negotiations with the NUM broke 
down and that evening Carr announced that there would be a court of inquiry into the 
dispute, headed by Lord Wilberforce; but most dramatically of all a mass picket of 
miners, augmented by local engineering workers on a one-day strike, forced the 
police to close the Saltley Road gates of the headquarters of the West Midlands Gas 
Board in Birmingham.  
 
This was a large coke depot which supplied local industries and usually served about 
four hundred lorries a day but by the end of January, as stocks at other depots 
throughout the country dwindled, the number had risen to something approaching 
seven hundred and queues of lorries were waiting at the Saltley Road Gates. 
Picketing began on Friday 4 February and over the week-end Arthur Scargill 
organised the arrival of several hundred more men so that by Monday 7 February 
five hundred pickets had gathered at the site. By Tuesday four hundred police, under 
the control of Sir Derrick Capper (Chief Constable of Birmingham) were ranged 
against one thousand pickets. Over the next two days the number of pickets increased 
until by Thursday 10 February there were an estimated 15,000 pickets, under the 
direction of Scargill. The police were totally outnumbered and in the middle of the 
morning, fearing violence and disorder on a large scale, the Chief Constable gave the 
order to close the gates.
41
  
 
Saltley has variously been described as ‘the great set-piece confrontation’ and ‘the 
showdown’.42 Descriptions of it have dominated many accounts of the 1972 strike.43 
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Prior described it as ‘the turning point’ and he was followed in this by Ramsden.44 
But as Campbell pointed out it was probably not a turning point because the power 
situation was already desperate, and Beckett and Sandbrook have seen it as a 
symbolic triumph. But while Saltley did not affect the course of the strike directly it 
was undeniably a significant event politically with long term consequences.  
 
The Saltley Road gates to the depot were closed while the Cabinet was in progress 
and a note was brought in to inform Maudling what had happened. The Cabinet 
minutes noted that the enforced closure ‘represented a victory for violence against 
the lawful activities of the Gas Board and the coal merchants’ and ‘provided 
disturbing evidence of the ease which, by assembling large crowds, militants could 
flout the law with impunity because of the risk that attempts to enforce it would 
provoke disorder on a large scale.’45 But the official records do not convey the full 
force of what Prior later described as a very dramatic moment.
46
 Maudling wrote 
later that since the Chief Constable had assured him that the gates would only be 
closed over his dead body, he (Maudling) had rung him the next day to enquire after 
his health. Nevertheless Maudling acknowledged that the risk of violence between 
the police and the huge numbers of pickets was so great that it was the correct 
decision, and that to have sent in the army would only have made the situation worse. 
‘If they [troops] had been sent in, should they have gone in with their rifles loaded or 
unloaded? Either course could have been disastrous.’47  
 
Not all ministers or officials agreed with him and in his memoirs Heath was strongly 
critical of the police whom he described as ‘weak, and frightened of a scrap with the 
pickets’ and condemned their ‘softly, softly approach’ as ‘disastrous’. He described 
Saltley as ‘the most vivid, direct and terrifying challenge to the rule of law that I 
could ever recall emerging from within our country’.48 Sir Douglas Allen also judged 
that at Saltley the government lost control and showed a terrible weakness, he 
believed that the army should have been sent in.
49
 During the five days of mass 
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pickets seven pickets and twenty police were injured and there were seventy five 
arrests.
50
 Although the violence was minimal in comparison with the miners’ strike 
ten years later at the time it was the most violent incident in British industrial history 
for sixty years.
51
 Ministers were shaken and felt that the law had been broken so 
flagrantly that the capacity of the government and the police to enforce it had been 
called into question and were distinctly alarmed at what they perceived to be a new 
and disturbing attitude among some sections of society towards laws with which they 
disagreed.
52
 
 
But in the annals of the labour and trade union movement the ‘battle of Saltley’ 
metamorphosed into a legendary victory; it made Arthur Scargill a hero of the left 
and contributed to the unbridled hubris which led him to embark, without a ballot, on 
another miners’ strike over ten years later.53 As Andrew Taylor has pointed out this 
perspective on Saltley has owed much to the much-quoted and self-aggrandising 
interview which Scargill gave a few years later.
54
 He declared,  
we took the view we were in a class war…We were out to defeat Heath and 
Heath’s policies. Anyone who thinks otherwise was living in cloud-cuckoo 
land. We had to declare war on them and the only way you could declare war 
was to attack the vulnerable points. They were the points of energy: the 
power stations, the coal depots, the points of supply. And this is what we 
did.
55
  
 
This interview is quoted in many accounts of the 1972 strike.
56
 But it is important to 
stress that this syndicalist perspective was not shared by most miners or those of their 
leaders, such as Gormley who, however much they disliked the Heath Government’s 
policies, regarded the dispute as one about pay and conditions. Gormley always 
maintained, although not entirely accurately, that the picketing was entirely within 
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the law and rather noticeably his memoirs contained only a very brief account of 
Saltley, perhaps because it was essentially Scargill’s show.57  
 
But it was a searing experience for Conservative ministers and for one in particular it 
was, ‘a victory for violence’, and a defeat for the forces of law and order. Margaret 
Thatcher later claimed,  
For me what happened at Saltley took on no less significance than it did for 
the Left. I understood as they did that the struggle to bring trade unions 
properly within the rule of law would be decided not in the debating chamber 
of the House of Commons, nor even on the hustings, but in and around the 
pits and factories where intimidation had been allowed to prevail.
58
   
 
Her experience of dealing with the trade unions as a member of Heath’s Cabinet was 
one of the most potent factors which formed Thatcher’s determination to curtail trade 
union power and stiffened her resolve to confront and defeat the NUM. It is revealing 
that a handwritten comment on the cover of the DTI’s file on the history of the strike 
noted, ‘This file contains a valuable record of the 1972 strike and will certainly be 
required in the event of any future strikes.’59  
 
It was unquestionably a humiliation for the government and perceived to be so at the 
time.
60
 King noted in his diary, ‘Picketing is no longer peaceful and blatant 
intimidation goes unchecked.’61 But it was not a real turning point. The decision to 
appoint a court of inquiry had been taken the day before at GEN 78 and the state of 
emergency had already come into effect. Moreover, since the power stations could 
not burn coke the closure of the depot, which in any case re-opened shortly 
afterwards, had no effect on the supply of electricity which was now the critical 
factor.
62
 Saltley was the most dramatic illustration of the government’s loss of 
control over the dispute but the decision to appoint a court of inquiry was widely 
seen as an indication, by everyone including senior officials, that the government 
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was now prepared to give in to the miners.
63
 Cecil King’s diary for 14 February 
noted ‘Presumably the court of inquiry will lead to a climb-down by the Government 
and an inflationary settlement.’64 Hurd famously recorded in his diary for 11 
February, ‘The Government now wandering vainly over battlefield looking for 
someone to surrender to – and being massacred all the time.’65  
 
The state of emergency 
The state of emergency began on 10 February, the same day as the confrontation at 
Saltley, but neither the public nor industry had been psychologically prepared for the 
drastic rota cuts in electricity which followed. On 11 February Davies announced in 
the Commons that the availability of electricity was deteriorating rapidly and that 
from the following week medium sized firms would only be allowed the use of 
electricity for three days a week. The use of electricity for heating in offices, shops, 
public halls, catering establishments and premises for recreation, entertainment and 
sport would be banned and he appealed to the whole community to do all within its 
power to reduce consumption.
66
 Wilson accused the government of trying to bully its 
way through with the miners and incompetence in miscalculating both the mood of 
the miners and the state of the electricity supply.
67
  
 
The severity of these measures took both Parliament and the public by surprise.
68
 
The manner in which they were implemented also led to vociferous protests from 
industry.
69
 On 11 February rota cuts reduced electricity consumption by 20% and on 
12 February by 30%.
70
 The results were chaotic; the power cuts sent some of the 
time switches on street lights haywire so they were on all day, to the annoyance of 
the public.
71
 A number of essential industrial plants, supposedly exempt, were 
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mistakenly served with notices to cut their consumption. In some areas rota cuts were 
operated for three hours on and three hours off, instead of four hours on and eight 
hours off as had been promised, and bakers complained that this was not long enough 
to bake bread.
72
 The leaders of the CBI protested to Carr at the chaotic way in which 
the emergency regulations had been implemented.
73
  
 
This criticism was echoed in the press, which had become increasingly harsh.
74
 The 
press had been surprised by the miners’ decision to strike and initially assumed that 
they would be defeated.
75
 At first the press coverage was neutral and news reports 
were largely confined to the inside pages, but as the strike continued the tone of the 
coverage began to change and reflected a growing sympathy and increasing 
recognition that the miners did a hard, dirty and dangerous job for which they were 
poorly rewarded. As one journalist wrote, ‘People feel that miners are not just a 
special case but a special breed of men.’76 The Times described the government’s 
strategy as ‘masterly inactivity’ and criticised both the DTI and the Emergencies 
Committee for having under-rated the effectiveness of the pickets and failed to warn 
industry adequately of the emergency measures. Both Maudling and Davies were 
singled out for falling short and Heath was warned that ‘the tougher the 
government’s line the less it can afford mistakes’.77  
 
Throughout the dispute public sympathy was on the side of the miners rather than the 
employers. Gallup polls taken in January, February and March 1972 showed that 
sympathy for the miners was respectively at 55%, 57% and 52% while support for 
the employers was at 16%, 19% and 20%.
78
 This was also reflected in the private 
polling done for the Conservative Party by ORC which found that on 1 February 
54% believed the miners were justified in striking for higher wages but by 14 
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February this had increased to 66%, by then 49% believed the government were 
handling the dispute very badly and 19% fairly badly.
79
  
 
The government also faced mounting criticism from its own backbenchers. On 14 
February Davies issued a stark warning in the Commons that in two weeks time the 
electricity generating capacity would be down to 20 to 25% of normal load, which 
would only be sufficient ‘to keep essential services going…the clear inference is that 
there would be neither electricity for industry, nor for the home….there is no 
experience of handling electricity supply at these low levels. The certainty of being 
able to provide for essential services must be regarded as pretty precarious.’80 Only 
one Conservative (David Crouch MP, Canterbury) stood up in the Commons and 
openly accused the government of incompetence.
81
 But the following day Davies and 
Howe faced a meeting of Conservative backbenchers who were strongly critical of 
the government for failing to keep its own backbenchers informed. They accused 
ministers of first failing to intervene and then appearing to panic and introducing 
draconian restrictions on the use of electricity in industry with little warning.
82
 
 
By Monday 14 February the coal strike had resulted in 800,000 people, nearly 4% of 
the employed workforce, being laid off, an acute problem for the government which 
had seen unemployment reach one million a few weeks earlier. The prospect of the 
country running out of electricity was now frighteningly near because, although the 
CEGB had not run out of coal, picketing had prevented them from accessing all but 
2.6 million tons of its total of 8 million tons.
83
 The Chairman of the CEGB attended 
E Committee to warn that this was only enough for ten days average consumption; 
within a fortnight the coal generated capacity would come to an end and the CEGB 
would have to rely on oil, gas and nuclear power stations. These could only provide 
about 25% of the normal requirements and it might not be possible to maintain 
supplies for essential users such as hospitals.
84
 The miners’ strike was so effective 
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because the UK economy was hugely dependent on coal. In 1971 it was the single 
major source of energy; it was the source of 75% of the electricity supply and it also 
supplied directly over 40% of the power needed in industry and over 55% of 
domestic needs.
85
 
 
By now the effects of the strike had penetrated to the very core of the Whitehall 
machine responsible for its management. Officials were under such pressure and so 
hampered by working without electricity that they failed to produce the daily ‘Coal 
Strike Report’ for ministers between 11 and 13 February.86 On 15 February Heath 
tried without success to persuade Feather to use his influence with the NUM to call 
off the picketing. Heath had a good personal relationship with Feather, whom he 
described as ‘very civilised’ and ‘a delightful man in many ways’.87 But the official 
record cannot disguise the tone of asperity as Feather interrupted the Prime Minister 
and roundly denounced the ‘catastrophic mistakes’ made by both the Coal Board and 
the Department of the Employment, which he accused of ‘fiddling about’.88  
 
Rebuffed by Feather and bereft of a strategy ministers were forced to contemplate 
increasingly desperate measures to conserve electricity. The restrictions on the use of 
electricity had achieved a 36% saving in power stations’ consumption of coal and 
domestic consumers had responded well to appeals for economy. However some 
large industrial firms had reorganised their work so that they operated additional 
shifts on the days when their electricity was not restricted so the total consumption 
remained high. Proposals that British Summer Time should be brought in early or 
that television programmes curtailed were mooted but dismissed on the grounds that 
the inconvenience and irritation would outweigh any savings in electricity.
89
  
 
As the position deteriorated rapidly there was confusion between the multiple 
different committees on the appropriate action to take. On Wednesday GEN 78 took 
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the view that there would be no need for additional restrictions on the use of 
electricity for another week.
90
 But the following day it was forced to revise this and 
recommended that restrictions should come into force from the following Monday 21 
February. It advised Davies that when he made a statement that afternoon in the 
Commons he should ‘aim to expose the full gravity of the outlook without giving an 
impression that the normal life of the nation would come to a virtual halt unless the 
dispute with the miners were quickly resolved.’91  
 
The suspension of the normal life of the nation was in fact an entirely accurate 
description of the gravity of the situation. Davies warned that further restriction would be 
necessary the following week for industrial, commercial and domestic users, but these 
restrictions would only delay by a few days the end of coal-fired electricity when it 
would be possible ‘to meet only the essential services of the country with very little left 
available for other users – domestic or industrial’.92 Despite the warning Davies’ 
statement was low key and he emphasised that the restrictions and the appeals for 
economy had resulted in reducing consumption but in private the Cabinet were made 
aware that if the picketing continued and the electricity supply fell to between 20 to 
25% then much more draconian restrictions would have to be implemented.
93
   
 
On the brink 
Brendon Sewill memorably described the atmosphere during the 1972 emergency in 
apocalyptic terms:  
At the time many of those in positions of influence looked into the abyss and 
saw only a few days away the possibility of the country being plunged into a 
state of chaos not so very far removed from that which might prevail after a 
minor nuclear attack. If that sounds melodramatic I need only say that – with 
the prospect of the breakdown of power supplies, sewerage, communications, 
effective government and law and order – it was the analogy that was being 
used at the time.
94
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This description has been widely cited in subsequent accounts.
95
 Ledger and Sallis 
have detailed how critical the position was in the power stations and concluded that 
by the end of the strike, ‘The situation could hardly have been more grave.’96 But the 
full picture of just how close the country came to running out of electricity and how 
near the government was to deploying troops has only become clear with the release 
of the official papers.  
 
The two or three days before Wilberforce reported were the height of the crisis when 
ministers feared that the miners might refuse to accept the findings of the court of 
inquiry, or delay returning to work for several weeks while they held a ballot, with 
dire consequences for the electricity supply.
97
 The depth of alarm was clearly evident 
in a paper by the DTI which forecast that after 28 February the CEGB would be 
reduced to its oil, gas and nuclear capacity, but even this would be vulnerable to 
breakdowns and disruption from industrial action. Although it might be possible to 
safeguard supplies to vital services such as hospitals and sewage plants since these were 
scattered throughout the networks this was a major engineering operation which would 
leave other consumers without supplies for days at a time. A further problem was that if, 
despite the rota cuts, demand for electricity still exceeded supply, then block 
disconnections would be triggered automatically, which would disconnect all 
consumers, including essential services.
98
  
 
The DTI envisaged that the use of electricity would be prohibited for most ‘commercial’ 
purposes, which was much wider than the dictionary definition, and included shops and 
government, local authorities and business offices, schools, hotels, theatres, banks, law 
courts, prisons, fire stations, garages and petrol stations, doctors and dentists premises. It 
meant that banking and other financial transactions would be at a standstill, payroll 
work would be delayed or prevented, so many workers would be left without pay, 
shops would only be able to open during daylight hours, schools and all places of 
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entertainment would be forced to close.
99
 Domestic supplies of electricity would also 
need to be restricted to the bare minimum to safeguard supplies to essential services, 
which would nevertheless be subject to unavoidable power cuts and Eden proposed 
restricting the use of electricity for both domestic heating and water. It would also be 
necessary to restrict electricity to London Underground and British Rail.
100
 All these 
measures were so draconian that if they had been introduced the normal life of the 
country would certainly have ground to a halt.  
 
When E Committee met at noon on Friday 18 February, ministers were already aware 
that Wilberforce had recommended a large increase in miners’ pay, but uncertainty over 
whether the miners would accept the report and the imminent end of coal-fired 
electricity forced them to plan more drastic restrictions. They agreed that from 23 
February electricity for medium-sized industrial consumers would be further restricted to 
two, rather than three, weekdays, and there would be power cuts of three or four hours 
between 6 am and midnight. The electricity position was so grave that ministers decided 
that once coal fired-generation was at an end it would probably be necessary to use 
troops to deliver lighting-up fuel into the power stations and EO was instructed to draw 
up plans to use troops and volunteers for the much larger operation of moving the coal 
stocks.
101
  
 
Under the Emergency Powers Act 1964 (which amended the Emergency Powers Act 
of 1920) the government had the power to used the armed forces on ‘urgent work of 
national importance’ during a state of emergency, which could be declared when any 
events were likely to occur which could ‘deprive the community, or a substantial 
proportion of the community, of the essentials of life’.102 Under the provisions of 
‘Military Aid to the Civil Ministries’, in the Queen’s Regulations servicemen could 
also be used in more limited circumstances if no state of emergency existed provided 
the government did not need to requisition property or equipment.
103
 While 
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servicemen were more than happy to provide ‘military aid to the civil community’ in 
the event of natural disasters such as floods there was much less enthusiasm about 
‘military aid to the civil ministries’ – which was strike-breaking.104 General 
contingency plans for the use of servicemen in industrial disputes already existed and 
had been reviewed since the beginning of the dispute but both Whitehall officials and 
the NCB were extremely reluctant to use them as other than a last resort.
105
 This 
view was shared by Cabinet ministers.
106
  
 
But by the final week of the strike the future of the electricity supply was so 
precarious that GEN 78 asked EO to draw up contingency plans for the use of troops 
if the Wilberforce Inquiry failed to settle the dispute.
107
 This meant using either 
troops or volunteers to deliver essential supplies to the power stations and to move 
some of the immobilised stocks of coal. Using servicemen to break a strike was a 
drastic step fraught with difficulties since it would place a huge strain on the police 
who would need to be deployed to protect the troops and it would exacerbate the 
tensions which already existed between pickets and the police. There was also a risk 
that it would lead to other groups of key industrial workers, such as tanker drivers 
and railway workers, going on strike.  
 
It is clear from the records that there was considerable pressure from ministers to use 
some combination of troops and volunteers to move the coal stocks and to deliver 
lighting-up oil to the power stations and this was viewed with great unease by 
officials.
108
 In a stark note Sir Philip Allen made no attempt to conceal the deep 
misgivings of both himself and the police, or to minimise the practical difficulties 
and dangers of these operations. ‘Operation Cutter’, the largest, would need over five 
thousand servicemen from all three services to distribute the coal stocks at the pit-
heads and elsewhere, which had been immobilised by the picketing. ‘Operation 
Arbiter’ would deliver lighting-up fuel to key power stations and ‘Operation Raglan’ 
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would replace tanker drivers, who were likely to strike if troops were used in ‘Cutter’ 
or ‘Raglan’. However, the same men needed to implement Cutter were also 
earmarked for Arbiter and Raglan, so not all three operations could be implemented 
in full simultaneously.
109
  
 
Moving the coal stocks (Cutter) was a large operation which would take seven days 
to put into effect and since not enough troops held heavy goods licences it would 
mean  that inexperienced drivers would be handling large vehicles. The police would 
have to maintain access for a steady stream of lorries. ‘This would be very difficult, 
but the police believe that at the probable cost of great violence and some failures, 
they would in general be able to manage this.’ Delivering oil to the power stations 
(Arbiter) was a more limited operation which could be put into effect within three 
days. The police thought that this would be possible but again ‘a good deal of 
violence in which people could get killed would have to be accepted and there might 
be some failures’. The police were above all anxious that the servicemen should be 
unarmed and that the use of armed servicemen ‘with all that that implied, should be 
reserved as a last possible resort’.110  
 
Deployment of troops during the strike was a delicate issue which was closely 
guarded within Whitehall and Allen’s note was regarded as highly sensitive.111 All 
discussions on the subject in the large Official Committee were minuted in 
Confidential Annexes with a very restricted circulation, documents which dealt with 
the issue were labelled ‘Top Secret’ with warnings that their circulation should be 
very closely controlled.
112
 Although the Emergency Powers Act 1920 gave the 
government the power to deploy troops during strikes if it was essential for public 
safety the Ministry of Defence was particularly apprehensive about their use. It was 
concerned to limit their role and above all adamant that under no circumstances 
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could soldiers driving tankers force a picket line, they would have to be escorted 
through pickets by police.
113
  
 
Although GEN 78 discussed Allen’s note, with its stark warning, on the Wednesday 
it hesitated to take any immediate decisions on the use of troops.
114
 But Heath 
instructed Maudling to discuss it further,
115
 and by the Friday E Committee 
recognised that troops would have to be deployed the following week if there were 
no settlement.
116
 It is clear from the papers in the National Archives that the 
government was on the brink of calling on the troops to put ‘Operation Cutter’ into 
effect.
117
 Just how close the armed services were to mobilisation is underlined by an 
operational telegram sent out the same day Wilberforce reported: ‘SITUATION 
CONSIDERED VERY SERIOUS, LIKELIEHOOD EXISTS THAT OPERATION 
CUTTER WILL HAVE TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT AT VERY SHORT NOTICE 
AND BE FULLY EFFECTIVE WITHIN 48 HOURS.’118 These plans were kept 
highly secret and so troops were not put on official stand-by since this would have meant 
them becoming public knowledge. But it is clear that if the miners’ pickets were not 
removed the MoD fully expected to have to deploy servicemen and break all the usual 
rules of notice.
119
  
 
But although the press was increasingly critical none of the extremely sensitive 
discussions about the effects of the end of coal-fired electricity or the use of troops 
became public. Davies’ statements in the Commons on the implications of the end of 
coal-fired electricity generation were reported factually but with little speculation as 
to the terrible consequences.
120
 Throughout the strike there was detailed factual news 
coverage of the effects of power cuts on industry and the incidence of picketing but 
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very little on the discussions within E Committee, no mention of the deployment of 
servicemen and no evidence of leaking and briefing by ministers.  
 
Senior officials have not corroborated Sewill’s description of chaos and panic. Over 
thirty years later Robert Armstrong judged that, ‘Panic was exaggerated, but there 
was great apprehension at the consequences of running out of coal-fired 
electricity.’121 Sir Philip Allen also denied that there was panic in Whitehall but 
admitted that the atmosphere was one of ‘widespread apprehension’.122 Sewill’s 
description might be somewhat lurid but even the under-stated tone of the official 
minutes of the Cabinet, GEN 78 and the Emergencies Committees revealed the acute 
anxiety felt by ministers and officials. In the last week of the strike the press coverage 
was sombre but not alarmist, with the general expectation was that the Wilberforce 
Report would end the strike, but this confidence was not shared by ministers.
123
  
 
The settlement 
The inquiry into miners’ pay was chaired by Lord Wilberforce, with two independent 
adjudicators, and its terms of reference were ‘to inquire into the causes and 
circumstances of the present dispute between the National Coal Board and members 
of the National Union of Mineworkers and to report’.124 Ministers’ forebodings about 
a court of inquiry proved to be justified since Wilberforce held two days of public 
hearings on 15 and 16 February which the NUM used to highlight the level of 
miners’ pay and their poor conditions to great effect.125 The final report was sent to 
Carr late on the evening of Thursday 17 February at the same time as Heath was 
making the final speech on the second reading of the European Communities Bill 
which ratified entry into the EEC, which the government won by a majority of only 
eight votes.
126
 The Wilberforce Report contained a comprehensive survey of the 
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recent history of the rundown in the mining industry and the arduous conditions of 
work and pay which the miners endured, and concluded that it was for ‘reasons 
which are exceptional and do not apply in industry generally that we believe the 
mine workers at this particular time to have a just case for special treatment’.127 It 
recommended pay increases of between £4.50 and £6 a week, around 22%, this was 
even more than ministers had feared and according to Robert Armstrong their 
reaction was one of dismay.
128
  
 
When ministers and officials of GEN 78 met at 9 am on Friday 18 February they 
faced the prospect of an end to coal-fired electricity and had no other option than to 
accept the Report, and to stress that Wilberforce had declared the miners were a 
special case.
129
 But generous as the settlement was, there was still no guarantee that 
the NUM would accept it. The NUM was presented with the Wilberforce Report at 
the Department of Employment in St James’s Square, where, according to the 
official records Gormley told Carr that the prospects of a settlement were good and 
he would recommend that the NUM Executive called off picketing that night.
130
 But 
although Gormley recorded his satisfaction that the Report was a total vindication of 
the NUM’s arguments he made no mention of this point in his memoirs.131 The 
miners had now been on strike for six weeks and there was a group on the NUM 
Executive which was unwilling to settle for anything less than the full claim and it 
voted to reject the Report and ask for a further increase of £1 a week.
132
  
 
Gormley later claimed that he knew there was no chance of a further cash increase, 
and that the only way out of the impasse was to ask for an improvement in a range of 
fringe benefits: ‘We made out a shopping list. It was as long as your arm.’133 The 
NCB was prepared to agree to most of these but the hardliners on the NUM 
Executive still wanted to hold out for more cash. Gormley later claimed that he could 
have engineered acceptance at this point if he had put it to the vote: 
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But to myself I said, “To hell with them. They’ve made us suffer for six 
weeks, now they’re going to suffer. I’m going to go for every last drop I can 
wring from them because I’m going to teach them a lesson, a lesson that 
they’ll have to start heeding advice in future”.134  
 
But Gormley consistently over-estimated his ability to persuade his Executive and it 
is probable that he was putting a retrospective gloss on his position. That was 
certainly Heath’s view who claimed that ‘Gormley himself was clearly 
uncomfortable about the tactics that his union had used, but lurking behind him were 
the real destroyers, McGahey and Scargill.’135   
 
Carr telephoned Heath late Friday afternoon to tell him that the NUM Executive had 
rejected the Wilberforce Report and asked Heath to meet them later that evening.
136
 
The Cabinet met at 8pm, by candlelight, according to Prior, because of a power 
cut.
137
 Carr came late from the negotiations with the NUM Executive and reported 
that Gormley, who had initially recommended acceptance of Wilberforce, was now 
asking for a further £1 a week, which the NCB were unwilling to grant. Feather had 
advised the NUM Executive that their position was unreasonable and they should put 
Wilberforce to a ballot even if they could not recommend it, but they had refused to 
do so, but they were however willing to meet Heath that evening.
138
 
 
The Cabinet now faced an acute dilemma; if it stood firm on the Wilberforce 
recommendations and the NUM remained adamant the implications were stark. 
Although servicemen and volunteers could be used to move the coal stocks these 
would run out within a few weeks and the government would then be unable to 
sustain the normal life of the country unless it surrendered to the miners. But if the 
government offered the NUM a further cash increase this ‘would present the militant 
leadership of the miners with so clear a victory that no democratically constituted 
Government could hope to sustain their authority for long without seeking a fresh 
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mandate from a General Election. To fight and to lose would be bad enough; not to 
fight at all would be even worse.’139 
 
Although the Cabinet minutes did not attribute particular views to named ministers 
Robert Armstrong’s Note for the Record on the events of the evening revealed the 
somewhat surprising fault-line of the division, which interestingly marked the basis 
of future political alliances. Sir Alec Douglas-Home (Foreign Secretary), Lord 
Hailsham, Barber, Geoffrey Rippon (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), 
Whitelaw, Prior and Thatcher were in favour of standing firm behind Wilberforce, on 
the grounds that the possible consequences were less serious than the implications of 
surrender. While Maudling, Keith Joseph, (Secretary of State for Social Services), 
Lord Jellicoe (Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the Lords), Davies and Peter Thomas 
(Wales), were unwilling ‘to take on a fight which might well end only in surrender to 
the miners, a humiliating defeat for the Government and the complete collapse of its 
authority’.140  
 
The hawks were in a small majority but it is clear that the Cabinet was fundamentally 
divided so it was agreed that Heath would try to persuade the NUM to stop the 
picketing immediately and to ballot their members on Wilberforce, and if this failed 
ministers should meet again.
141
 This meeting, with its hint that a general election 
would be necessary to restore the government’s authority, uncannily prefigured the 
Cabinet meeting which was to take place nearly two years later on 5 February 1974, 
in almost exactly the same circumstances, but with a different outcome.
142
  
 
The sequence of meetings through the late evening in No 10 which eventually settled 
the miners’ dispute had a distinct element of farce and were minutely chronicled by 
Robert Armstrong. The NCB members and the NUM Executive were corralled in 
different rooms, with Feather and Campbell Adamson in yet another room. The 
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Cabinet ended at 9.15pm and, after a short meeting with Feather and Campbell 
Adamson, Heath and Carr then met the NUM negotiating team led by Gormley and 
Daly for an hour.
143
 At this meeting Heath argued that Wilberforce was fair and 
generous and had gone well beyond the NCB offer and he pleaded with the NUM to 
recognise their responsibilities not only to their members but to other workers and 
the country. But the NUM still threatened to reject Wilberforce because it did not 
give them the £7 increase for underground workers and £6 for surface workers.
144
 
 
The NUM negotiating team then resumed talks with the NCB while Heath, Carr and 
a few ministers and officials waited for the outcome. At 12.15 am the NUM 
negotiators rejoined their delegation and it was at this point that one of the NCB team 
told an official that the NUM had been convinced by Heath that there was no 
prospect of any further increase in pay and had concentrated on other benefits. But at 
12.45 am, to great consternation, it was noticed that the NUM Executive were 
leaving No 10 by the front door, but it then transpired that this was not because the 
talks had broken down but because they had voted to accept an agreement. Heath and 
Carr then met the NCB and NUM negotiating teams for a meeting which lasted only 
15 minutes where Gormley announced that they had done a deal with the NCB, 
based on the Wilberforce cash settlement plus a range of fringe benefits which 
included changes to bonus payments, when adult rates would be paid and an extra 
week’s holiday. The NUM Executive had by a majority agreed to recommend it to 
the membership.
145
   
 
GEN 78 met for the last time at noon on Saturday 19 February in No 10 and was 
widened to include all Cabinet ministers within reach of London. Although Maudling 
tabled warm congratulations for the way in which Heath had stood firm during the 
final hours of the negotiations ministers acknowledged that they had failed to 
appreciate the miners were a special case and that they had been ill-prepared for the 
shortages of electricity.
146
 The miners called off the picketing immediately so the 
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power stations were able to access NCB coal stocks and imported coal and the 
electricity position eased. The NUM Executive recommended acceptance of the 
Wilberforce Report in the ballot of its members, which voted overwhelmingly in 
favour of the settlement (over 95%), but this took several days so the miners did not 
return to work until 28 February. The rota cuts of electricity finally ended on 1 
March and the state of emergency was lifted on 8 March. 
 
Aftermath and reaction 
The post mortems on the emergency began immediately. Two days after the NUM 
Executive had agreed to recommend acceptance of the Wilberforce Report 
Armstrong wrote to Trend: ‘The Prime Minister finds it hard to believe that the way 
in which the miners’ dispute developed was unplanned and he has asked for the 
preparation of an analysis to show who was responsible for the organisation of this 
episode.’ This was to include who was responsible for the decision to try to bring 
power supplies to a standstill and who planned and organised the programme of 
picketing.
147
 Heath also requested an urgent analysis of how the dispute had been 
managed by the Ministerial Committees Emergencies and on Pay.
148
  
 
Heath’s request elicited a long and extremely detailed post mortem on the strike from 
Trend, which was mainly defensive in tone.
149
 Trend admitted that although the 
possibility of a miners’ strike had been discussed at a departmental and official level 
in the summer of 1971, ‘Ministers were not sufficiently warned – and did not 
themselves sufficiently appreciate – the “moral” strength of the miners’ claim until very 
late.’ But he also pointed out that since ministers’ overriding imperative was to maintain 
the pay policy it was doubtful that, even if they had focussed earlier on the details of 
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the miners’ pay claim, whether they would have been willing to breach the unofficial 
ceiling of 8%.
150
  
 
Trend acknowledged that ministers had been divided over whether to have an 
independent inquiry and as a result the decision to set up a court of inquiry had been 
left until very late and there was considerable force in the criticism that it should 
have been done earlier.
151
 Trend defended the delay in the proclamation of a state of 
emergency on the grounds that it was of paramount importance not to risk industrial 
action by the electricity workers. While he admitted that the government was taken 
by surprise by the speed at which coal-fired power stations approached a halt he 
pointed out that the success of the pickets ‘was as much of a surprise to the pickets 
themselves as to everybody else’.152 He defended the absence of any plans to deal 
with the end of coal-fired electricity on the grounds that ‘nobody supposed that we 
should have to face strike action for as long as this’.153 
 
Trend’s overall conclusion was that ‘nobody foresaw the scale on which the 
emergency would develop but that their failure in this respect was not due to any 
particular deficiency in their procedures for discussion and planning but was the 
result of the unforeseen – and unforeseeable – course which the strike took as a result 
of the miners’ intransigence in maintaining their claim far beyond the point at which 
they might have been expected to compromise.’154 Trend’s document is a 
bureaucratic masterpiece in that it combined clarity of analysis with evasion of 
responsibility. It achieved the difficult feat of simultaneously identifying several 
points of serious failure in the handling of the miners’ pay dispute while exonerating 
those who took the decisions.  
 
Allen responded to Heath’s request for an analysis of the strike and enclosed material 
from the Security Service.
155
 The Security Service judged that before the strike began 
the NUM had made no preparations for picketing which had developed on an ad hoc 
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basis and was initially chaotic. The NUM Executive were surprised by the solidarity 
shown by the rank and file after the close ballot result and their considered verdict 
was that, ‘It could not be maintained that the strike has been under Communist 
control.’156 A second background note provided a detailed analysis of subversive 
influences within  the NUM. It described the NUM Executive of twenty eight as 
including six members of the Communist Party (CP) and two sympathisers and a 
group of anti-communists who took their lead from Gormley. Before the strike began 
the CP element was concerned there would be a sell-out by Gormley. Once the strike 
began the CP threw its weight behind it, since they thought it a way of extending 
their influence and ultimately bringing down the government, which was their prime 
political objective. CP officials unconnected with the NUM had played a significant 
part in organising the mass picketing at Saltley and throughout the dispute McGahey 
had been in touch with Bert Ramelson. But it nevertheless concluded that the NUM 
Executive Committee as a whole had not been decisively influenced by the 
Communist Party and that ‘traditional moderates in the NUM Executive and among 
the rank and file have adopted as militant a stand as the Communists. The apparent 
unanimity of the Executive and the solidarity of the rank and file have to a large 
degree been created by the progress of the dispute itself.’157  
 
But Heath remained deeply suspicious that there was a political element to the 
dispute and wrote on Allen’s note, ‘I don’t find this very convincing. What are Sir 
Denis Barnes’ comments on this? We must discuss.’158 Barnes judgement was that 
the eight CP members on the NUM Executive constituted a substantial minority of 
‘wreckers’ who were prepared to use industrial power to damage the political system. 
This, coupled with the fact that every member of the Executive was anti-government 
and the Labour Party’s attitude gave it the quality of a political strike; ‘the influence 
of the extremists was very much in tune with the mood of the Executive and was 
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helped by the political atmosphere...what developed was a near wrecking consensus 
rather than any planned conspiracy.’159  
 
Barnes also commented that the NUM were very dissatisfied with Feather’s early 
reluctance to encourage sympathetic action from other unions and this led Feather to 
give an assurance that other unions would respect miners’ picket lines. Barnes judged 
that Feather had done this to get himself out of a difficult position without foreseeing 
the consequences. But Barnes regarded the strike as an example of the increased 
militancy of a minority of workers and the greater effectiveness of the weapons they 
chose.
160
 Heath’s handwritten comment, ‘This adds something’ appears to express 
satisfaction that Barnes’ note reflected his own suspicions.161 
 
Heath’s request for an analysis of the strike was sent to the Security Service and on 
16 March Furnival Jones sent Trend a note ‘Subversion in the UK – 1972’, the tone 
of which was resolutely unalarmist. It judged that the CP had failed to attract the 
electorate and although it was pursuing political power by infiltrating the trade 
unions it was weakened by internal dissension. The CP did its best to exploit disputes 
but did not control any union or exercise a decisive influence over the TUC, but the 
note acknowledged that, ‘It sees an opportunity in current disputes for forcing a 
General Election, its principal aim since June 1970.’162 It was precisely this point 
which worried Heath and his ministers. 
 
The Security Service judgement that the main driving force of the strike was not 
political was also shared by the TUC. In a note which shed an interesting light on its 
attitude Len Murray (Assistant General Secretary TUC 1969-73) remarked on the 
relative passivity of other unions, whose attitude had not been marked by great 
enthusiasm: ‘I at least detected little fervour, nor much serious attachment to the 
view that the miners were blasting a hole through which others could pour. Nor was 
there much disposition on the part of other unions to escalate the strike, even for 
political purposes.’ A decisive factor was ‘The Government’s carelessness – in 
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assessing the determination of the miners, in over-estimating the capacity of the 
electricity supply industry, in wrongly assessing the effect of public attitudes.’163  
 
But Heath and most of his colleagues seized on such evidence that there was of 
subversive activity and Barnes’ note demonstrated that the mood of antagonism and 
suspicion existed among officials as well as ministers. The only minister who did not 
share this perspective was Maudling who disagreed with most of his colleagues that 
industrial disputes could be blamed on subversive activity. He read the Subinds 
reports
164
 with much interest and thought that those, particularly on the railways 
dispute, supported his point of view.
165
 Phillips has argued strongly that the 1972 
strike was not ‘a victory for violence’ and that it should be viewed as a 
straightforward industrial dispute to arrest decline in real wages and gain security in 
an industry in structural decline.
166
 But the mass pickets at Saltley and the Longannet 
power station in South East Scotland, which he described in detail, were a new 
phenomenon which shook Conservative ministers and became inextricably linked in 
their minds with the militant rhetoric of class war employed by NUM officials such 
as McGahey. Although the main driving cause of the strike was pay it took place 
against the background of the bitter conflict over the Industrial Relations Act which 
gave it a political dimension.  
 
The miners’ victory in 1972 bolstered their self-confidence for the second strike in 
1974, sharpened antagonism between government and the unions and contributed to 
the growth of industrial militancy throughout the decade. This was acknowledged 
implicitly by Gormley, who, although he rejoiced at a great victory which restored 
the miners to a position near the top of the industrial wages league, later expressed 
doubts about some of its consequences.  
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But I’m not sure whether the strike performed a good or a bad service. It was 
good that it united the lads and showed them the strength which unity could 
bring. On the other had it meant that it led to an attitude of mind that people 
thought immediately of strike action when they didn’t get what they 
wanted.
167
  
 
In a television broadcast on 27 February Heath maintained that it was not the case the 
miners had won, but that everyone had lost.
168
 But this outlook was not shared even 
by some of his closest advisers, Hurd was quite clear, both then and later, that the 
outcome of the miners’ strike was disastrous.169 ‘I could not understand why 
ministers set about disguising and trying to forget what had happened, which was a 
public and disastrous defeat.’170 But whatever their public position many of Heath’s 
most loyal ministers admitted later that they knew that they had suffered an 
ignominious defeat, as Carr acknowledged later, ‘the court of inquiry blew us to 
pieces’.171  
 
Although historians have stressed the build-up of resentment among the miners at the 
rundown of the industry and the erosion of their pay the 1972 strike was not 
inevitable. The ballot result in favour was very narrow and it could not have taken 
place without the change to Rule 43. The strike could have been avoided if the 
government had paid more heed to the warning signals in the summer and autumn of 
1971 and been less rigid in adhering to its pay norm. As Gormley argued, a 
settlement even marginally above the 8% norm would probably have been acceptable 
to the NUM even when the strike began in January.
172
 As the papers in the archive 
have shown, Heath and the ministers most directly concerned with the issue were 
aware that a miners’ strike was a real possibility from the summer of 1971, the 
government was not taken by surprise by the strike, rather it was prepared to confront 
the miners rather than breach its pay guidelines.  
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Heath and his ministers paid too little attention to the dispute in its early days, GEN 
78 was not set up until very late and even then it failed to come up with any strategy. 
The main explanation for this lay in the political context of the autumn of 1971 and 
the first two months of 1972. The miners’ victory was not inevitable but once the 
strike began it developed a momentum of its own as the NUM’s attitude hardened 
and the government made a series of mistakes. An earlier declaration of a state of 
emergency would have conserved the coal stocks already within the power stations 
and prolonged endurance for a while but it is uncertain that it would have affected 
the final outcome. However, the delay coupled with the government’s failure to 
explain its reasoning undermined its authority and damaged its reputation. The 
decisive factor in the miners’ victory was the effectiveness of the picketing of the 
power stations which surprised the miners as well as the government. Some 
historians have speculated that a tougher attitude by the government towards the 
picketing might have defeated the strike.
173
 But if the government had attempted to 
use servicemen to force deliveries through to the power stations it would have led to 
extremely ugly confrontations which ministers were not prepared to contemplate 
except as a last resort.  
 
Jeffery and Hennessy questioned to what extent the Emergencies Committee was at 
fault: 
Conventional wisdom in Whitehall has it that the central government’s 
handling of the 1972 miners’ strike was a shambles, that the old Emergencies 
Organisation, as developed in the late 1940s, had rusted throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s, and finally fell apart when required to tackle the economic and 
physical consequences of Mr Scargill. This view is directly challenged by 
some of the excellent quality officials who were involved in it throughout the 
period. The ‘shambles’ story, they claim, was put about by the Cabinet 
Office, who took over responsibility for civil emergency planning in the 
aftermath of the 1972 crisis, in order to justify their imperialism at the 
expense of the Home Office. The real reason for the move, according to this 
school of thought, was the difficult relationship between the Prime Minister 
and his Home Secretary Reginald Maudling. Heath wanted to bypass a 
colleague in whom he had lost confidence.
174
 
 
But the evidence in the National Archives has demonstrated that the Whitehall 
structure for handling civil emergencies was deeply flawed. There is no certainty that 
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the existence of the central project team, which Heath had wanted, would have led to 
a different final outcome but it might well have proved more adept than the 
Emergencies Committees in devising and implementing a strategy to deal with the 
coal and electricity shortages. Trend must bear some of the blame for this since he 
had opposed any structural reform in the autumn of 1970 but Heath was also 
responsible for not pushing it through.  
 
The strike marked a seminal moment in British politics. It meant that ministers were 
determined not to give in during the next dispute with the miners. As Prior put it, 
‘We vowed that never again would we, “do a Wilberforce”.’175 But the government’s 
authority had already been fatally compromised and the handling of the miners’ 
strike was roundly condemned by sections of the Conservative Party. After one 
meeting Ramsden judged that ‘Few heavier brickbats can ever have been thrown at a 
Tory Government by a national representative body of its supporters.’176 As 
Carrington acknowledged, ‘The most devoted of our supporters thought the 
Government had bought their way out of trouble by giving in to industrial muscle – a 
circumstance which undoubtedly influenced us two years later when further trouble 
in the mines arose.’177 Hurd also judged that it was a decisive episode,  
After that, although there were moments when the government seemed to 
seize the initiative, from then on the Furies were at it, and it was being 
knocked about and on the defensive. There were occasional moments when it 
seemed to regain the initiative, but yes, I do regard it as a turning point.
178
  
 
The 1972 miners’ strike can be summed up as both a failure of political strategy and 
government machinery from which neither ministers nor officials emerged with any 
credit. It was unquestionably a searing experience for ministers, and a humiliating 
defeat for the Heath government which undermined its authority. It led directly to 
major changes in the government machinery for dealing with civil emergencies.  
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Chapter 4  Bayonets and power stations 
 
The establishment of the Civil Contingencies Unit 
The experience of the mass picketing during the 1972 miners’ strike, which had 
placed the electricity supply in such a perilous position, had a profound effect within 
Whitehall. It spurred ministers and officials into efforts in a number of directions to 
prevent a repetition of the crisis. This chapter will cover several of these aspects; the 
establishment of the CCU and the strengthening of the machinery for dealing with 
civil emergencies, attempts to guard against subversion in the trade unions and 
anticipation of the threat to oil supplies in the Middle East. 
 
To date very little has been written about the reform of contingency planning after 
1972. The existence of the Civil Contingencies Unit was first revealed publicly by 
Fay and Young in 1976 and followed up by Peter Hennessy.
1
 But its existence was 
kept very secret within Whitehall and not formally acknowledged until the mid-
1980s. The first account of the early work of the CCU and the review of contingency 
planning was by Jeffery and Hennessy.
2
 References to it by all other authors have 
been based on this, although Davis has a condensed account which refers briefly to 
some of the recently released government files.
3
 This is the first detailed study of the 
establishment of the CCU and the major review of contingency planning to make 
extensive use of the files in the National Archives which shed new light on its 
development.  
After the débâcle of the miners’ strike Heath was more than ever convinced that a 
thorough reform of the system for dealing with civil emergencies was absolutely 
necessary and Trend, who had formerly defended the status quo, now conceded its 
shortcomings. In a long post-mortem on the strike, which was written only a few 
days after the Wilberforce settlement, Trend admitted that the Emergencies 
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Organisation had operated at too low a level of competence, information had been 
too slow to reach the top and it had taken too long for decisions to be executed.
4
  
Trend now acknowledged the need for an improved system of contingency planning 
for both natural disasters and industrial emergencies and for an organisation which 
could deal with a crisis once it developed. He proposed that a senior minister should 
take charge of preparations for dealing with any emergency and then ensure that all 
other ministers were kept informed as a crisis developed. Since this minister would 
need a support staff, Trend suggested that this should be based in the Whitehall 
Situation Centre, which was then under construction as the base to manage the 
transition to nuclear war. The communications systems and the planning personnel in 
Whitehall departments were much the same for both war and civil emergencies 
Trend proposed that plans for dealing with civil emergencies should now be 
rehearsed in much the same way that war plans were.
5
  
But Trend still emphasised that the responsibility for managing any emergency was 
primarily that of the department concerned and that it would be constitutionally 
improper to give executive responsibility to a centralised unit. He still advocated the 
retention of something similar to the Emergencies Organisation although he thought 
it needed to operate at a higher level and in a more compact form. He was also 
anxious that the minister responsible for emergency planning should be in the 
Commons and not the Lords. He was also sensitive that it would be a perceived 
humiliation for the Home Secretary if he lost responsibility for this area.
6
 
 
There was still a considerable amount of foot-dragging in Whitehall since although 
Permanent Secretaries recognised the need for greater centralisation of crisis 
management they disagreed over its form. Barnes wanted any new unit to be situated 
within the Department of Employment, while Allen was still anxious for the Home 
Office to retain its responsibility for dealing with civil emergencies.
7
 By the end of 
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April Heath had clearly become impatient with the lack of progress as the 
peremptory tone of a weekend telex from Chequers to Robert Armstrong showed.  
I asked the Secretary of the Cabinet to go ahead with setting up one command 
post for the whole of Whitehall. I emphasised that this was a matter of the 
greatest urgency. I have not yet received any specific proposals for this 
organisation or for the staffing of it. Kindly inquire and report. I cannot over-
emphasise the importance which I attach to this project.
8
  
 
In reply, Armstrong reassured Heath that the new Emergency Room would be ready 
by July.
9
 But Heath was not placated and wrote on the note,  
Yes, but what I want immediately is a CP [command post] working out the 
overall strategy for dealing with crises in addition to dealing with immediate 
ones. This requires a full staff and cannot wait until July. Discuss urgently.
10
  
 
He stressed that he wanted an immediate investigation into every emergency which 
could face the country on the civil side together with full and detailed proposals as to 
how to deal with it:  
I must have immediate action on this. Even if the present threats do not all 
materialise, we may well be threatened with a more serious situation from 
next autumn onwards.
11
  
 
But if Trend moved too slowly there were others who were prepared to act decisively 
and grasp the nettle of reform. Heath’s anticipation of further industrial trouble and 
the need for an organisation to counter it was made more acute by the railway dispute 
which began in April and lasted for two months. When the railway unions began a 
work-to-rule in support of a 16% pay claim the government applied to the NIRC for 
a cooling-off order. This was granted, the unions complied but after it had expired 
they reimposed the work-to-rule and overtime ban. The government then applied to 
the NIRC for an order for a compulsory strike ballot. The unions opposed this but 
eventually agreed, however the result was 80% in favour of industrial action and the 
government allowed British Rail to settle at around 13%. The dispute made the 
government look ridiculous and undermined the compulsory ballot provisions of the 
Industrial Relations Act which was never used again.
12
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Heath had now lost all confidence in Maudling and both the Emergencies 
Committees and he established two ad hoc committees to deal with the railways 
dispute; GEN 94, a ministerial group, which he chaired, to deal with overall 
strategy
13
 and GEN 96, a committee of officials.
14
 GEN 96 was chaired by Lord 
Jellicoe (Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal) with John Hunt (Second 
Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office) as his deputy. Jellicoe was a veteran of Special 
Boat Squadron of the Royal Marines during the Second World War.
15
 Heath had 
entrusted the task of overseeing the miners’ return to work, the resumption of full 
production in the pits and getting power supplies through to industry to him, rather 
than to John Davies. Jellicoe threw himself into this role with relish and sent Heath 
reports on a daily basis and his robust handling of this and the favourable publicity 
he generated greatly impressed Heath.
16
 
 
During the railways dispute GEN 96 met daily and was in direct communication with 
the two emergency rooms run by the Department of the Environment and the 
Department of Trade and Industry. Daily situation reports were produced by the 
departments and supplied directly to each member of the ministerial group, GEN 94. 
GEN 96 also ensured that ministers received oral briefings on recent developments.
17
 
GEN 96’s work also included keeping abreast of the wider implications of the 
dispute such as its effects on the transport of food and industrial raw materials, as 
well as the attitudes of the trade union leaders and members.
18
 It was composed of 
approximately half a dozen officials from the departments most affected and so it 
was both more senior and less unwieldy than the Official Emergencies Committee. 
There was a much tighter system for ensuring that ministers were rapidly made 
aware of all significant events on the ground as rapidly as possible.  
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The linchpin between the two committees, was Jellicoe, who chaired GEN 96 and 
was also a member of both GEN 94 and the Cabinet. The other key figure was John 
Hunt, the main driving force in Whitehall behind the reform of contingency 
planning. In the spring and summer of 1972 Hunt used GEN 96 to forge a crucial 
alliance with Jellicoe which became the motor for the overall reform of the system 
for contingency planning.  Hunt’s thinking was already clear by the end of April 
when he commented that the role of GEN 96 
has brought home to most Departments (if not to all Ministers) the 
desirability both of putting the Cabinet Office in the lead and of our 
organising ourselves to do the work properly. We now want to strike while 
the iron is hot and to establish more satisfactory standing arrangements.
19
 
 
Hunt took forward the ideas in Heath’s Chequers telex and within a few days drew 
up proposals for a new committee for strategic planning based in the Cabinet Office. 
This would be composed of senior officials who would also be responsible for 
contingency planning within their own departments. It would be strategic in 
character and would identify the vulnerable points in the economy where industrial 
disputes had the potential to develop into emergencies. During an actual emergency 
this committee, chaired either by a Cabinet Office official or by the Lord Privy Seal 
would report to a small group of ministers chaired by Heath. These two committees 
would be serviced by a small ‘command post’ within the Cabinet Office and based in 
the new Situation Centre. He also proposed that there should be something along the 
lines of the War Book, for civil emergencies.
20
  
Hunt’s memo was an incisive analysis of the weaknesses of the past system and the 
need to both overhaul the overall machinery for contingency planning and identify 
potentially dangerous problems in advance. His stated aim was to strengthen 
strategic planning, and ensure more effective management of a crisis without 
removing formal executive responsibility from the department concerned. But his 
proposals, which included the abolition of the Emergencies Committees, were more 
radical than Trend’s and greatly enhanced the role of the Cabinet Office. He 
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acknowledged that the Home Office was reluctant to lose its traditional role in this 
area and there was also some resentment about Jellicoe straying into other ministers’ 
areas.  
Heath seized on Hunt’s proposals with alacrity and on the same evening that he 
received the note held a meeting with Hunt and Jellicoe. Jellicoe endorsed Hunt’s 
thinking and emphasised the need for officials of high calibre. Hunt’s proposals were 
also warmly received by Heath, who stressed that the officials in the ‘command post’ 
should have a strategic and not just a tactical role. It was also essential not to wait 
until the Whitehall Situation Centre was completed in July since the government was 
likely to face industrial troubles well before then and the new machinery would be 
invaluable in dealing with them. Heath hoped that because the Situation Centre 
would cover defence as well as civil emergency planning this might assuage 
sensitivities in other Whitehall departments. He asked Hunt to put his proposals into 
effect with the minimum of delay.
21
 
But Whitehall turf wars had not vanished overnight and there was still resistance to 
change. Hunt informed Heath that ‘eyebrows were being raised’ because GEN 96, 
which was ostensibly concerned only with the railways was turning its attention 
towards the docks, and he advised Heath that it might now be a good idea to inform 
both Maudling and the rest of the Cabinet of the new arrangements which had 
hitherto been kept within a very small circle.
22
 Although the Emergencies 
Committees had been sidelined they had not been formally abolished, and since they, 
along with the Cabinet itself, were one of the few Committees whose existence was 
then publicly admitted, there had been some embarrassment in Whitehall about how 
to explain the lack of meetings during the railway dispute.
23
 But it was not until 1 
August that Heath formally informed the Cabinet that since the Emergencies 
Committees were not ‘well adapted to present circumstances’, from now on he would 
chair a ministerial group, the Industrial Relations Policy Committee (IRP), to oversee 
industrial disputes. Reporting to this would be a group of senior officials, to be 
known as the Civil Contingencies Unit, chaired by Jellicoe with Hunt as his deputy. 
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At the same time Heath also informed the Cabinet that a full scale review of 
emergency planning was already underway.
24
  
GEN 96 thus evolved seamlessly into the Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU) with 
exactly the same membership of senior officials. Its remit was: ‘To co-ordinate the 
preparation of plans for ensuring in an emergency the supplies and services essential 
to the life of the community; to keep these plans under regular review; to supervise 
their prompt and effective implementation in specific emergencies.’25 The CCU was 
not the outcome of the Hunt Review
26
 nor did the establishment of the CCU lead to 
the review of contingency planning.
27
 The CCU developed, under the direction of 
Hunt and Jellicoe, out of the experience of managing first the railway dispute and 
then the dock strike in the spring and summer of 1972. Although it was only formally 
established in August 1972 it already existed de facto, and its successful operation 
shaped the direction of the review of contingency planning.  
 
The review of contingency planning 
The review was carried out by the Committee on Civil Emergencies Planning (GEN 
108) which was established in June 1972 with Hunt as the chairman assisted by F W 
(Frank) Armstrong, a senior official seconded from the Ministry of Defence. It 
contained representatives from key Whitehall departments but Hunt was determined 
to keep control of emergencies firmly within the Cabinet Office. He made it plain 
that other Whitehall departments would be consulted only when relevant
28
 and he 
gave short shrift to their complaints of exclusion.
29
 Most of the work was done by 
Hunt and Frank Armstrong within the Cabinet Office and GEN 108 met only four 
times.
30
 The review was kept very secret within Whitehall: only the upper echelons 
were informed of its existence and as late as October 1972 the Cabinet Office 
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advised that any reference to GEN 108 should be omitted from a general circular to 
under secretaries.
31
 
By the time the review began Hunt’s ideas were already well-formed and he and 
Armstrong were also able to build on the ground work which had been done by the 
earlier Weiler review of contingency planning in the spring of 1971. Armstrong 
proposed that the main priority for the review should be industrial action which put 
the normal life of the nation at risk, leaving ‘Acts of God’ natural disasters and 
foreign action aside. Armstrong agreed with Hunt’s proposal that a recently retired 
military officer should be recruited to run the Whitehall Situation Centre and draft a 
Civil Emergencies Book, analogous to the highly secret War Book designed to be 
used in the transition to nuclear war, for the Cabinet Office.
32
 In an interesting 
reminder of the state of communications in the early 1970s Armstrong’s initial 
opinion was that the facilities in the Situation Centre did not need to be too 
sophisticated for handling civil emergencies, while ‘facsimile transmission’ was 
desirable, television was unnecessary. While it is not clear who thought of the name 
‘Civil Contingencies Unit’ this note contained the first reference to a ‘Contingencies 
Committee’.33  
 
At the first meeting of GEN 108 Armstrong tabled a list of vital industries taken from 
the Weiler Report; coal, gas, electricity, oil, rail, docks, seamen, water, fire, 
ambulance, hospital, local authorities, postal services and the industrial civil service. 
He noted that the police had been deliberately left off the list and suggested that steel 
and road haulage should probably be added.
34
 The committee agreed with 
Armstrong’s approach and Hunt was so gratified by the constructive atmosphere of 
the meeting and the enthusiasm for the review that he informed Jellicoe that the 
minutes ‘make rather dull reading largely because there was general agreement with 
the way in which we proposed to conduct the operation’.35  
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The core question for the review was how to prolong endurance during strikes in 
essential industries, but at an early stage Hunt warned Robert Armstrong not to 
expect dramatic results since departments had been over the ground several times 
before. It was impossible to maintain the normal life of the nation in the face of 
certain types of industrial action. This would be the case in a general strike, or if 
there were major strikes in two or three industries, but the single industry which 
caused the most anxiety among politicians and officials was electricity.
36
 Electricity 
was (and is) the industry on which all other essential services were dependent since 
without it everything from sewage pumping to street lighting, factories, offices, 
schools and hospitals would be unable to function.  
 
In December 1970 industrial action by manual workers had caused the electricity 
supply to drop by 25% and during the 1972 miners’ strike the supply had fallen by 
35% and was about to get worse.
37
 Hunt was so concerned that he floated the idea of 
a no-strike agreement in the electricity industry in return for treating them as a 
special case in pay negotiations.
38
 But Robert Armstrong pointed out that while it 
was an ingenious suggestion, he doubted if the unions would accept it since they 
would calculate that they could be treated as a special case without having to trade in 
their right to strike.
39
   
 
It was in this context of acute anxiety over the vulnerability of the electricity industry 
that Hunt and Frank Armstrong had to deal with the highly controversial idea that 
one way to cope with strikes in key industries was to train and deploy an alternative 
labour force consisting either of troops or of volunteers. The proposal that either a 
‘civilian support corps’ or troops should act as strike-breakers, was viewed with 
alarm in Whitehall and Hunt made no secret of his reservations. He pointed out that 
it would be impossible to train either troops or volunteers in secret, it would 
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inevitably become known immediately and would make the government’s 
relationship with the TUC very difficult.
40
  
 
Plans already existed within the Ministry of Defence for the deployment of 
servicemen in civil emergencies caused by strikes and each operation had its own 
esoteric code name: CUTTER - distribution of coal stocks; GRAPEFRUIT – 
operation of gas works; DEMAGOGUE – operation of power stations; ARBITER – 
delivery of oil to power stations; RAGLAN – distribution of oil from terminals. But 
officials were acutely aware that these plans should only be activated with extreme 
care as a last resort.
41
 During the 1972 miners’ strike both Maudling and Philip Allen 
had strongly resisted suggestions that the army should be used. Experiences during 
the dock strike in the summer of 1972 had also highlighted some of the weaknesses 
in using troops during industrial action. One of these was the shortage of army 
drivers capable of driving large lorries, particularly oil tankers, dangerous vehicles 
which were, and are, the equivalent of bombs on wheels. This could be crucial if 
there were a tanker drivers’ strike, and after the dock strike Jellicoe had noted that, ‘a 
lot of servicemen were given what was perhaps unfortunately described as a “crash 
course” on articulated vehicles during the emergency’ and proposed that this needed 
to be done much more widely.
42
  
 
This thorny issue was discussed at a meeting between Heath, Jellicoe, Hunt, Frank 
Armstrong and Sir William Armstrong. While they agreed that overt training of 
troops was so provocative that it was inconceivable in present circumstances Jellicoe 
was still keen on the idea of a civilian volunteer force and Hunt was asked to discuss 
with the Chairman of the CEGB on a ‘purely personal basis’ various ways of 
improving endurance in an electricity strike, one of which was ‘the training of troops 
or volunteers to replace striking labour’. Hunt’s reaction to this idea can only be 
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surmised but he underlined the phrase ‘purely personal basis’ and placed a question 
mark by it in the margin.
43
   
 
In an effort to resolve this sensitive issue of an alternative labour force Hunt 
discussed it with key officials from a range of departments. They agreed that while it 
was acceptable to use troops or volunteers in the aftermath of natural disasters, this 
was very different to using them in strikes. Training volunteers to work in industries 
such as coal mines, or run power stations or the railway system was complex and 
skilled work which could not be done secretly or quickly. The Ministry of Defence 
was particularly anxious about the acute political dangers of such proposals.  It was 
adamant that the Territorial Army should not be used in strikes and wanted nothing 
to do with the organisation of a Civil Support Corps. The MoD was only prepared to 
consider training servicemen to carry out non-military tasks if it could be done 
discreetly. The Department of Employment was also convinced that a standing 
register of volunteers was not worth the political trouble it would cause and would 
only commit the department to a revision of the pamphlet which it had issued to its 
local offices on the recruitment of volunteers in an emergency.
44
 
 
But Hunt and Armstrong still had to head off the enthusiasm of Jellicoe and other 
Conservative politicians on the use of volunteers. In the aftermath of the 1972 
miners’ strike Sir Peter Roberts (Conservative MP for Sheffield Ecclesall 1945-50, 
Sheffield Heeley 1950-66) had sent a long memorandum to Maudling with a raft of 
ideas including reinforcing the police with members of local rifle clubs. The papers 
had been mislaid only to resurface awkwardly during the review of contingency 
planning.
45
 Frank Armstrong regarded these proposals with alarm.  
The memoranda by Sir P Roberts are dangerous documents. I cannot see any 
Civil Service planners ever working on these lines. The cure proposed seems 
to be worse than the (vastly overstressed) disease. I am aware that our 
proposals for a General Strike situation look puny compared with these 
Cromwellian tactics but I think that, short of the power workers joining with 
other industries in strike action, national endurance can be sensibly increased 
by our proposals if HMG are prepared to meet the cost. For the power 
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industry, in the situation envisaged, even Sir P Robert’s proposals do not 
provide a solution. As Napoleon almost said, you can do everything with 
bayonets except work power stations.
46
 
 
By the middle of October 1972 Hunt and Armstrong had produced an interim report 
which reflected the substantial progress which had already been made. The Whitehall 
Situation Centre (now known as the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms) was in 
operation and considerable improvements had been made in the ability to stockpile 
foodstuffs and oil. The highly sensitive issue of ‘substitute labour’ had been 
considered with the tentative conclusion that the main recourse must be to the 
services. The Ministry of Defence was asked to examine how it could discreetly 
extend training in some areas so troops could drive articulated lorries and work 
modern cranes. The practicalities of recruiting civilian volunteers were so great that 
it was more or less ruled out.
47
 
 
But the most intractable problem was still the power industry, particularly because of 
the threat posed by industrial action in the coming winter. Plans were underway to 
buy more mobile generators for places ranging from hospitals to large dairies and 
bakeries, to provide emergency heating and lighting for government offices and to 
reduce civil servants in London to 10% for essential work only. But Hunt 
acknowledged that all these measures would not solve the problem of electricity, and 
that neither troops nor volunteers could perform skilled work in power stations.
48
 
 
The Hunt/Armstrong report 
F W Armstrong made such good progress in drafting the final report that by early 
November Hunt was ready to share the findings with Jellicoe; although prepared to 
listen to his suggestions he was determined to brook no obstruction from him or 
Whitehall generally.
49
 The final report, ‘Civil Emergencies: Action to Increase 
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Preparedness’, was completed by January, sent to the Prime Minister and then 
formally submitted to the Cabinet’s Industrial Relations Policy Committee.50  
 
The report identified sixteen industries and utilities where industrial action could 
cause disruption: out of these the five where workers could inflict the greatest 
damage were oil, coal, rail, docks and electricity, and in rail, coal and docks they had 
shown themselves prepared to do so. The most worrying was electricity, ‘short of a 
general strike no likely combination of stoppages was as damaging to the nation as a 
stoppage in the electricity industry on its own’.51 The electricity industry was also 
vulnerable to coal, rail and oil stoppages. Government departments had already 
increased their expenditure on mobile generators but since they could only provide 
0.1% of the national generating capacity this would be inadequate in a severe 
electricity emergency. It recommended that vulnerable places such as government 
offices (including benefit offices), national computers, hospitals, prisons, water and 
sewage stations should have permanent standby generators. But they stressed that 
this would only offer a breathing space of a few weeks.
52
 The Report had again 
examined the idea of a no strike agreement in the electricity industry but reluctantly 
concluded that it was unworkable.
53
   
 
On electricity Hunt and Armstrong basically admitted defeat. Their review had only 
served to confirm the nation’s vulnerability to a power crisis. Modern power stations 
were too complex for troops to make much difference. The main recommendation on  
standby generators would cost £36 million but this was only a palliative. In the event 
of a total stoppage it was only possible to duplicate a tiny proportion of the national 
generating capacity, ‘a power crisis is still by far the worst of the industrial threats. It 
will be seen from the Report that we have approached it from several directions 
without much success.’54  
 
                                                 
50
 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3653 'Industrial Relations Policy Committee', ‘Civil 
Emergencies: Action to Increase Preparedness: Report by the Cabinet Office’, IRP 
73 2, 12 January 1973. 
51
 Ibid., Para. 5. 
52
 Ibid., Paras. 5-7. 
53
 Ibid., Para. 53. 
54
 TNA: PRO, CAB 164/1226 'Cabinet Office organisation in civil emergencies', F 
W Armstrong to Hunt, 10 January 1973.  
  145 
Two areas were identified where industrial muscle was concentrated in relatively few 
hands and which needed immediate remedial action; oil distribution and grain 
imports. The memory of the dock strike in the summer of 1972 was still fresh and the 
aim was to extend endurance in food supplies against a national dock strike of up to 
twelve weeks by stockpiling. In 1972 there had been fears that an imminent shortage 
of animal feed would lead to a premature mass slaughtering of animals so the report 
recommended that the stock of animal foodstuffs should also be built up at a cost of 
£16 million.
55
 The Report concluded that it was too expensive and impractical to 
stockpile industrial raw materials. It also recommended that special measures should 
be taken to safeguard the Scottish Islands in terms of food, animal feedstuffs and oil 
supplies.
56
 
 
Coal stocks had been a point of acute vulnerability during the 1972 miners’ strike. 
The Coal Industry Bill was making provision for grants to the NCB to increase coal 
stocks and the Report suggested that these subsidised stocks should be held at power 
stations and away from NCB stock areas which would be affected by a strike. It 
explicitly acknowledged the external threat to oil supplies and mentioned that plans 
were already underway, backed up by legislation, to make sure that oil stocks should 
never be less than ninety days supply.
57
  
 
The vexed issue of substitute labour was tackled head on and the impractical nature 
and dangerous consequences of some of the wilder ideas exposed. The Report noted 
tartly that ‘The increased complexity of industry since 1926 [the General Strike] has 
put out of reach some of the things, such as train-driving, in which amateurs were 
then allowed to participate (although even there the legend may have overlaid the 
truth).’58 There was now a premium on specialist skills in many industries. It was one 
thing to replace lorry drivers or dustmen but to run a railway, a modern power station 
or a large sewage works was quite another.  
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The Report had examined the plans which already existed for using servicemen in 
industrial disputes in twelve major utilities, but using them was subject to two severe 
constraints. The first was whether their deployment might make the situation worse 
by exacerbating the strike and leading to sympathetic action in other industries. The 
second was availability, which was especially pertinent as Northern Ireland was now 
swallowing up troops. The one area where the services could make a real difference 
would be if they trained more drivers to drive articulated lorries which were essential 
for oil distribution. But the Ministry of Defence was very concerned that extra 
training would became public knowledge and cause both political embarrassment 
and the relationship between the MoD and trade unions to deteriorate.
59
 The MoD 
view was that to use volunteer reserves such as the Territorial Army to deal with 
strikes would be disastrous since they relied on the goodwill of the whole 
community, many of them were also members of trade unions and would have 
divided loyalties.
60
 
 
The report rejected the notion of a trained civilian corps which had been Jellicoe’s 
pet hobby-horse. It concluded that to call for volunteers in advance to engage in 
strike-breaking would be extremely divisive. The idea of recruiting civilians would 
always be seen as provocative by the unions and might well make the situation 
worse. Although the report conceded that there might be some rare occasions when it 
was justified; such as when life was under threat from a strike by emergency 
ambulance drivers, if a union had come under the control of extremists or if there 
was a general strike when the object was to bring down the government by industrial 
means. The report was firmly against keeping a register of volunteers in advance, but 
the Department of Employment was revising the pamphlet which it issued to its local 
offices on the recruitment of volunteers in an emergency.
61
 Armstrong acknowledged 
that ‘I am sure that there will be Ministerial disappointment at the cold water poured 
on the idea of volunteers and admittedly the rewriting of a DE pamphlet is a pretty 
insignificant outcome. It seems however that the Lord Privy Seal is now persuaded 
that we cannot sensibly do more.’62  
                                                 
59
 Ibid., Para. 39-43. 
60
 Ibid., Para. 44. 
61
 Ibid. Para. 46-50. 
62
 TNA: PRO, CAB 164/1226, F W Armstrong to Hunt, 10 January 1973. 
  147 
 
There were four main recommendations which needed decisions; three of which 
related to the cost of stockpiles and electricity standby generators. The fourth, and 
most contentions, was the recommendation that servicemen should be trained to drive 
articulated vehicles. Hunt was not convinced by the MoD’s objections and advised 
Heath to over-rule them.
63
 When the Industrial Relations Policy Committee met on 25 
January it agreed that training servicemen to drive articulated vehicles was neither 
inflammatory nor unsuitable for the armed forces and that it should be given to as 
many servicemen as possible. It approved all four recommendations.
64
 
 
The Report did not resonate with grand conclusions since many of the preventative 
measures which Hunt and Armstrong had examined had already been put into effect. 
Updated plans for accidents and natural disasters, as well as major strikes, had already 
been incorporated into the Civil Emergencies Book and the procedures for activating 
the Regional Emergency Centres (RECs) had been revised. However, it was not only 
a comprehensive review of all the issues related to contingency planning but a 
penetrating analysis of the vulnerability of the modern state to industrial action as 
technology made industries both more complex to run and more dependent on 
technical and managerial skill. It also provided an illuminating picture of the 
antagonistic state of industrial relations in the early 1970s and revealed the depths of 
apprehension amongst senior officials at the ease with which industrial disputes 
could cause extensive damage.  
 
The CCU and COBR 
The first test for the CCU was the dock strike in August 1972, which posed a severe 
threat to supplies to the Scottish islands and to animal feedstuffs. The Heath 
government declared its fourth state of emergency but its general strategy was, in 
Trend’s words, to ‘play it cool and low’ to try and avoid public alarm over possible 
shortages.
65
 But in private there was considerable anxiety and active consideration 
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was given to the possibility of using troops to unload ships.
66
 But although the RAF 
was used to deliver supplies to the Scottish islands the government held back from 
using troops to unload ships.
67
 They feared that road haulage drivers would then 
‘black’ the docks, which would have serious implications for oil distribution.68 
The CCU acquitted itself well during the dock strike and Heath was at last satisfied 
that a functioning system for handling industrial emergencies was now in place. He 
commented approvingly, ‘I have read the daily reports which have been provided 
about the state of our resources during the dock strike. These seem to have been 
admirably compiled and a great improvement on previous efforts. We also seem to 
be in a position now to obtain more accurate information about most aspects of these 
problems. Please congratulate those concerned.’69 Jellicoe reported to Heath that the 
new machinery had worked very satisfactorily. ‘Departments have been represented 
at senior level on the Civil Contingencies Unit at which I take the chair. We have 
kept the membership small. The flow of information has been quick and the response 
to demands has been prompt and flexible. For myself, I found it very convenient to 
be able to go to Cabinet or Ministerial meetings direct from a briefing by the Unit.’70  
 
The success of the CCU underlined the fact that another element of the government 
machinery designed to forewarn ministers of impending crises had now outlived its  
usefulness. The Early Warning System (EWS) set up at the instigation of Lord 
Rothschild and managed by the CPRS had always met with resistance in Whitehall, 
notably from the Treasury, which was anxious that market sensitive information 
would become public. Trend also deplored the fact that too much sensitive and 
essentially pessimistic information would be broadcast through Whitehall, ‘It 
contains several items which make one raise one’s eyebrows.’ He advised Heath that 
its circulation should be restricted by grading it secret rather than confidential.
71
 To 
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Rothschild’s dismay and irritation, Heath agreed to Trend’s suggestion that the 
circulation list of the EWS document be restricted to a small group of senior 
ministers. Rothschild protested that if the document was not widely circulated and 
became merely a sanitised diary of forward events then it was not worth the time 
and effort and it might as well cease.
72
 By this stage the CCU was well into its 
stride and so was Hunt’s review of contingency planning and Heath was content 
that the EWS exercise should be abandoned.
73
 Hunt, a former Treasury official, 
wrote on his copy of the note, ‘No tears need be wept!’74  
 
In the autumn of 1973 Mark Schreiber (Special Adviser Civil Service Department) 
proposed that the EWS should be revived.
75
 But while Hunt supported the idea of a 
‘forward look’ he was opposed to any revival of the EWS. As he explained to 
Heath, the Cabinet Office was working on a plan to provide a systematic forward 
look three times a year: ‘This is not a resuscitation of the CPRS Early Warning 
system which attempted to cover too much ground and was intended for Ministers 
generally. Our plan is to produce a tool for the management of business at the 
centre.’76 A ‘forward look’ exercise was begun, but not finished, in December 1973 
and a further one completed in May 1974 for Harold Wilson.
77
 
 
During the autumn of 1972 the prospect of industrial action in the electricity industry 
was a source of acute anxiety for the government and the CCU oversaw preparations 
to withstand it. The CCU supervised a programme to purchase mobile generators to 
provide standby power for key services ranging from hospitals to large dairies and 
bakeries, and drew up plans to provide emergency heating and lighting for 
government offices and to restrict civil servants in central London offices down to a 
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core of 10% for essential work.
78
 At Hunt’s request the code names 
GRASSHOPPER and HERRINGBONE replaced the rather too obviously 
apocalyptic TWILIGHT and DOOMSDAY for the final stages of an electricity 
emergency.
79
  
During the first half of 1973 the CCU was responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the recommendations in the Hunt Report. Most of these were 
concerned with improvements in the ability to stockpile oil and foodstuffs. The most 
contentious, where Heath, on Hunt’s recommendation, had overruled the MoD, was 
that the armed services should train more servicemen to drive articulated vehicles.
80
 
By the summer of 1973 the CCU had been in existence for a year and met several 
times a week. The range of subjects on its agenda illustrated just how widespread 
disruption from industrial action was in the early 1970s. It analysed the prospects for 
industrial action in the gas, coal and water supply industries, the National Health 
Service, and the docks and railways. It also examined the problems of picketing at 
power stations, how to manage social security payments at a time of mass 
unemployment and the provision of standby electricity generating equipment to vital 
services.  
 
The CCU also conducted a review of the Emergency Powers Act 1920 (as amended 
in 1964). Under Section 1 of this Act a state of emergency could only be declared if 
the community, or a substantial part of it, was in danger of being deprived of the 
essentials of life. The Hunt Report had questioned whether the Act should be 
redrafted to cover widespread, but not hazardous disruption, to one portion of the 
community. The CCU set up a working party which concluded that anxiety about 
ultra vires and what legally constituted a ‘substantial proportion of the community’ 
was unnecessary. The declaration of a state of emergency was ultimately a political 
judgement, which was more likely to be challenged in parliament than in the courts 
and it recommended that there was no need for new legislation.
81
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The CCU met regularly in the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms, formerly known as 
the Whitehall Situation Centre, located in a suite of rooms in 70 Whitehall. This 
contained all the political, home defence and military information necessary for the 
Prime Minister to take fully informed decisions on the release of nuclear weapons 
and provided a base for the Transition to War Committee.
82
 Heath had authorised the 
construction of this in July 1971
83
 and it was in operation from September 1972.
84
 It 
was variously referred to as ‘the Briefing Rooms’, ‘the Rooms’ or simply by its 
initials ‘COBR’. Tight secrecy surrounded its existence since its primary purpose 
was to manage the transition to a nuclear war. If there were competing claims on its 
use priority lay firstly, with transition to war, secondly, terrorist incidents and only 
thirdly with civil emergencies, whether industrial action or natural disasters.
85
 
Although the Cabinet was informed of its existence Trend was most anxious its real 
purpose should be kept secret and suggested that ministers should be told that its role 
was simply to enable the government to carry out the complicated civil and military 
exercises required by NATO.
86
  
 
Hunt had overall responsibility for the Rooms and Brigadier R J (Dick) Bishop 
(Controller of the Rooms) was in charge of their day to day running.
87
 Bishop had 
been both a member of GEN 108 and the CCU from its inception and became 
Secretary of the CCU in early 1973. Bishop was also responsible for keeping the 
Civil Emergencies Book (CEB), first issued in February 1973, updated. This was a 
loose-leaf folder, updated annually and circulated to all Whitehall departments and 
the RECs. It contained a summary of all the factors which affected civil emergencies 
and the means of dealing with them. It was divided into three sections. The first dealt 
with potential industrial disputes in industries which threatened the essentials of life, 
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the second covered general preparedness, including the reserve resources such as 
electricity generators held by government departments, and the third section was 
concerned with natural disasters and environmental pollution.
88
 
 
The section on general preparedness set out the guidelines on Military Assistance to 
the Civil Ministries (MACM) and the political and legal considerations which 
governed the use of troops. It warned that the introduction of servicemen in any 
industrial dispute was likely to produce an emotive reaction in the unions and ‘as a 
general rule troops should not be employed unless most serious harm to the nation’s 
interest will follow if they are not committed’. The CEB also acknowledged that in a 
major industrial dispute which gravely affected the life of the community the 
government might need to appeal for volunteers to help maintain essential services 
but it stressed that this could only be a measure of last resort since the use of 
volunteers would invariably be regarded as strike-breaking, harden attitudes and 
delay a settlement and could pose a serious threat to public order. It is a measure of 
how sensitive this issue was that there was a strict instruction, printed on the DE 
circular which set out how Employment Exchanges were to recruit volunteer labour, 
that it was to be kept extremely secret.
89
 
 
By May 1973 Bishop had trained and organised teams from across government 
departments into shifts who could man the briefing rooms in a severe industrial 
dispute and co-ordinate activity through departmental emergency rooms. The Rooms 
had domestic support and provision for eating and sleeping. They were also kitted 
out with state-of-the-art equipment and had secure communications to duty rooms in 
government departments, Civil Service regional offices, the police, military 
headquarters in the UK and northern Europe, NATO HQ and Washington and 
Moscow.
90
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From the Briefing Rooms central government was able to communicate with the 
Regional Emergency Committees (RECs) based in eleven provincial towns across 
Britain. During the autumn of 1972 GEN 108 reviewed their role and they were 
overhauled so that by the end of the year office suites complete with standby 
generators for emergency heating and lighting and telex communications had been 
set up. GEN 108 had considered activating them during the autumn of 1972 when an 
electricity strike seemed imminent but did not in the end do so.
91
  
 
The CEB set out the role of the regional organisation during a severe peacetime civil 
emergency. The RECs would be chaired by a civil servant of under-secretary rank 
and they were coterminous with the division of the regions for civil defence but they 
were civilian operations with no wartime or home defence responsibilities. Their role 
was to co-ordinate government activity in a civil emergency and to resolve local 
clashes of interest. They were responsible for preparing a regional plan and the co-
ordination of actions to maintain supplies in a civil emergency and not to take 
executive action and assume the responsibilities of government departments, nor did 
they have any responsibility for police operations. They were to report to the CCU, 
which would activate them in an emergency.
92
 
 
In May 1973 Jellicoe was forced to resign from the government as a result of a 
scandal involving a call girl. In June 1973 James Prior succeeded him as chairman of 
the CCU and held the posts of Lord President of the Council and later Leader of the 
House of Commons. In May 1973 John Hunt was appointed to succeed Trend as 
Cabinet Secretary, although he did not take up the appointment until October. He 
was succeeded as deputy chairman of the CCU by Patrick Nairne, an official from 
the MoD who became Second Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office. 
The establishment of the CCU was one of the most successful and certainly the most 
long-lasting of Heath’s reforms to the machinery of government. Like the creation of 
the CPRS it reflected Heath’s desire to strengthen institutions at the centre of 
government. Jeffery and Hennessy raised the issue of the Home Office’s conviction 
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that the creation of the CCU was a product of Cabinet Office imperialism.
93
 Robert 
Armstrong judged that the CCU was a significant change in the role of the Cabinet 
Office: 
Trend saw the Cabinet Office in an old-fashioned way as the collective servant of the 
Cabinet; co-ordinating and organising business rather than a centre of positive 
activity. The development of the European Unit in 1971-2 [to support the 
negotiations for entry to the EEC] was taking the logic of the Cabinet Office one 
stage further. The CPRS was another element in that. The creation of the Civil 
Contingencies Unit under John Hunt, who was a very effective administrator and a 
centralising man by instinct was a further element.
94
 
But although the CCU undoubtedly marked a significant accrual of power to the 
Cabinet Office, which continued under Hunt’s tenure as Cabinet Secretary from 1973 
to 1979, it was a reform which Heath had wanted from 1970 and was given a final 
impetus by the disastrous handling of the 1972 miners’ strike. It adapted and evolved 
to deal with a wide range of civil emergencies and is clearly recognisable as the 
forerunner of the present Civil Contingencies Secretariat.    
 
Subversion 
By the summer of 1973 Hunt was cautiously optimistic about the overall state of 
contingency planning but not complacent, ‘in most of the key public sector services 
the position is significantly better than last year: and the longer term measures 
authorised by the Industrial Relations Policy Committee are all being pressed ahead 
as quickly as possible. As against this we must remember that militants may become 
more sophisticated in ways of applying pressure and we must look ahead and try to 
anticipate trouble.’95 The activities of politically motivated militants and subversives 
within the trade union movement had been a source of anxiety for the Heath 
Government ever since the strikes in the summer of 1970. This had been exacerbated 
by the violent picketing during the 1972 miners’ strike which had severely shaken 
the Cabinet and Heath and his ministers had become convinced that sections of the 
trade unions were prepared to use industrial disputes over pay as a cover for bringing 
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down a Conservative government. The evidence in the National Archives on this 
subject is patchy and much of it is retained under Section 3(4) of the old Public 
Records Act 1958 but it complements and adds to the material in Andrew’s 
authorised history of the Security Service based on its files. It demonstrates the 
considerable level of anxiety about subversion among ministers as well as the greater 
caution of officials and confirms Andrew’s judgement that officials acted as a brake 
on ministerial ambitions to extend the scope of the Security Service.  
 
After the 1972 miners’ strike the problem of subversives was very much on the 
Whitehall agenda.
96
 Within the context of an overall review of industrial strategy 
Trend identified three subject areas to be examined. First, prices and incomes; 
secondly, measures to restrict picketing and curtail social security benefits to 
strikers’ families; thirdly, ‘Covert actions against subversion both in industry and in 
other fields’. Trend suggested that the Cabinet’s Economic Strategy Committee (ES) 
should co-ordinate a review of this last area and that he and Donald Maitland (Chief 
Press Secretary No 10 1970-73) would welcome an opportunity to discuss with 
Heath the part to be played by the information services in exposing subversion.
97
 
There is no record in the National Archives of any subsequent discussion between 
Heath, Trend and Maitland but there are indications that work on subversion was 
underway.
98
 At the first meeting of the Industrial Relations Policy Committee it was 
noted that ‘The impact of subversive activity was under study separately.’99   
 
The proposal that there should be some interdepartmental system of reporting on 
internal threats which would include a proper assessment of communist influence in 
the trade unions had been ‘in the air for some time’ and was strongly supported by 
Trend, who ‘had a streak of romanticism in him about the work of the intelligence 
services’.100 He argued that in the same way that the JIC produced intelligence 
reports for ministers on overseas based threats there was a need for a ‘home JIC’. But 
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other senior figures in Whitehall, including Allen, were rather more sceptical and 
both the Home Office and MI5 were very anxious to prevent sensitive intelligence, 
derived from covert surveillance which had to be authorised by the Home Secretary, 
from being too widely disseminated across Whitehall.
101
  
 
Soon after Carr became Home Secretary in July 1972, Michael Hanley (Director 
General of the Security Service 1972-78) proposed a new committee under the aegis 
of the Home Office to be responsible for assessing internal security in the UK. In 
September 1972 the new committee on Subversion in Public Life (SPL) was created 
to supervise and direct the collection of intelligence about threats to internal security 
arising from subversive activities, particularly in industry. The reports were prepared 
jointly by an MI5 officer and an official from Department of Employment.
102
 SPL 
was chaired by James Waddell, a senior Home Office official experienced in 
counter-subversion who had been an unsuccessful candidate to replace Furnival 
Jones as DG.
103
 He was described by one who knew him as ‘very dry, very much an 
old style civil servant, not much of a sense of humour but very sharp’.104 SPL issued 
a series of reports on subversion in industry, around every two months, which drew 
on background on unions and industry from the Department of Employment. On 
Heath’s instructions the circulation was restricted to a small group of senior 
ministers.
105
 According to Andrew there was consistent pressure on the Security 
Service to go beyond its charter in the investigation of subversion and industrial 
unrest but was resisted by both Hanley and Allen.
106
  
 
There is evidence in the National Archives that SPL was not the only group 
concerned with subversion in industry. In October 1973, shortly after he had taken 
over as Cabinet Secretary, Hunt discussed with Heron and Hanley whether the 
Industrial Assessment Group, also chaired by Waddell, should provide ministers with 
a preview of the prospects for industrial unrest during the coming winter. But the 
IAG had concluded that this was simply not practical since the situation was moving 
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so fast that it was impossible to foresee the interaction of events on each other 
without getting into the realm of pure speculation. Hunt’s own scepticism was 
evident when he stressed that ‘experience has shown that covert sources can 
contribute only slightly to broad general assessments, for which the other sources 
available to Ministers are of more use than the product of the Group’.107  
 
According to one former official who was closely involved in this area there were 
two types of product from the groups which were concerned with subversion in 
industry. The first was a weekly summary written by a recently retired Security 
Service officer, who was technically on the Joint Intelligence Committee’s (JIC) 
Assessments Staff. This was drawn largely from published material because there 
was not enough material from covert sources. The second product was a series of 
special longer reports which covered each of the main unions. They were drafted by 
the Security Service (MI5) and the JIC machinery was involved in their production 
and distribution. The former official is adamant that they were ‘very measured 
reports’, and ‘they found very few “reds under the beds” in the unions, which was 
not what Conservative ministers wanted to hear’.108 In the National Archives there 
are six editions of a paper ‘Subversive Influences in Industry’, which was a digest of 
material only from public, not intelligence sources, and consists of a mixture of 
direct quotes and extracts from newspaper articles. This is possibly the first of the 
two types of reports.
109
 
 
Another group also existed, which was described as a ‘small inter-departmental 
group of officials’, chaired by Sir Patrick Dean (former Chairman of the JIC, 1953-
60 and Ambassador to Washington, 1965-69) under the direction of Robert Carr, 
charged ‘with developing methods, including appropriate publicity and exposure, by 
which certain types of subversive activity can be countered’. Hunt and Robert 
Armstrong examined whether the work of this group could be useful in the context of 
the disputes with the NUM and ASLEF in December 1973 but Hunt’s view was that 
it was best to proceed very cautiously when emphasising the role of subversion 
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within the trade unions and there was scope to do this without using covert 
sources.
110
 
 
Hunt’s cautionary influence on Heath is clear when in January 1974 he sent him 
three pages of a draft speech for an important debate in the Commons which accused 
the NUM and Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) of 
being subject to the influence of the Communist Party, which was opposed to any 
form of wage restraint and wanted to use industrial activity to bring the government 
down. The draft had been agreed with the Department of Employment and the 
Security Service and Hunt commented, ‘I think you would be safe in using this 
material which seems to go as far as possible [one and a half lines redacted]. 
Whether it is wise to use is in this particular debate is a matter for political 
judgement.’111 Heath heeded Hunt’s advice and the following day refrained from any 
accusations of subversion: instead he struck an emollient tone and ended his speech 
with an impassioned plea for reason and moderation.
112
 
 
Hunt, who was himself a former Secretary of the JIC,
113
 was more sceptical of the 
work of the intelligence services than Trend. Further evidence of Hunt’s caution in 
this sensitive area was demonstrated in December 1973 when he told Heath, ‘There 
is some tidying up required of the various Committees concerned with subversion 
and at some stage they might become a “home” JIC. But I do not think the moment is 
ripe for this yet.’114 The files in the National Archive do not provide a comprehensive 
picture of the structure of committees in this area since neither the records for the 
SPL nor the IAG on this subject are available. On 4 March 1974, the day the Heath 
Government left office, Hunt returned all IAG and SPL documents to the JIC 
Secretariat, possibly an indication that he thought this material would be perceived 
differently by the incoming Labour Government.
115
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Anticipation of the oil shock 
One significant issue which linked the CPRS and the central machinery for planning 
for civil emergencies was a growing anticipation of a problem with oil supplies. This 
was high on the government’s agenda before the oil shock in October 1973. Energy 
policy was a personal interest of Lord Rothschild’s and as the former Head of 
Research at Shell he had both an acknowledged expertise and an extensive network 
of personal contacts.
116
 The UK’s dependence on foreign oil had long been of 
particular interest to him and in October 1971, at his instigation, Heath met Sir David 
Barran (Chief Executive of Shell).
117
 Barran predicted a major world energy crisis 
between 1980 and 1995 because of the gap between supply and demand. Oil would 
have to take the strain on demand which would enhance the political strength and 
bargaining power of Middle East oil producing countries.
118
  
 
Another warning of the dangers posed by the OPEC countries to the price and supply 
of oil came from Robert Belgrave (a former diplomat and a senior executive at BP) 
who sent Donald Maitland a long memorandum which dismissed some of the 
popular misconceptions about scarcity of resources. But he also warned that during 
the next ten years demand for oil could well exceed supply and that the US, Japan 
and the EEC could end up in competition with each other. OPEC had the ‘whip 
hand’ and could at any time cut off supplies for political reasons. This memorandum 
was taken very seriously and circulated widely among senior officials.
119
 
 
Energy policy fell within the remit of the DTI but this was not its main 
responsibility, and, apart from the coal industry, the topic received very little 
attention.
120
 From the autumn of 1971 the CPRS attempted to fill the gap and worked 
on possible counter-measures the UK could take to protect its economy from 
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expected rises in the price of oil during the 1970s. This was such a complicated 
subject that Rothschild produced what he called a ‘Child’s Guide’. This controversial 
memorandum, ‘Oil Economics and Supplies’, concluded that very little could be 
done and that only palliatives were available during the 1970 s. In its original form it 
contained a list of recommendations, the thrust of which was that the UK should rely 
more on gas, indigenous oil and nuclear power, but it also contained the highly 
sensitive proposal that the UK should attempt ‘by all means possible to divide the oil 
producing countries’.121 It went through a number of drafts and was circulated, 
without the recommendations, as a CPRS note to Heath, the DTI and also to 
Carrington.
122
 
 
In early 1973 Heath commissioned a wide ranging review of energy policy from the 
CPRS.
123
 Oil was then around $2.20 a barrel
124
 and this report predicted three 
scenarios for the oil price in 1985, at 1972 prices. These were EASY $3.75, 
SCARCE $6, CRISIS $9. It recommended increased investment in exploration for 
new coal supplies and that new nuclear power stations should be commissioned as 
soon as possible.
125
 Heath’s reaction was immediately positive, he wrote on 
Rothschild’s covering letter, ‘This requires urgent treatment by the DTI. Thank you. 
Please keep me in touch.’126 Heath was so interested in this report that swift 
arrangements were made by the No 10 private office for Rothschild and his team to 
give the Prime Minister a personal briefing.
127
  
 
Rothschild’s script for the presentation was punchy and colloquial; it was a foray into 
what he described as ‘the world of futurology’ and ‘crystal ball gazing’, and he 
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emphasised, ‘$9 a barrel is not a CPRS joke. We got it from a major international oil 
company.’128 Blackstone and Plowden (both former members of the CPRS) claimed  
that the CPRS gave an oral presentation to incredulous ministers which caused 
something of a sensation and that many ministers refused to accept the validity of the 
report.
129
 However, in May 1973, when the Cabinet’s Economic Strategy Committee 
(ES) considered the CPRS report at the same time as a memo by Peter Walker 
(Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 1972-74) on energy policy, Walker 
admitted that there were good reasons for accepting the CPRS estimate of the oil 
price rather than the DTI one and ES agreed to adopt the SCARCE scenario.
130
  
 
It is important to note that Rothschild was looking over 10 years ahead and his 
predictions were based on assumptions about supply and demand as well as the 
desire for oil producing countries to gain an increased share of the profits from the 
natural resource they owned at the expense of the western oil producing companies. 
But while the CPRS Report did not predict the oil shock of October 1973, it was 
proved ‘right in principle, if wrong in practice’ and the report was a major factor 
which established its credibility in Whitehall.
131
  
 
It also raised the salience of the issue of oil supplies and further evidence of the 
government’s concern in this area was the establishment of the Task Force on Oil 
Supplies (ESOT) as a sub-committee of the Economic Strategy Committee. It was set 
up in June 1973 to examine the threat to an interruption of oil supplies from Libya 
and was a mixed committee of ministers and officials drawn from various 
departments. It was chaired by Carrington and its members also included Walker and 
Rothschild.
132
 In July 1973 it produced a report which was a frank and trenchant 
analysis of the extent of the UK’s dependence on oil from unstable regions. It 
pointed out that Libya and Iraq were radical, unpredictable and ready to pick quarrels 
with the west on any pretext. The Arab world was obsessed by the Arab/Israel 
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dispute and there was increasing talk of using oil as a political weapon to induce the 
west to put pressure on Israel. Egypt was the most influential Arab state and a key 
factor in the behaviour of the traditional regimes which had friendly relations with 
the west. Most presciently it predicted that a further round of serious fighting could 
well lead to a shutdown of Arab oil, although it drew the erroneous conclusion that 
an outbreak of major hostilities between Israel and the Arab countries was unlikely at 
present.
133
 
 
This was proved dramatically wrong when on 6 October Egypt attacked Israel. When 
the US airlifted arms to Israel there was a swift reaction from the OPEC countries 
which decided on a price increase from $2.90 to $5.11 a barrel. Some of the Arab oil 
producing countries also announced an immediate cut in oil production of 5% to be 
followed by additional cuts that each month Israel failed to withdraw from the 
occupied territories of 1967. By the autumn of 1973 the price of oil was already high. 
Between December 1970 and September 1973 the official price of oil (Arabian light) 
had risen from $1.21 a barrel to $2.90 a barrel, prices on the spot market were even 
higher.
134
 At the same time demand increased from 46 to 56 million barrels a day, the 
bulk of this increase was in the industrial countries with the US top of the list.
135
 The 
price rise, the cut in production and the selective embargo against countries 
supportive of Israel, generated alarm bordering on panic in the western oil 
consuming countries. Auction prices for oil soared and in December OPEC raised the 
price to $11.65 a barrel. The price then fell slightly in 1974 and the threat to 
production turned out not to be as great as it first appeared. Even at the height of the 
cutback in November 1973 the shortfall was not more than 5% of world 
consumption, which could be met by drawing on stocks and in early 1974 the 
cutbacks ended.
136
 But during the autumn of 1973 there were no reliable figures on 
the impact of production and therefore enormous uncertainty among western 
governments including Britain.  
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The oil shock was the biggest peacetime political and economic seismic event of the 
second half of the twentieth century. Oil was central to the prosperity of industrial 
economies and the enormous price increase had a severe and long lasting effect. As 
Yergin described it ‘It had recast the alignments and geopolitics of both the Middle 
East and the entire world. It had transformed world oil and the relations between 
producers and consumers, and it had remade the international economy.’137 Some 
historians have implied that the oil crisis in the autumn of 1973 took the government 
entirely by surprise and that Rothschild’s warnings were ignored.138 But although the 
exact timing and the extent of the oil shock in the autumn of 1973 was not foreseen 
warnings from several quarters were taken seriously by both ministers and officials. 
While Rothschild was not as uniquely prescient as has sometimes been supposed
139
 
the CPRS work on energy had a significant impact. 
 
The attempts to counter subversion and the preparatory work to guard against 
problems with the oil supply were supplementary aspects of the government’s 
attempt to strengthen its capability to deal with civil emergencies. All of them took 
place in secret so previous accounts have of necessity been partial. It is only with the 
release of the papers in the National Archives that one can appreciate the full extent 
of the effort which went into the Heath Government’s preparations against a 
recurrence of a crisis such as the 1972 miners’ strike. On the domestic front the 
creation of the CCU was by far the most significant development and by the autumn 
of 1973 it had overseen the build up of stocks of oil as well as coal to help the 
government weather an energy crisis. But there was comparatively little the 
government could do to influence the international oil market. 
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Chapter 5 A ‘red-meat’ settlement or a special case 
 
The background to the crisis 
This chapter examines the reasons for the declaration of the fifth state of emergency 
in November 1973. It covers Heath’s relationship with Gormley and the NUM and 
the source of the misunderstandings and friction between them. It examines the 
various factors which constituted the energy crisis in the autumn of 1973 and the 
government’s attempt to formulate a strategy to deal with them. It sets the decision to 
move to a three-day week in the context of the deteriorating economic outlook and 
the role played by the rigid statutory incomes policy in exacerbating several 
industrial disputes. It examines the various opportunities to settle the dispute with the 
miners; extra payments for ‘bathing and waiting’, the ‘oil card’ and the TUC offer 
that the miners should be treated as a special case. It has drawn extensively on the 
files in the National Archives to support or modify the existing accounts in a number 
of areas.  
 
The state of emergency has to be seen in the context of the evolution of the 
government’s policies since the summer of 1972 and the general economic 
background in the autumn of 1973. The need to strengthen contingency planning was 
the first major lesson which the Heath government drew from the crisis of 1972; the 
second was that there had to be a better way to settle differences with the trade 
unions.
1
 This conviction was reinforced during the late spring and summer of 1972 
which had been marked by angry protests against the Industrial Relations Act and 
industrial disputes first on the railways and then on the docks, which had necessitated 
a fourth state of emergency in August 1972.  
 
Throughout the autumn of 1972 Heath embarked on a series of long and exhaustive 
talks with the CBI and the TUC in an attempt to reach a voluntary agreement which 
would hold down wages and prices. But the tripartite talks ended in failure and left 
the government convinced that it had no alternative but to try and hold down 
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inflation by introducing a statutory incomes policy in November 1972.
2
 Stage 1 was 
a 90 day freeze on wages and prices announced on 6 November 1972.
3
 This was 
followed by Stage 2 to cover the pay round which would run from the end of March 
1973 to the autumn and it limited wage rises to £1 a week plus 4% and also set up an 
independent Pay Board to adjudicate on wage claims.
4
  
 
The move to a statutory incomes policy was in direct contravention of the words in 
the 1970 Conservative manifesto, which had declared, ‘We utterly reject the 
philosophy of compulsory wage control.’5 As Prior explained it later the Cabinet 
were reluctant converts since they realised the difficulties it would cause with all the 
inevitable anomalies and inflexibilities.
6
 It was bitterly opposed by Heath’s old 
enemy, Enoch Powell (MP for Wolverhampton South West 1950-74)
7
 who queried 
whether Heath had taken leave of his senses?
8
 But although it caused dissent on the 
free-market right of the party only Powell voted against the legislation.
9
 Despite a 
small number of localised strikes and token one-day stoppages Stage 2 was generally 
successful.
10
 In April 1973 even the NUM voted against industrial action against the 
advice of the Executive.
11
  
 
But by the summer of 1973 the statutory pay policy was under severe strain from 
rising inflation. In the summer of 1971 it had been 10%, by the summer of 1972 the 
government had managed to reduce it to 6% but by July 1973 it had risen again to 
9.4%.
12
 Inflation was due to a number of factors. The liberalisation of credit controls 
in 1971 led to an explosion of bank lending and a property boom which had caused 
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house prices to soar by 70% in two years. Inflation was also fuelled by the Budget in 
March 1972 which cut taxes and increased public expenditure in a move designed to 
curb the rise in unemployment and boost growth.
13
 At the same time the 1972 
Industry Act, which gave wide powers of intervention to the Secretary of State and 
established an Industrial Development Advisory Board, also increased expenditure 
through a system of generous regional grants and subsidies to industry.
14
  
 
The rise in inflation was also partly due to international factors beyond the 
government’s control. In June 1972, after the United States ended parity between the 
dollar and the gold standard, the British government had abandoned a fixed exchange 
rate for sterling against the dollar and allowed the pound to float, so that between the 
end of 1971 and the middle of 1973 sterling fell by 20% against the dollar. While this 
helped exports it made the price of imports, which were already high because of a 
world-wide surge in commodity prices, even more expensive. This led to a balance 
of payments deficit and yet more downward pressure on the pound.
15
  
 
One of the main figures in the tripartite talks between the government, the TUC and 
the CBI was Sir William Armstrong (Head of the Home Civil Service 1968-74) who 
had also been influential in the secret preparations for the 1972 Industry Act.
16
 Both 
officials and ministers have testified to his considerable influence over Heath.
17
 
Robin Butler believed that it was in part because Heath was distrustful of the 
Treasury.  
Heath had been at the DTI and seen the effect of the Treasury’s ‘stop-go’ 
policies on industry...He was a shy man and felt comfortable with a small 
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number of people which included Peter Carrington, Jim Prior, Willie 
Whitelaw. Armstrong came from a poor background, he had grown up in the 
depression of the 1930s and shared Ted’s feeling of compassion really for 
working people and hatred of unemployment – the belief that you had to do 
everything to try and re-engage the feeling of social cohesion during the 
war.
18
 
 
Sir Frank Cooper (Deputy Secretary Civil Service Department 1970-73) believed 
that Armstrong had become bored with civil service management issues and 
hankered after a major role in central issues of economic policy.
19
 He was the most 
prominent of the able triumvirate of civil servants at the centre of government (the 
others were Robert Armstrong and John Hunt) on whom Heath relied. Armstrong’s 
commitment to the statutory incomes policy, which he had helped draft, was intense. 
When he had appeared in public beside Heath and Barber at its launch at a press 
conference at Lancaster House on 6 November 1972 Bill Kendall (General Secretary 
of the Civil and Public Services Association) had dubbed him ‘the real Deputy Prime 
Minister’.20    
 
There has been a debate over the extent to which the move towards intervention in 
industry and a statutory incomes policy constituted a break with the government’s 
previous policies as set out in the manifesto. Ramsden argued that both amounted to 
one of the biggest changes of direction that the Conservative Party had carried out in 
office since the early 1960s.
21
 While Taylor argued that while the industrial policy 
was not a complete U turn it was not totally consistent either.
22
 Both were later to 
become the focus of bitter criticism from the Conservative right.
23
 The debate over 
the U-turns is not directly relevant to the subject of this thesis since as far as the 
effect on the government’s stance towards the miners went, the similarities between 
N-1 and the statutory incomes policy proved more marked than the differences. 
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The garden meeting 
At first sight it seems extraordinary that less than two years after the bruising defeat 
by the miners in February 1972 the Heath Government ended up embroiled in a 
second dispute with the NUM. It is all the more so since it was a dispute which both 
Heath and Gormley wanted to avoid. After the NUM annual conference in early July 
1973 called for a large wage increase of around 35% Heath held a secret meeting on 
16 July with Gormley in the garden of No 10. Gormley was anxious both to avoid 
another strike and also to limit the influence of the more left wing and militant Daly 
and McGahey.
24
 No officials were present at the meeting apart from Sir William 
Armstrong.  
 
All previous accounts of the garden meeting, which has been universally cited by 
historians as the source of a fatal misunderstanding between Heath and the NUM, 
have been based on Gormley’s version of events, first as told to Fay and Young and 
then recounted in his own memoirs.
25
 Gormley recalled that he told Heath and 
Armstrong that wages would not be the sole component of the NUM’s claim, there 
would also be a demand for an increased payment for working unsocial hours. He 
believed that Heath and Armstrong had taken the hint and left the garden in an 
optimistic mood, convinced he had shown the government the way to pay the miners 
more and yet retain their incomes policy. ‘I was sure they would use that loophole to 
avoid a second confrontation.’26  
 
But the official note of the meeting, ‘marked personal and secret’, presents a rather 
different picture. This minute, based on Sir William Armstrong’s account recorded 
what was described as a, ‘wide-ranging general discussion’, in which Gormley was 
remarkably frank about the problem of militants, communists and fellow travellers 
within his union. He told Heath and Armstrong that while he himself understood the 
wider picture of rising world commodity prices, the miners at the pit-heads saw only 
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an increase in the cost of living. He canvassed the possibility of some kind of 
productivity deal and suggested extra payments for shift workers.
27
  
 
While the official record does not directly contradict Gormley’s account, it does not 
corroborate it, nor even overlap with it to any extent. There was no mention of 
unsocial hours, only the possibility of a productivity element in Stage 3, which 
Gormley acknowledged would require detailed work and he promised to keep in 
touch with Armstrong, ‘on the way his thoughts were developing so that they could 
be taken into account in the consideration of possible criteria for Stage 3’.28 Gormley 
stated in his memoirs that he did not tell his Executive about the meeting.
29
 Prior also 
confirmed that the meeting was also kept from the Cabinet
30
 although the note of it 
was sent to Robert Armstrong and Conrad Heron (Permanent Secretary Department 
of Employment 1973-75), ‘on a personal basis’.31  
 
Heath presented the details of Stage 3 of the pay policy at a press conference on 8 
October 1973, which even Hurd acknowledged was almost incomprehensible to the 
journalists there let alone the television audience at home.
32
 Stage 3 limited wage 
increases to £2.25 a head or 7%, whichever was greater, it also contained 
complicated provisions for extra ‘threshold payments’ of forty pence a week which 
would be triggered once the Retail Price Index (RPI) rose 7% above its level at the 
start of Stage 3, and another forty pence a week for every point after that.
33
 Stage 3 
included allowances for increased productivity and for working unsocial hours, 
which would be applied to all workers. There was also a provision for difficult cases 
which could be judged in accordance with a report on relativities by the Pay Board, 
which was expected to report at the end of 1973.
34
 Significantly, there was also a 
                                                 
27
 TNA: PRO, PREM 15/1680 'National Coal Board pay negotiations: National 
Union of Mineworkers' pay claim; post mortem review; part 4', ‘Note for the 
Record’, 17 July 1973.   
28
 Ibid.  
29
 Gormley, Battered Cherub, p. 78. 
30
 Young, Hugo Young Papers, p. 64. 
31
 TNA: PRO, PREM 15/1680, Stuart to Armstrong, 17 July 1972.  
32
 Hurd, End to Promises, p. 114. 
33
 The Price and Pay Code for Stage Three, Cmnd 5444 (London: HMSO, 1973); 
Counter-Inflation Policy: Stage Three, Cmnd 5466 (London: HMSO, 1973).  
34
 Barnes and Reid, Governments and Trade Unions, pp. 176-78. 
  170 
clause, which Ronald McIntosh said he drafted, which allowed ministers to break the 
Pay Code when they thought it was in the national interest to do so.
35
   
 
Stage 3 was not only extremely complicated and rigid: it had been devised over the 
summer of 1973 before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war and subsequent rise in 
the price of oil caused inflationary price increases. The threshold agreements were to 
prove a fundamental flaw and one of the main causes of spiralling inflation in 1974-
5. Gormley claimed he had envisaged his proposal on unsocial hours as a special deal 
for the miners alone and stressed his irritation that the provisions in Stage 3 applied 
to all workers. ‘I wasn’t best pleased. I had gone there to try to solve our problem, 
not to give them help in running the country as a whole.’36 However, the official note 
of the meeting does show that there was indeed a general discussion of economic 
problems and not just of miners pay.
37
 
 
On 10 October the Coal Board offered the miners a pay deal which went almost to 
the limit of what was available under Stage 3. It included a 7% increase in basic pay, 
4% for unsocial hours plus another 1% holiday pay, with another possible 3.5% for a 
productivity agreement. Nonetheless the NUM turned the deal down.
38
 Conservative 
ministers later blamed the NCB for offering too much too soon. Carr complained that 
they left no room for negotiation.
39
 Heath noted later that he was dismayed that such 
a generous offer should have been made so early and personally blamed Derek Ezra 
(Chairman of the NCB 1971-82).
40
 But Tom Boardman (Minister for Industry 1972-
74) pointed out that one of the major problems with a statutory code was that it 
would have been offensive and counterproductive to the miners to offer them less 
than the maximum allowed.
41
 Roger Dawe (Private Secretary to the Employment 
Secretary 1972-4) recalled that while the Department of Employment was ‘amazed 
and annoyed that the NCB offered the full amount straight away but after 1972 it was 
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fairly gloomy as to whether the miners would settle for anything less than the full 
amount they were seeking’.42  
 
Heath had lost confidence in both the NCB and the Department of Employment after 
the 1972 miners strike. Boardman recalled that Heath removed responsibility for the 
negotiations away from the Department of the Employment and handed it to the DTI, 
which caused a certain amount of friction with Maurice Macmillan (Employment 
Secretary 1972-73) in government.
43
 Dawe thought that a question mark hung over 
the department, partly because of the 1972 strike, partly because of Macmillan, 
whom he described as ‘an able man and a nice man’, but one who appeared to lack 
sufficient weight with his colleagues and did not have the confidence of No 10.
44
 
According to Sir Douglas Allen, ‘there was a tendency in Whitehall to think Derek 
Ezra a bit of a wet’.45 Ezra himself admitted that the negotiations in 1973 were 
directly between the government and the miners; the NCB was sidelined and only 
knew what was going on through their contacts with the NUM.
46
  
 
This meeting in the garden of No 10 has been blamed by historians as the source of a 
critical misunderstanding between the government and the miners which played a 
major part in the 1974 strike.
47
 Former ministers also thought the same. Boardman 
thought that it ‘was a disaster. They did not let anyone know what had been said.’48 
Prior wrote later that ministers were given the impression that a deal had been done 
on unsocial hours but in retrospect he questioned whether Gormley was, ‘too wily an 
old fox’ to have given the firm pledge in which Heath and Armstrong put so much 
faith.
49
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Robin Butler believed that Heath had an exaggerated notion of both Gormley’s 
ability to deliver and placed too much faith in the existence of a mutual interest 
between employers, trade unions and government. Heath, ‘really thought he had 
done a deal with Gormley which Gormley would deliver.’ But in Butler’s view, ‘It 
was not that Gormley was a dishonest man but he was a weak man and Ted Heath 
exaggerated his ability to deliver.’50 Dawe was more sceptical, his perception was 
that Gormley was an allegedly moderate wheeler-dealer, who appeared in different 
guises to different people. He judged that in meetings the militants Daly and 
McGahey were calling the tune and that Gormley did not possess the power of the 
other two. Gormley was working his way round Whitehall allegedly looking for a 
deal, but, ‘I sometimes wondered...You never had any doubts where McGahey and 
Daly stood but you could never be sure with Gormley.’51 
 
The incident of the meeting in the garden is a stark illustration of the dangers of 
unminuted meetings and the pitfalls into which ministers and officials at the apex of 
government can fall when trying to manage complex issues through informal 
contacts. Heath, Armstrong and Gormley all believed they had heard what they 
wanted to hear and their different recollections resulted in a serious 
misunderstanding, whereby both Heath and Gormley felt betrayed by the other. 
Gormley had wanted the miners to be a special case within Stage 3 while Heath felt 
that Stage 3 had been drawn up to meet their concerns in mind, that no further 
exception could be made and they were unreasonable in demanding more. The end 
result was intransigence on both sides. 
 
The energy crisis and the reasons for the state of emergency 
Prior wrote later that, ‘Our reaction to the miners’ overtime ban which began in 
November was dictated by the traumatic experience of the 1972 miners’ strike. We 
were determined not to get caught out again, but now we went to the other 
extreme.’52 Historians have not analysed in detail the reasons behind the declaration 
of the fifth  state of emergency announced on 13 November 1973 but the inference 
drawn has been that the government over-reacted and both the state of emergency 
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and the three-day week were to some extent unnecessary. Whitehead judged the 
emergency ‘precipitate’ while Campbell argued that compared with 1972 the coal 
stocks were high, but partly because of the simultaneous threat to oil supplies and 
partly to signal their determination not to get caught out again ministers decided on a 
state of emergency. 
53
  
 
But during October and November the government was faced with an increasingly 
serious energy crisis from three sources; the uncertainty over oil supplies in the wake 
of the Yom Kippur war, the prospect of an overtime ban by the miners, which 
became a reality on 12 November, and the threat of industrial action from the 
moderate Electrical Power Engineers’ Association (EPEA) which represented vital 
technical staff in the power stations. With the exception of Ledger and Sallis, who 
correctly emphasised its significance,
54
 other historians have made only glancing 
references to the dispute with the EPEA.
55
 This was not least because the 
government was anxious to play down the threat in public but the papers in the 
National Archives show the extent to which it was a source of acute anxiety to 
ministers and an equally important factor, along with the oil shortage and the miners’ 
overtime ban, which was announced on 8 November to take effect on 12 November, 
in the decision to declare a state of emergency.   
 
After the Yom Kippur war and the OPEC oil price rise there was great uncertainty on 
the international front and the government’s estimates of the effect on the UK 
changed daily; one estimate suggested that in November there would be a 20% 
shortfall in normal oil supply.
56
 The government found it extremely difficult to 
obtain accurate information and the Oil Industry Emergency Committee which 
consisted of DTI officials and representatives of the oil companies was activated so 
that ministers could have daily updates on the oil supply position.
57
 The Task Force 
on Oil was also instructed to maximise efforts to maintain Britain’s oil supplies, 
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which included pressure on British owned oil companies to give priority to supplies 
to the UK.
58
 
 
Figure 3. Structure of Cabinet Committees which dealt with the 1973-4 crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
CCU Civil Contingencies Committee worked directly both to the Cabinet 
and ES 
ES  Economic Strategy Committee 
ESOT  Task Force on Oil (abolished at the end of 1973) 
GEN 203 Ministerial Committee to supervise the CCU – came into existence 
only during the general election campaign and met only once. 
IRP Industrial Relations Policy Committee (GEN 94) to which the CCU 
originally reported, fell into disuse and was abolished at the end of 
1973 during Hunt’s cull of committees. 
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During the autumn the main strategic committee which dealt with the energy crisis 
was the Cabinet’s Economic Strategy Committee (ES) which was chaired by Heath 
and its members included all the most senior ministers. Mindful of the lessons from 
the disjointed machinery in 1972 Heath instructed that there should be close co-
ordination between the Task Force on Oil Supplies and the CCU.
59
 The CCU 
focussed on practical preparations and its briefings provided a solid foundation for 
wider strategic discussion at both ES and Cabinet.
60
 Since the spring of 1972 the 
CCU had overseen a programme of building up the coal stocks so that by October 
1973 the power stations held twenty million tons of coal equivalent to twelve weeks 
of normal winter usage, the highest ever. Stocks of the ancillary supplies such as 
lighting-up fuel, which had been the weak link in keeping the power stations going in 
1972, had also been built up to six weeks of endurance.
61
 The CCU had also made 
early plans for petrol rationing so that by mid-October a large number of petrol 
coupons were already stored at a Ministry of Defence depot ready for distribution to 
post offices. During October and November it pressed ahead with preparations for 
petrol rationing and for legislation to implement price controls on petrol.
62
  
 
But the government’s efforts to conserve stocks of oil were circumscribed by the 
growing threat of industrial action from the miners. In 1973 coal provided 
approximately 63% of fuel for electricity generation, oil approximately 26% and 
nuclear energy 10%.
63
 The energy dilemma which faced the CCU was that the 
country could save a large amount of oil, between five and six million tons, but only 
at the expense of burning an extra fourteen million tons of coal, which would leave 
the country dangerously exposed to the miners or severe winter weather.
64
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The growing energy crisis was compounded by industrial action from the moderate 
EPEA which banned overtime from 1 November. This was because the government 
refused to implement an agreement, which the EPEA had reached with the employers 
in December 1972 under Stage 2 of the incomes policy, because it contravened the 
more restrictive Stage 3. Action by the EPEA was serious because at that time any 
disconnections caused by a generating capacity shortage, which would ensue from an 
absence of engineers in the power stations outside normal hours, had to be done by 
engineers at substations out in the field, to avoid switching off hospitals and other 
vital electricity users. Action by the EPEA also reduced the output of nuclear power 
stations and affected the efficient operation of coal fired power stations so that more 
coal was burned.
65
   
 
Most worrying of all for the Cabinet was that industrial action by the EPEA would 
preclude the operation of any system of orderly and selective rota cuts in a power 
shortage. Instead there would have to be a much more unpredictable and 
indiscriminate system of cuts which would not allow preferential treatment to be 
given to emergency services.
66
 The DTI had produced a chilling assessment of the 
effects of a strike by both manual and engineering staff which would mean ‘the 
National Grid would be broken up, many essential consumers would be disconnected 
and most of the country would be blacked out’.67 It was abundantly clear from the 
papers in the National Archives that nobody at the CEGB or in Whitehall knew just 
what the effects of industrial action by the power station engineers would be and this 
contributed to the general mood of apprehension.
68
 
 
As in 1972 ministers continued until the last minute to hope that the threatened 
overtime ban by the miners would not materialise.
69
 But this hope was dashed by the 
decision of the NUM to operate an overtime ban from 12 November, which ratcheted 
up the energy crisis, and ministers at ES decided there should be a general appeal for 
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a 10% reduction in fuel consumption.
70
 An overtime ban was likely to have a rapid 
effect on coal production and the most pessimistic estimate was that it could reduce 
the coal supply by 40%. If that proved accurate then the coal stocks would only last 
until the end of February before the safety level of six million tons, which the CEGB 
was obliged to hold as a reserve level so that it could ensure a balanced distribution 
of stocks between power stations, was reached. If extra coal was burnt to achieve a 
25% cut in oil consumption then the safety level of coal stocks would be reached by 
the end of January. Moreover, although coal stocks had been built up at the power 
stations, industrial firms were in a much more vulnerable position.
71
  
 
Ministers at ES discussed tactics at length but were unable to formulate any coherent 
overall strategy. In public ministers claimed that the pay offer to the miners was a 
good one but privately among themselves ministers acknowledged that the NUM had 
a case; that while the unsocial hours payment under Stage 3 would benefit 
underground workers it would do very little for surface workers. They admitted that 
under Stage 2 of the pay policy the miners had lost most of the ground which they 
had gained in the Wilberforce settlement. Although they were still determined to 
defend Stage 3 at all costs ministers lacked any strategy to persuade the miners to 
settle; there was no scope for legal action under either the Industrial Relations Act or 
the Counter Inflation Act, and they rather feebly, but unrealistically, hoped that 
adverse public opinion might have an effect on the NUM.
72
  
 
But pressure on the government increased when the opposition tabled an emergency 
debate in the House of Commons for Tuesday 13 November. In preparation for this 
Heath convened a Cabinet Committee composed of ministers and senior officials 
which met the evening before to discuss the miners’ industrial action.73 This meeting 
acknowledged that the presentation of the government’s case was not good, that the 
figures in the pay offer were very complex and that the NCB had failed to get them 
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across to the public while Gormley had had a clear field on radio and television. 
Ministers also admitted that the EPEA, unlike the miners, had a genuine grievance 
and it would be a good idea to settle with them.
74
 From the official record it is clear 
that the discussion at this meeting lacked a general sense of direction and was 
essentially tactical rather than strategic. Since the government’s overriding goal was 
to adhere completely to Stage 3 there was little room for compromise.   
 
By the time the Cabinet met the next day they felt under growing pressure from 
public opinion to take action. For the first time The Times focussed on the issue of 
the miners’ pay, until then its attention had been on the Middle East war and the 
problem posed by the EPEA.
75
 The Daily Mail also pumped up the crisis.
76
 Ministers 
concluded that the triple threat from the miners, the EPEA and the disruption of oil 
supplies now justified a proclamation of a state of emergency to conserve fuel stocks 
and to protect industry.
77
 That afternoon Carr announced that the industrial action by 
the miners and the power engineers, coupled with the uncertainty over oil supplies 
from the Middle East constituted a threat to the essentials of life of the community. A 
state of emergency would take effect from midnight; the initial restrictions were 
relatively mild; electricity for display advertising would be limited and government 
buildings were ordered to cut their fuel consumption by 10%.
78
  
 
At the time the declaration of a state of emergency came as a surprise to the press, 
the public and the Commons and seemed an over-reaction.
79
 The Times commented 
that, ‘The government’s change from a stance of ‘wait and see’ to urgent action took 
the House of Commons by surprise yesterday…Behind the scenes, in fact senior 
ministers emphasised the precautionary nature of the decision rather than a crisis.’80 
It was greeted with hostility by the Labour Party and Shirley Williams (Labour MP 
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for Hitchin, Spokesperson on Home Affairs) queried its necessity and suggested that 
the government was attempting to blame the miners for the oil crisis.
81
  
 
But the decision to declare a state of emergency was not taken lightly; at the time the 
energy position was genuinely precarious with a triple threat to electricity from 
uncertainty over oil supplies, the prospect of a rapid decline in coal production and 
the threat which the EPEA action posed to the safe and orderly management of the 
electricity supply. But while the threat to oil supplies was an external factor over 
which the government had only limited influence the industrial action by the NUM 
and EPEA was the direct result of its statutory incomes policy.   
 
Deeper into the mire 
Hurd later observed that, ‘During November 1973 the earth began to move under the 
Government’s feet...We had most of us dreaded, beyond anything else, a further 
engagement with the miners. Yet here we were being manoeuvred once again 
towards the same fatal field, still littered with relics of the last defeat.’82 This 
ascribed a measure of helplessness and passivity to the government’s predicament 
but the decision to adhere religiously to Stage 3 and allow no exceptions was a fully 
conscious one. At the beginning of November Heath discussed economic prospects 
and the implications of Stage 3 with a group of senior officials. The main worry was 
that inflation was rising as a result of increases in both the costs of raw materials and 
wages, and there was a danger that the thresholds were triggered once but not twice. 
They agreed that wage settlements were the critical factor and the most crucial were 
the miners and the railwaymen so it was essential to ‘achieve an industrial “red 
meat” settlement’ and to get across the message that the government was operating 
under a statutory regime which gave no room for concessions.
83
 
 
During November and December there was still considerable uncertainty over the oil 
supply and the government tried all possible means to secure the UK’s supplies, 
including pressure on the major oil companies of Shell and BP which between them 
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accounted for half the UK supplies. While the government had little leverage over 
Shell, it held the majority shareholding in BP and ministers argued that it should 
therefore give the UK preferential treatment, but BP resisted this as it would 
undermine its position as a multi-national corporation, and provoke a similar action 
in other countries, particularly the US.
84
 Heath was furious at what he later described 
in his memoirs as ‘the obstinate and unyielding reluctance of these magnates to take 
any action whatever to help our own country in its time of danger’.85  
 
As the shortage of oil supplies began to be felt there were long queues at petrol 
stations, largely as the result of panic buying and Walker appealed for a reduction in 
weekend motoring to a minimum and none on Sundays.
86
 The DTI, following 
instructions from the CCU, set up Regional Petroleum HQs ready to administer a 
system of petrol rationing and fuel rationing books were printed and distributed to 
post offices. The Cabinet returned to the issue of whether to introduce petrol 
rationing on several occasions in November and December but always baulked at it, 
relying instead on public appeals and price controls.
87
 Walker claimed later that he 
was adamantly opposed to rationing since it would have been monstrously unfair and 
the administration of it was a potential disaster area.
88
 But rumours of petrol 
rationing, reported in the press, exacerbated the public sense of crisis and anxiety 
over petrol shortages was so acute that some people resorted to stealing it.
89
  
 
At the beginning of December the oil companies were still unable to predict supply 
levels with any confidence; their best estimate was that in December there would be 
a shortfall in crude oil of 16% and in January of just over 20%. The CEGB had 
intended to cut its oil burn by 30% but if it went ahead with this, in conjunction with 
the miners’ overtime ban, this would entail electricity disconnections between the 
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end of January and mid-February, depending on the extent to which the overtime ban 
reduced the level of coal production. The Cabinet decided to limit the CEGB’s oil cut 
to 13% but this would only delay the need for disconnections by a week.
90
 More 
restrictions on fuel consumption were necessary and Walker announced measures to 
limit the temperature in commercial premises, curtail street lighting and impose a 
maximum speed of 50 mph on roads.
91
  
 
On 23 October Heath, accompanied by Macmillan, Boardman and Heron, had met a 
deputation from the NUM, led by Gormley, Daly and McGahey. The NUM asked for 
changes to the proposals for Stage 3, particularly on unsocial hours and holiday pay. 
But Heath was adamant that the proposals had been constructed so that the miners 
would benefit.
92
 At this stage the NUM Executive was not prepared to put the NCB’s 
pay offer to a ballot of its members but nor was it yet prepared to recommend strike 
action. It opted instead to seek authority for an overtime ban in support of its pay 
claim from a special delegate conference on 26 October.
93
 This was a repeat of its 
strategy in 1972 and both ministers and officials were by this stage thoroughly 
disillusioned with the leadership of the NUM. Macmillan blamed Gormley for failing 
to hold an early ballot which would have been unlikely to vote for industrial action 
and ministers were now convinced that Daly was seeking another confrontation.
94
  
 
The miners’ overtime ban began on 12 November and the state of emergency 
followed a day later. Coal production began to fall rapidly and on 28 November 
Heath called the entire thirty six members of the NUM Executive to a meeting in No 
10 in an attempt to persuade them to settle within Stage 3. Hurd’s criticisms of the 
civil servants who prepared Heath for this meeting were stringent. ‘It should have 
provided a chance for that clear-headed analysis of the options before the 
Government, which was by then badly needed. Instead there was silence on the big 
issues and a confused, bitty discussion of trivial tactical points. I felt critical of the 
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senior civil servants present, whose duty it should have been to force the discussion 
into some coherent channel.’95  
 
It is certainly true that the official briefing for this meeting was voluminous and 
much of it was concerned with the detailed intricacies of the NCB offer.
96
 But the 
main flaw was the absence of any effective political strategy; ministers simply hoped 
that the NUM would ballot its membership on the NCB offer and a motion for a 
strike would be defeated. The evening before Heath’s meeting with the NUM Prior, 
Macmillan, Boardman, Terence Higgins (Financial Secretary to the Treasury) and 
Heron met to discuss how to achieve a settlement to the various disputes. But the 
minutes showed the ministers were divided on whether to offer the NUM an inquiry 
into the future of the industry and unsure of how to persuade the moderates within 
the NUM to call off the overtime ban.
97
 Ministers simply pinned their hopes on 
‘private intelligence’ that moderates within the NUM would press for a ballot on the 
NCB’s offer.98  
 
But there were warnings from other sources that this was still uncertain. After a 
private dinner with Gormley, Donald Harker (Director of Publicity at Conservative 
Central Office) told Hurd that while Gormley wanted to see the dispute settled 
quickly without a head-on collision with the government, he would call the ballot 
only when he was confident the miners would vote against strike action, and that 
would not happen without some drastic improvement to the NCB offer.
99
 That the 
government’s strategy was a high risk one was clear. Sir William Armstrong, after a 
private conversation with Len Murray (General Secretary TUC 1973-84), reported 
Murray’s conviction that if the miners settled within Stage 3 so would other unions. 
But there was also a real danger that public sector unions could coalesce round the 
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miners in a determined effort to overthrow Stage 3, and the possibility of an early 
election would be in the forefront of many union leaders’ minds.100 
 
By the time of the meeting on 28 November the NCB had been completely sidelined 
and was not even represented at the meeting. Heath was flanked on either side by 
Barber and Sir William Armstrong, the other ministers present were Macmillan and 
Boardman. Gormley sat facing Heath, with Daly on his left and McGahey on his 
right, accompanied by the whole of the NUM Executive, including Scargill.
101
 
Previous accounts of this meeting have focussed on the acrimonious clash between 
Heath and McGahey, Andrew Taylor has made use of the NUM records but none 
have made use of the official record of the meeting.
102
 The recollections of those 
present differ as to what exactly what was said. Barber remembered that Heath asked 
McGahey what he wanted and that McGahey replied, ‘something to the effect, “I 
want to see the end of your Government!”.’103 According to Boardman, Heath 
welcomed the NUM and told them he hoped they could exchange views, to which 
McGahey retorted, ‘I’m not interested in your point of view. I’m only interested in 
getting you out of that chair.’104 Robin Butler was also present at the meeting and 
cannot recall the exact words but he does remember that McGahey said something 
along the lines of, ‘we mean to bring the government down’.105  
 
The official note of the meeting only recorded rather blandly that McGahey told 
Heath that, ‘The miners were not trying to defeat the Government but he made no 
secret of his views that the quicker there was an election and a change of 
Government the better.’106 But those who were present at the meeting remember it as 
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much more acrimonious and it was reported as a clash in The Times the next day.
107
 
McGahey later denied he had implied the use of force and Gormley also claimed that 
McGahey only meant the use of the ballot box.
108
 But all the miners’ leaders had 
recently made a series of public statements which gave ministers good grounds for 
believing the NUM were seeking a confrontation. The preceding weekend the press 
had reported that Daly had told a rally that the miners could break Phase 3 and force 
the withdrawal of the counter-inflation legislation.
109
 Even the moderate Gormley 
had also been quoted as saying that the miners meant to get a £50 basic wage and if 
this meant breaking the Government ‘then a break there would have to be’.110  
 
The most interesting aspect of the official note of the meeting is not the clash 
between Heath and McGahey but what it reveals about Heath’s attitude to wage 
bargaining and economic policy. Heath described Stage 3 as an orderly framework to 
provide a sensible way of controlling inflation. He had discussed it with the NUM 
negotiating committee and taken account of the points which they had made. While 
Stage 3 did not give the miners everything they wanted it enabled them to catch up 
on the ground they had lost since the Wilberforce settlement. ‘The Code had been put 
before Parliament and it was now the law’, so any settlement must be within its 
limits. In ‘a free-for-all’ there would be greater inflation, the pound would lose its 
competitiveness, prices would go up and most important, the government would be 
unable to continue the policy of expansion, with the result that unemployment would 
rise.
111
 
 
Sir William Armstrong recalled later that one of the NUM delegation asked Heath 
why he could not pay the miners for coal what he was willing to pay the Arabs for oil 
and, ‘that in fact was bang on the economic nose. And the Prime Minister really had 
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no answer to that.’112 The NUM records show that Heath responded that he was 
trying to convey to the Arab states that that they would suffer financially if they 
pursued their present policies and ‘just as the Arabs could push things too far, so 
could others’.113 While the official record merely states that Heath’s response was 
that the government was trying to keep all prices down.
114
 Later in his memoirs 
Heath expressed outrage at the suggestion, ‘The majority of the NUM executive had 
priorities which no democrat could tolerate and, at one point, it was even suggested 
that, since we were having to pay the oil producers the price they demanded we 
ought to treat the miners in the same way.’115   
 
This meeting seems to have reinforced Heath’s suspicions that elements within the 
NUM were politically motivated. In his memoirs he noted that McGahey proclaimed 
he wanted to bring the government down.
116
 But rather remarkably Heath reported to 
the Cabinet that it had been, ‘a useful and restrained discussion in a relatively good 
atmosphere’. Although disappointed that the NUM Executive still refused to ballot 
their members Heath believed that there were signs that his exposition on world and 
national economic problems ‘had made a genuine impact on at least the more 
moderate members of the Executive’.117  
 
This is a remarkable testament to Heath’s unflagging but unrealistic confidence in 
the rationality of human nature in general and Gormley in particular but his hopes 
that Gormley would be able to persuade the NUM Executive to put the NCB offer to 
a ballot of the membership had proved misplaced. The NUM met in private in No 10 
and their records show that it was argued that now was the time to have a ballot to 
see if the members supported the NEC’s rejection of the offer, but they agreed a 
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ballot would not be held at this stage.
118
 Heath recalled that Gormley told him he 
would take a vote directly after lunch. ‘He assured me it was going to be all right. He 
came alone to my study after their meeting had resumed looking pale and drawn, to 
tell me he had been defeated.’119 This was one of several of Gormley’s failures to 
persuade his Executive, which are a notable omission in his memoirs. 
 
What shines through the official records is Heath’s conviction that the interests of the 
miners were the same as those of the nation as a whole; to keep prices and wage 
inflation down so the policy of economic expansion essential for high employment 
would follow. His dismissive view of free collective bargaining was that it would be 
a ‘free-for- all’ and his genuine conviction was that Stage 3 would benefit both the 
miners and the country. Heath’s meetings with the NUM testified above all to his 
faith in ‘rationality in politics’.120 Heath felt strongly that the pay code had the 
backing of Parliament and hence an almost moral political legitimacy as well as a 
statutory authority and that by rejecting the NCB offer the miners were being 
completely unreasonable. But the NUM Executive was focussed on the problems of 
the industry, and particularly their pay and conditions compared to other workers in 
more pleasant environments. Heath’s appeal to the NUM to identify with the national 
interest was one which they were unable to meet. The meetings resulted in an 
impasse and served only to illustrate the widening gulf between the government and 
the miners.  
 
Reasons for the three-day week 
On 13 December, after the state of emergency had been in force for a month, the 
government announced that from 1 January 1974 industry would move to a three-day 
week. Most previous historians have not analysed the reasons why the government 
took the drastic decision to implement the three-day week in detail although 
Sandbrook has drawn on the Cabinet minutes to emphasise the difficulties with the 
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energy position.
121
 There is, for example, no discussion in Whitehead although there 
is a passing reference to the rail dispute with ASLEF in Jeffery and Hennessy.
122
 
Prior later argued that it was a mistake, ‘having taken such drastic action at the very 
outset, it was subsequently more difficult to convince people that the situation was 
really as serious as we had claimed’.123 Campbell believed that the three-day week 
was a misjudgement, that it was a response to party pressure for a signal that the 
government was going to stand firm.
124
 But despite Prior’s later doubts the papers in 
the National Archives show that at the time there was intense anxiety among 
ministers and officials as to whether the country’s energy supplies could hold out.  
 
Throughout the second half of November the government had attempted to maintain 
an air of normality which had led a frustrated Douglas Allen on 6 December to 
complain to McIntosh (now Director General of NEDO) that ministers did not realise 
how bad things were.
125
 By early December the pressure on ministers and officials 
mounted as the wider economic outlook deteriorated. There had been a disastrous set 
of trade figures in November, due mainly to the weakness of the pound, and higher 
oil prices were now inevitable, which would affect not only the balance of payments 
but the whole range of government policy on public expenditure, counter inflation, 
public transport and energy. On 6 December the pound fell by ten cents against the 
dollar and there was a wave of panic selling in the city, which generated alarmed 
newspaper headlines.
126
  
 
It was against this background that four of the most senior officials, Sir William 
Armstrong, Sir John Hunt, Sir Douglas Allen and Robert Armstrong met to discuss 
the Treasury’s plans for an emergency budget, which included drastic cuts in public 
expenditure for the financial year 1974/5 and the possibility of tightening Stage 3, 
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with even a complete freeze on pay.
127
 After this meeting Robert Armstrong warned 
Heath that the ‘business as usual’ line which the government had so far followed was 
now no longer viable and it was necessary to prepare public opinion for the difficult 
times ahead. ‘It is arguable that confidence is no longer served by continuing as at 
present: if the situation is clearly serious and calls for action, confidence is damaged 
not improved, by a continuing appearance of Governmental blindness (or refusal to 
see) and inaction.’ Since a series of emergency economic measures were likely to be 
needed in mid-January it would be highly unwise for Heath to be out of the country 
and he should cancel his planned visit to China.
128
  
 
It was a measure of just how deep the crisis was that Armstrong felt it necessary to 
commit such a stark warning to paper. The same day there was an almost identical 
warning from Hurd and a group of political advisers. Hurd worried that Heath had 
become too detached from the political aspects of the crisis and he echoed 
Armstrong’s warning that the policy of trying to maintain business confidence had 
reached its limit and if the government continued along this course, ‘it would 
increasingly be felt to be out of touch with reality and to have lost its grip on 
events’.129   
 
But while senior officials were aware of the seriousness of the problems they were 
unable to come up with any solutions and as McIntosh recorded in his diary, during 
December even the most senior and able civil servants such as Douglas Allen seemed 
at a loss, ‘for the first time since I have known him I found him uncertain what 
should be done next…He confessed that he not only didn’t know what ministers 
would do but didn’t know what advice he ought to give them.’130 William Armstrong 
was, ‘in a very depressed mood. He said that the situation was graver than anything 
we had faced since the war. But he didn’t offer any suggestions for getting out of 
it.’131 Robert Armstrong recalled, ‘Those last months in the autumn of 1973 onwards 
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were as difficult a time as any period faced by any government...There was so much 
going on it was difficult to keep pace with it all.’132 
 
There was a widespread recognition among those who dealt with him that by 
December Heath was exhausted.
133
 Hurd believed that the pressure of other events 
prevented the miners’ crisis from getting the attention it needed.134 The industrial 
unrest coincided with arduous and delicate negotiations on a power sharing 
agreement in Northern Ireland which culminated in the Sunningdale Agreement on 9 
December which was only concluded by talks which lasted through the night. This 
was followed by other diplomatic activity and a disastrous European summit on the 
oil crisis at Copenhagen. Other ministers were also exhausted; Barber, who was deep 
in planning an emergency budget was suffering from ‘acute fatigue’ while Carr was 
also very tired.
135
 Hunt commented later that the strain of dealing with the Yom 
Kippur war had taken its toll, ‘they were all very tired men and they were not taking 
decisions in the most sensible way.’136    
 
A sense of powerlessness and despondency in Whitehall was reflected in an 
increasingly hostile press. A full page spread in the Labour-supporting Daily Mirror 
was headlined, ‘Country of Chaos,’ with sub-headings; ‘The rail crisis’, ‘The 
economic crisis’, ‘The fuel crisis’, ‘The power crisis’.137 While The Times was also 
sharply critical, ‘The Government have now begun to run into a bad press over their 
handling of the fuel crisis and they have only themselves to blame. They are once 
again busy proving that they are the worst readers of popular psychology in the 
country.’138 In this febrile atmosphere there was widespread gloom among the 
political elite not only about the economic prospects but also the future of democratic 
government. Freddie Fisher (Editor Financial Times) thought there was a real risk of 
a right wing authoritarian government while Lord Plowden (former Chair of the 
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Atomic Energy Authority and one of ‘the great and the good’) prophesied ‘a 
dictatorship of the left’.139  
 
The energy position, which was already weakened by the triple threat from the 
uncertain nature of the oil supply, the effects of the miners’ overtime ban and the 
industrial action from the EPEA came under further threat when pay negotiations 
with the train drivers’ union ASLEF broke down on 3 December. The tone of the 
official record conveys a sense that the CCU was almost overwhelmed by the 
problems it faced. ‘The risk to the life and economy of the nation was such that 
immediate action by the Unit was necessary...Time was at a premium.’ Prior 
acknowledged that although contingency plans had been drawn up to deal with 
different types of emergencies, ‘none had envisaged simultaneous action on so many 
fronts with such potentially damaging effects as now seemed possible’.140   
 
By 10 December fears over the energy position had become acute. The ASLEF 
work-to-rule was likely to reduce the movement of coal to power stations by 10%, 
which combined with the effects of the miners’ overtime ban, meant a 50% reduction 
in the coal supply to power stations. The EPEA action had already reduced the output 
from nuclear fired power stations which meant a greater oil and coal burn, when both 
were in short supply, was necessary. Walker predicted that if the miners’ overtime 
ban continued electricity disconnections would be necessary by mid-January and 
within two or three weeks after that electricity generating capacity would be down to 
the level of the 1972 miners’ strike.141  
 
If all the industrial disputes were settled by the end of December it might be possible 
to scrape through but on the worst assumptions there would be widespread and 
unpredictable disconnections by mid January. Walker argued that drastic savings in 
electricity were necessary to get through the winter and he proposed to achieve this 
by restricting industry and commerce to three days electricity a week. The tone of 
Walker’s paper was deeply pessimistic, ‘In my view we dare not assume the best or 
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anything like it. If we do, and are wrong, the consequences are so serious as to be 
unacceptable. We should therefore resolve to pay a considerable insurance premium 
now and recommend that we take steps to restrict electricity demand by 20% as from 
next week.’142 The government was also under pressure from the electricity industry 
which had already called publicly for restrictions on the use of electricity, and now 
pressed ministers for further controls on consumption so that stocks of both coal and 
oil could be conserved.
143
  
 
During the week beginning 10 December the various ministerial and official 
committees responsible for handling the crisis met frequently; the CCU met three 
times, the Economic Strategy Committee (ES) twice and the Cabinet twice as they 
grappled with the practical implications of the draconian restrictions which were 
proposed. Ministers at ES were extremely anxious at the effect of Walker’s proposals 
on the economy since it was estimated that they would very quickly lead to a 10% 
fall in industrial production, unemployment of three quarters of a million people, 
with serious implications for growth and the balance of payments. In a desperate 
attempt to avoid putting industry on a three-day week ES considered a range of 
drastic measures such as restricting domestic heating to one room, electric light to 
only one in each room and requiring thermostats on water heaters and fridges to be 
set at the lowest feasible level. Ministers reluctantly decided that these swingeing 
cuts in domestic consumption would be unenforceable, but were still anxious, if at all 
possible, to avoid a three-day week and ES requested Walker to investigate the 
possibility of achieving the necessary 20% saving from a four-day week with rota 
cuts.
144
  
 
But the next day Walker reported that this was impossible since it would require 
selective rota cuts which could not be implemented because of the EPEA action. 
While this was not widely understood there was little point in provoking this 
moderate union by pointing the blame at them. Walker argued strongly that there was 
no alternative but to restrict industry to a three-day week with normal hours and no 
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overtime and with great reluctance ES agreed.
145
 On 12 December Walker warned 
the Cabinet that the position at the power stations was likely to deteriorate and 
repeated his argument that savings of 20% in electricity consumption were 
necessary. He proposed a five-day limit between 14 and 29 December and a three-
day week from 31 December.
146
 Heath endorsed the proposal for the three-day week 
with the gloomy comment that it was necessary if the government were to have any 
chance of surviving until the end of March.
147
  
 
The next day in the Commons Heath announced that from the following Monday 17 
December industry and commerce would be limited in their use of electricity and 
from 1 January they would be restricted to three consecutive days a week. While 
shops could open every day they would have electricity only for three days, there 
were restrictions on street lighting and advertising displays and television would 
close down at 10.30pm. He warned that power cuts would become inevitable unless 
energy savings were achieved and that because of the EPEA action vital services 
could be badly affected. He exhorted everyone to keep rooms at lower temperatures, 
switch off lights and turn down thermostats. In his Commons statement Heath placed 
most of the blame for the measures on industrial action. He emphasised that stocks of 
coal in the power stations had fallen to 40% below normal because of the miners’ 
overtime ban and that deliveries of both coal and oil to the power stations were 
threatened by the ASLEF action, while the EPEA action meant it was difficult to 
manage electricity restrictions in an orderly manner.
148
  
 
The announcement of the three-day week came as a shock. The Times called it, ‘one 
of the gravest statements made to the House of Commons since the war’.149 The 
Daily Mail reflected the views of many Conservative supporters and advocated a 
firm stand against the miners, ‘The measures the Prime Minister announced 
yesterday will mean inconvenience for all and hardship for not a few. The Daily Mail 
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believes they are necessary. And that Mr Heath will get the support of the nation for 
which he asked so directly on TV last night’.150 This typified the kind of reaction of 
‘seeing it through with the miners’ and ‘avoiding appeasement’ which so worried 
McIntosh, who was anxious that the government after having first under-reacted 
would now over-react.
151
 Cecil King on Friday 14 December commented, ‘So the 
balloon has begun to go up...I doubt if this will work – the resentment is more likely 
to build up against the Government – and rightly so.’152  
 
The TUC had not been consulted, either formally or informally about the move to the 
three-day week and were both resentful about this and anxious about the effect on 
employment.
153
 Sir Sidney Greene (Chairman of TUC Economic Committee 1968-
75, General Secretary of NUR 1957-74) told Heath that the unions had been 
flabbergasted by the suddenness of the decision to impose the three-day week.
154
 
Both the failure to consult the TUC and the presentation of the reasons for the three-
day week angered the unions.
155
 Jack Jones recalled in his memoirs that he told the 
TUC General Council, ‘The miners are being made to carry the can and we should 
do all we can to support them.’156   
 
The official records show that the Cabinet took the decision to implement the three-
day week with great reluctance and real anxiety about the effects on industry and 
unemployment. The main factor was undoubtedly the genuine shortage of all fuel 
stocks at the power stations, not just coal, but in placing the blame in public on 
industrial action the government antagonised the unions and made a settlement of the 
miners’ dispute more difficult to achieve. It also laid it open to the charge that the 
three-day week was a political measure to counter the industrial disputes and bolster 
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Stage 3. This was to prove deeply damaging to all attempts to reach a settlement with 
the miners over the next few weeks.  
 
Missed opportunities 
There is a widespread view, well-entrenched among historians and commentators, 
 that Heath and his ministers missed a number of opportunities to reach a settlement 
with the miners, either through blindness or wilful obstinacy. At various times there 
were proposals that the miners might be paid more than Stage 3 for ‘bathing and 
waiting’ time before and after shifts began, that the increase in the oil price relative 
to coal justified paying the miners higher wages or that the TUC offer to regard the 
miners as a special case should have been acted upon. The view that mistakes were 
made is firmly held by some of the participants, although they differed in the 
emphasis they place on each. Gormley claimed that ‘bathing and waiting’ would 
have achieved a settlement if Wilson had not intervened.
157
 Ezra, Murray and 
McIntosh were all convinced that the TUC offer was a real opportunity to settle and 
the government made a huge mistake in not accepting it.
158
 With hindsight, although 
not at the time, Prior accepted that it would have been sensible to accept the TUC 
offer, while Whitelaw admitted later that his failure to refer the miners’ claim to the 
Pay Board was a mistake.
159
  
 
Historians have also differed in the emphasis they have placed on the various missed 
opportunities. Gormley’s claim on bathing and waiting has been treated with a 
moderate amount of scepticism but discussion of it has served to reinforce the 
impression that the government was culpable of a series of errors.
160
 Much more 
emphasis has been placed on Rothschild’s argument that the rise in the oil price after 
the Middle East War made coal cheaper than oil, and several commentators have 
judged that Heath summarily and mistakenly rejected this.
161
 The files in the 
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National Archives have shed more light on the claims and counter-claims which have 
surrounded all these proposed solutions. 
 
The appointment of William Whitelaw (Employment Secretary 1973-74) was also 
seen as a possible solution to the crisis. At the beginning of December Heath 
reshuffled the Cabinet and replaced Macmillan, in whom no one in the Cabinet had 
much confidence,
162
 with Whitelaw, whose conciliation skills had achieved a great 
deal in Northern Ireland and there was a considerable expectation that he might be 
able to achieve something similar with the miners. Although King noted in his diary, 
‘Poor Willie Whitelaw knows nothing about industrial relations and I doubt whether 
his charm will avail him.’163 As Whitelaw later candidly admitted he was the wrong 
man for the job since he was mentally and physically exhausted after Northern 
Ireland and out of touch with events at Westminster.
164
 Nor, as he also 
acknowledged, did he have any understanding of the intricacies of Stage 3 of the Pay 
Code, unlike Heath who knew the detail ‘down to the last comma’.165 One of his 
anonymous colleagues put it even more graphically, ‘Willie was a danger to shipping 
throughout.’166  
 
Whitelaw’s reputation as a conciliator coupled with his instinct for compromise led 
the NUM to have high expectations that he would offer them more than Stage 3, and 
at the beginning of December he held a confidential meeting at Browns Hotel in 
Mayfair with Gormley, who found him sympathetic to the miners’ case.167 One way 
out of the impasse would have been to have made the miners a special case under 
Stage 3 by invoking the clause in the Pay Code which allowed the government to 
make exceptions in the national interest. In his memoirs Whitelaw later claimed that, 
‘Privately I felt that such an approach had few objections, for the Government had 
power under the Act to sanction a higher settlement under exceptional 
circumstances.’168  
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But Whitelaw was out of step with the core belief among most ministers and senior 
officials that to make the miners a special case would open the door to higher claims 
from other unions and cause great resentment among those workers who had already 
settled within Stage 3. He later told McIntosh that he was never in any doubt that the 
government should have settled the miners claim before Christmas in the wake of the 
oil crisis. ‘He said he regretted not having pushed this point of view harder. He was 
new to the job at the time and Conrad Heron and William Armstrong were advising 
ministers to stand firm at all costs.’169 By the time Whitelaw arrived the state of 
emergency was already in operation and Heath and No 10, not the Department of 
Employment, were managing the dispute.
170
 Whitelaw even felt that he was excluded 
from top level meetings with officials.
171
 According to Roger Dawe, while 
Whitelaw’s arrival boosted the Department’s morale and he was very good at 
personal contact, by then Daly and McGahey had become ever more intransigent, 
and it was arguably already too late.
172
 Robert Taylor thought that by December the 
Cabinet and NUM Executive were not yet completely locked into an inevitable 
confrontation.
173
 But even if that were so once the three-day week was announced in 
mid-December attitudes on both sides hardened still further. 
 
Gormley claimed that the dispute was almost resolved just before Christmas by his 
proposal that the miners could be paid extra for the time they spent waiting at the pit 
heads for their shift to begin and bathing afterwards. According to Gormley, Harold 
Wilson scuppered this idea by betraying his confidence and claiming ownership for it 
as his own idea which forced the government to repudiate it but there are some 
discrepancies in Gormley’s account.174 The idea of paying the miners for bathing and 
waiting time had been examined within government even before Wilson wrote to 
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Heath at the end of November and suggested that the miners could be paid for all the 
time they spent on NCB premises such as waiting for their shift to begin or end.
175
 
 
On 27 November, the day before Heath’s meeting with the NUM Executive at No 
10, Wilson repeated his proposals at a meeting of the trade union group of Labour 
MPs in the House of Commons. Gormley then raised the issue at the meeting 
between Heath and the NUM on 28 November but Heath’s reply was 
discouraging.
176
 The Pay Board examined the issue in more detail during December 
but found that the time the miners’ spent at the pit heads was not long enough to 
justify an increase substantial enough to satisfy the NUM.
177
 The issue dragged on 
over Christmas and the Pay Board’s final ruling came in early January.  
  
Another argument was that the miners could and should have been made a special 
case after the change in the supply and prices of oil after the Middle East war. There 
was a reasonable argument that the effect of the Middle East war on the supply and 
price of oil made coal both more necessary and relatively cheaper. This was the line 
taken by Rothschild who had always argued that the supply of coal was more secure 
than oil, but by the autumn of 1973 his relationship with Heath had cooled. At the 
opening of a government laboratory in Wiltshire he had been dismissive of Britain’s 
future economic prospects on the same day that Heath had made an extremely 
optimistic forecast.
178
 Rothschild had omitted to clear his speech in advance and 
Heath had been furious.
179
 The issue was even discussed by the Cabinet and 
Rothschild was severely reprimanded.
180
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Although Rothschild kept his post Robin Butler believed that the Letcombe speech 
marked a significant souring of relations which had already grown more distant. 
 
There was always something of the maverick about him [Rothschild]. It was 
not too much to say he was naïve about government and politics but he had 
interesting contacts and friends with whom he was influential…Ted found 
him interesting but I think that consciousness of the financial naiveté and the 
danger that could lead Ted into, led him not to regard him in any way as a 
soul mate.
181
  
 
It was with some apparent trepidation, ‘I hope I won’t be excoriated for straying into 
forbidden fields’, that Rothschild pointed out to Heath that coal was now definitely 
cheaper than oil and would be so even if the miners’ pay were increased and ‘as 
lifelines are sometimes useful there may be one here’.182 Heath merely sent a neutral 
acknowledgement.
183
  
 
One account has suggested that Heath angrily rejected Rothschild’s proposal.184 But 
the economic and political arguments were more complex than Rothschild admitted. 
Heath and his ministers were sceptical about the real extent to which coal was 
cheaper than oil given how much public money, over £1,100 million under the Coal 
Industry Act, had been invested in the mining industry.
185
 At the end of January 
Rothschild tried again to persuade Heath that the oil price rise necessitated a re-think 
of the economics of energy and would justify settling with the miners above Stage 
3.
186
 But Rothschild failed to persuade Heath. ‘The Prime Minister discussed this 
with Lord Rothschild. It was clear that he was not in general agreement: whatever the 
“energetic” arguments for a larger offer to the miners, they took no account of the 
fact that the disturbance of relativities that would result would certainly generate 
massive claims from other groups to whom the “energetic” arguments did not apply, 
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and who could apply their industrial power with equally damaging effect (e. g. 
railwaymen)’.187  
 
Heath’s resistance may also have been due to the almost hysterical tone of 
Rothschild’s memo. The strain was clearly considerable on Rothschild, who had had 
a heart attack in December.
188
 His memo also contained an apocalyptic warning of 
the dire state of the economy and to remedy it he envisaged a wartime scenario of 
hardship and sacrifice. He advocated the immediate cancellation of Stage 3 and a 
new Stage 4, which would be a temporary freeze on both wages and prices, plus the 
immediate imposition of ruthless temporary import controls. ‘Shortages will occur in 
the shops and manufacturers will discontinue particular lines. But these are burdens 
which can be sustained for a period of time in comparison with the alternative – 
chaos, riots and anarchy’.  
 
He suggested that Heath should secretly ask the US President Nixon to make a 
hundred million tons of coal a year available, ‘to prevent the UK going Communist’. 
He proposed that ‘positive and ruthless action should be taken to discredit those 
responsible for the nation’s troubles in the mines and elsewhere, and those members 
of the Labour Party who are prepared, actively or passively, to endorse the activities 
of those who are dedicated to the downfall of democracy in the United Kingdom, 
irrespective of the political hue of the Government in power’.189 These were drastic 
remedies which no government could have introduced short of total war and could 
hardly have helped his case with Heath. 
 
The new evidence in the National Archives has highlighted some of the 
discrepancies in Gormley’s account of ‘bathing and waiting’ and supported the 
judgement of those who have rightly expressed scepticism that it was a real solution. 
The files also show that while Rothschild was more far-sighted than most in 
understanding the long-term implications of the oil price rise his arguments on 
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miners’ pay were considered and dismissed on economic grounds as well as because 
Heath was determined to adhere to Stage 3. 
 
The TUC offer 
On 9 January 1974 the TUC representatives at a meeting of the National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC or ‘Neddy’) made a surprise offer that if the 
government treated the miners as a special case under Stage 3 then they would not 
support any other union in a similar claim.
190
 The TUC or Neddy offer has been seen 
by some of the participants and several historians as the most viable of the several 
missed opportunities to settle the dispute. This view was held at the time by Ezra, 
Murray and McIntosh and particularly strongly expressed by them at a witness 
seminar held at the ICBH.
191
   
 
Historians have devoted considerable space to discussion of the TUC offer but have 
been divided on whether or not it could have worked. Dorfman thought it was a 
missed opportunity.
192
 Whitehead judged that ‘In effect they [the TUC] were 
endorsing Stage 3, almost policing it.’193 Andrew Taylor called it ‘a remarkable 
offer’.194 While Robert Taylor judged Heath’s refusal to accept it was at least a 
tactical mistake.
195
 Campbell has a detailed account but reserved judgement on 
whether it would have worked.
196
 Sandbrook tended to think it was too cynical a 
manoeuvre for Heath to accept but that Barber’s rejection was a big ‘what if’.197 
Barnes was always sceptical that any reasonable settlement could ever have been 
reached with the NUM.
198
 While Clarke’s verdict was that it was industrial nonsense 
but a political lifeline.
199
 Ziegler has a brief reference to the Cabinet discussion
200
 but 
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none of the accounts have drawn on the official records of Heath’s many meetings 
with the TUC.  
 
Whitelaw had held a number of meetings with the NUM Executive in December and 
early January in which he tried unavailingly to convince them that Stage 3 offered 
them a good deal and that if they returned to work then the government would 
examine the whole future of the coal industry.
201
 But it is clear that by the beginning 
of January Whitelaw had privately given up on any hope of a breakthrough and his 
advice was, ‘to sit it out’.202 Whatever optimism he had begun with had evaporated 
and he warned the Cabinet that the NUM was intractable and he had only decided to 
meet them again so he could resist Ezra’s desire for a meeting between the NCB and 
the NUM. In his view this would be dangerous since Ezra’s ‘known desire to seek 
every means of an accommodation with the union might weaken the Board’s position 
in the dispute’.203 Nor was much progress made in the dispute by removing 
responsibility for energy policy from the mammoth DTI and creating a new 
Department of Energy under Lord Carrington, also Chairman of the Conservative 
Party, whose appointment was not welcomed by the miners.
204
 This division had 
been strongly resisted by Walker at the end of 1973 and Carrington took over the 
new department, ‘without enthusiasm’.205 
 
It came as a complete surprise to ministers when Sir Sidney Greene announced that, 
‘if the Government were prepared to deal with the miners as an exceptional case, 
Congress and the trade union movement would not use it or quote it with reference to 
wage negotiations in any other field or sections of industry’. This appeared to be an 
offer which might enable the government to settle with the miners as a special case 
but still adhere to Stage 3 for other workers, but Barber, who chaired the meeting, 
was unenthusiastic and questioned whether it meant that the TUC would now support 
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Stage 3.
206
 McIntosh noted in his diary that he thought this was a major concession 
by the TUC and that Barber’s inadequate response was a huge missed opportunity. ‘I 
could hardly believe my ears when I heard this tendentious question and the hostile 
tone in which it was asked...One would have expected him to be more adroit, 
however much he disliked it.’207  
 
But there was some justification for Barber’s refusal to engage since normally any 
such move by the TUC would have been signalled informally to No 10, the Treasury 
and the Department of Employment so that a considered response could be given, not 
produced like a rabbit out of a hat with no warning.
208
 Barber was taken by surprise 
and felt that the offer was ‘a little bit of trickery’.209 But the TUC records show that 
the idea had first occurred to them only that morning.
210
 Allen, who was also present 
at the NEDC meeting, said that if he had known about the TUC’s initiative in 
advance he could have prepared Barber and stopped him rejecting it outright, but it 
was only on the way into the meeting that Greene had given him a hint. In Allen’s 
view there were serious weaknesses to the proposal but he scribbled a message to 
Barber on a piece of paper, “It’s not good enough, but don’t let it go.” But by the 
time he managed to get the note to him Barber had already said, “It’s no good, quite 
hopeless”.’211  
 
The TUC’s failure to signal the offer in advance convinced Barber that it was not 
serious and Barber made his view that it was a propaganda exercise clear at the 
Cabinet the following day.
212
 Allen believed that Whitelaw would have handled it 
better but he was not present at NEDC since he was engaged in yet another 
deadlocked encounter with the NUM, after which his offer of a full investigation into 
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the future of the coal industry had been publicly rejected.
213
 Allen thought that it was 
Whitelaw’s rebuff by the NUM which led him to dismiss the TUC offer as ‘flim-
flam’, and so, ‘when they told Heath about it, it went dead’.214 Whitelaw reported on 
what he termed his depressing meeting with the NUM to the Cabinet, ‘The moderate 
members of the executive were clearly unhappy, but they said little and when they 
spoke they played into the hands of the militants.’ Nevertheless he still thought that it 
was unlikely that the NUM Executive would hold a ballot and that there would not 
be an all out strike.
215
  
 
It is clear from the minutes that the Cabinet was now fundamentally divided on how 
to handle the miners’ dispute. Particular views are not attributed to individuals but 
some ministers took the view that as unemployment increased there was a danger 
that public opinion would turn against the government and therefore they should 
make a final all out effort to reach a settlement with the NUM. But another more 
hard-line group was convinced that this would show a fatal weakness, ‘Any 
settlement with the miners beyond the terms of the Stage 3 Pay Code could 
demonstrate once for all that the Government could never withstand the monopoly 
powers of unions and this would not only put an end to all possibility of a rational 
economic policy but would strike at the heart of democratic government.’216 
 
Despite their initial scepticism during the next few weeks Heath, Barber and 
Whitelaw, accompanied by senior officials held a number of tortuous and ultimately 
fruitless meetings with the leadership of the TUC. The lengthy minutes of these 
meetings on 10, 14 and 21 January in the National Archives show that the TUC side 
was anxious to see the end of the three-day week and desperate to convince Heath of 
the likelihood that once the miners had settled all other major unions would also 
settle within Stage 3. The TUC pledged to use its moral authority to this end and 
Hugh Scanlon (President AUEW) made it clear that his own union, the engineers, 
would settle within Stage 3. They urged the government to reach an agreement with 
those on the NUM Executive who were ‘reasonable men’. But Heath was clearly 
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angry that the miners were not prepared to discuss their general conditions and were 
only interested in extra money. He was adamant that the special nature of the miners’ 
case had been taken into account in the drafting of Stage 3 and refused to promise 
that any more money could be made available. While he  recognised the sincerity of 
the TUC’s offer he wanted a specific guarantee that no other union would claim to be 
a special case under Stage 3.
217
  
 
The last meeting on 21 January to discuss the TUC offer ended in an impasse.
218
 The 
TUC felt they had put themselves out on a limb and been rejected and Murray in 
particular was decidedly irritated. ‘A sense of affront was felt by the whole 
Movement...caused by the lack of response on the Government’s behalf.’219 At the 
meeting on 21 January the TUC delegation asked whether there were any 
circumstances in which the government was prepared to make the miners a special 
case. ‘That question, it was said, had been met with absolute silence.’ This silence 
was taken to mean that the government was absolutely determined to let the miners 
dispute drag on and ride it out.
220
  
 
Robert Armstrong, who was present, remembered that at the last meeting: 
Mr Heath realised he had pressed them as hard as he could and he was not 
going to get the kind of guaranteed commitment he would have needed. He 
sat at the meeting absolutely silent for a measurable period of time which felt 
endless. He was clearly thinking what he should do. I remember thinking that 
if I had been him I would have adjourned the meeting and kept them there 
and had a discussion with colleagues. But he didn’t do that and after the long 
silence said that what the TUC was able to offer was not sufficient.
221
  
 
Although ministers eventually acknowledged the TUC’s sincerity they remained 
fundamentally unconvinced of its ability to restrain individual trade unions. 
Boardman recalled that electricians leader, Frank Chapple, had earlier told him, “If 
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those buggers [the miners] get one farthing more than me, then all bets are off. And I 
could stop the country in forty eight hours. It’ll take them forty eight weeks, you 
know.”222 On the other hand Jack Jones later asserted that ministers had an 
exaggerated view of Chapple’s importance and that he could not have prevailed 
against the general will of the TUC.
223
 Chapple later condemned Heath’s, ‘refusal to 
pick up the TUC olive branch’ as his biggest error.224 Before Christmas Jones had 
privately told Whitelaw that he did not believe that special treatment for the miners 
would be followed by similar claims by other workers, and although he could not say 
it in public, many of his members would be glad to settle within Stage 3.
225
 
 
Heath reported to the Cabinet that although the TUC argued that the economic 
situation would keep wage awards below Stage 3 levels it could not guarantee that 
other unions would not also claim to be a special case. Ministers concluded that the 
TUC offer did not justify making the miners an exception to Stage 3; they were 
acutely aware that their own supporters would find this very difficult to accept and 
the memory of the Wilson government, which had relied on undertakings from the 
TUC was an unhappy precedent.
226
 
 
That the Neddy offer was the answer was held largely by trade unionists and 
industrialists. Murray believed that the TUC could have made the offer stick, ‘Heath 
had us where he wanted us. We were in his hands and he could not lose.’ If it had 
worked it would have been a great political triumph for Heath in showing he could 
bring the miners to heel. If it had failed then Heath would have been able to 
implement whatever anti-union policy he wanted.
227
 McIntosh was also convinced 
that whatever noises they might make in public other unions would be obliged to 
settle within the limits of Stage 3.
228
 Ezra also considered the government missed a 
                                                 
222
 Whitehead, The Writing on the Wall, p. 103. 
223
 'Trade Unions and the Fall of the Heath Government', p. 43. 
224
 Chapple, Sparks Fly! , p. 137. 
225
 TNA: PRO, PREM 15/2118, ‘Note for the Record: Meeting between Secretary of 
State for Employment and General Secretary of the TGWU, 18 December 1973’. 
226
 TNA: PRO, CAB 128/53, CM 74, 3
rd
 Conclusions, Minute 6, 17 January 1974. 
227
 Fay and Young, The Fall of Heath, p. 22. 
228
 McIntosh, Challenge to Democracy, p. 47. 
  206 
great opportunity.
229
 John Hunt also conceded that this episode showed neither 
ministers nor civil servants at their best.
230
 
 
But other senior officials remained more sceptical. Allen did not believe that the 
TUC could have restrained other unions, but that if Heath had accepted the TUC 
offer and it then failed he would have been in a much stronger position. But 
‘Politicians don’t understand politics and it was a great opportunity lost.’231 However 
Butler was even more sceptical, ‘The trade unions were selling a pig in a poke. There 
was a high degree of cynicism and a belief that what the unions were out for was a 
victory over the government. The government wanted to settle it but felt that if they 
did so on a basis that wasn’t defensible to workers in other industries, that would be 
asking for trouble. So in the end they had no choice but to reject the package that the 
TUC offered and just hope the miners would accept the deal.’232  
 
Some ministers who opposed the TUC offer at the time later changed their minds.  
Whitelaw always wanted to settle, but Prior who was in favour of standing firm 
against the miners, later considered that the government had made a mistake, ‘It 
would have got us off the hook, and put the unions on their best behaviour. Had their 
self-restraint failed, we would then have been in a much stronger position to take 
whatever steps might have been necessary.’233 Thatcher also concluded, ‘We might 
have done better to accept it and put the TUC on the spot.’234  
 
The Neddy offer was much more of a political expedient than a real solution. The 
TUC had no powers to restrain other unions from also claiming to be a special case 
under Stage 3 and Heath and his ministers were not convinced that it could exercise 
effective restraint. In Heath’s eyes this invalidated it as a real solution to the 
problems which faced the country and he was not willing to use it as a manoeuvre to 
escape from a confrontation, in a way in which Harold Wilson would probably have 
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done.
235
 A rational logic underlay Heath’s position but the logical outcome of his 
failure to accept the TUC offer as an expedient to extricate the government from a 
collision course with the NUM led inexorably to the other confrontational option of a 
general election, which he found equally unpalatable.   
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Chapter 6  Honour and party unity 
 
Breakdown 
Historians have criticised both Heath’s hesitation in calling a general election and his 
eventual decision to hold one. Fay and Young argued that the majority opinion 
within the Conservative Party was in favour of an early election and Heath’s 
ambiguity infuriated his ministers and advisers.
1
 Whitehead’s account testified to the 
divisions within Heath’s closest circle.2 Campbell also detailed the divisions between 
ministers and advisers but argued that opinion within the Conservative party was 
much more evenly balanced.
3
 Kavanagh analysed the decision making process in 
detail
4
 while Ramsden was acutely critical of the delay.
5
  
 
This chapter will cover the debate over whether to hold an early general election, the 
reasons for the delay and the factors which determined the eventual decision. Both 
the hesitations over the election and the February 1974 election campaign have been 
covered in previous accounts but the files in the archives shed more light on the 
reasoning behind the delay, the Cabinet divisions over a possible move to a four-day 
week in the middle of January, the state of the economy during the three-day week 
and the rationale behind the government’s often opaque position.  
 
The possibility of an early general election had been considered seriously within 
Conservative Central Office as early as February 1973.
6
 A paper by Michal Fraser 
(Chairman of Conservative Research Department 1970-74) and others had envisaged 
that the next hurdle would be a serious challenge to the authority of the government 
and the law by a powerful union. It had envisaged several election possibilities 
including ‘a snap Election because of a particularly compulsive set of 
circumstances’. But as the paper also warned, ‘since the First World War no General 
Election has been confined to a single issue...there is no guarantee that the electorate, 
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or significant parts of it, will not decide to vote about something else with possibly 
disturbing results’.7  
 
Rumours that the government might hold an early election surfaced in the press from 
mid-November onwards.
8
 These aroused strong feelings in several quarters: at a 
private dinner Sir Hugh Cudlipp (Chairman of International Publishing Corporation 
– the owners of Mirror Group Newspapers) told Sir William Armstrong to pass on 
his view to Heath that if the government chose to have a snap election on the issue of 
who governed the country the Daily Mirror would oppose it as ‘a bogus election’.9  
 
A head of steam behind an early election had built up in some sections of the party 
since the autumn of 1973. Nigel Lawson (a journalist and former editor of The 
Spectator) had been recruited to the Conservative Research Department in October 
1973 to work on a draft manifesto and he argued that the electorate needed to be 
warned of tough times ahead, based on changed world economic prospects.
10
 Hurd 
also warned Heath that the government needed to recognise the gravity of the 
economic position and that the emergency Treasury package under discussion, 
‘would pave the way for an early General Election, if you decided that this was 
desirable’.11 Hurd argued strongly that a settlement in breach of Stage 3 would 
destroy the government’s authority and break the morale of the Conservative Party. 
This was a position which Hurd continued to hold even after the election defeat.
12
  
 
For the next two months while rumours surfaced in the press, Heath held an endless 
series of meetings which inconclusively debated the merits of an early election on 7 
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February, which would be held, to the Conservative’s advantage, on the basis of the 
old electoral register. Heath refused to make a decision and his thoughts appeared 
obscure even to his closest advisers.
13
 Heath’s closest advisers were divided in their 
views. Hurd, and the younger group of political advisers were in favour of an early 
election but Sir William Armstrong was strongly opposed, since he believed the 
government would be abnegating its authority. As Armstrong told Hugo Young two 
years later, ‘I was always convinced the election would not be won. I thought they 
were running away from the thing by having an election.’14 Armstrong later admitted 
that in giving advice on this subject he had overstepped the mark.
15
  
 
This division was mirrored in both the Cabinet and in the wider Conservative Party. 
Both Carrington and Prior, who were both close to Heath, were in favour of an early 
election. Carrington said later, ‘As Party Chairman I knew – particularly in the light 
of what many thought a weak-kneed settlement with the miners in 1972 – that the 
Government would not be forgiven for a surrender. Our resolution was on trial and I 
believed that if we conceded the miners’ case Conservative support throughout the 
country would be in tatters.’16 But Whitelaw, also close to Heath, was opposed to an 
early election since he feared it would jeopardise the fragile power-sharing 
agreement in Northern Ireland. His reservations were shared by his successor Francis 
Pym (Northern Ireland Secretary 1974) and by Carr.
17
 Hailsham was also opposed to 
an early election.
18
 Whitelaw said later that Heath never revealed his thinking, ‘His 
great mistake was in letting Peter and Jim go on thinking he favoured 7 February, 
even though he never intended to have an election then.’19  
 
A critical weekend conference to discuss an early election was held on 12 and 13 
January at Chequers.
20
 Lawson had by this stage produced a couple of drafts of a 
possible manifesto for a snap election. The first draft had summoned up memories of 
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inflation in Weimar Germany and attacked the militant leaders of the NUM: ‘a 
surprising proportion of whom are dedicated members of the Communist Party, 
committed to the overthrow of the British way of life, are at present exploiting their 
members’ traditional loyalty for political ends’.21 Even Carrington ‘felt that the 
general tone was rather hard and anti-miner’.22  
 
The Chequers meeting on the evening of Sunday 13 January included Heath, 
Douglas-Home, Barber, Carrington, Carr, Prior, Whitelaw, Atkins as well as Fraser, 
Hurd, Lawson and other officials from the Conservative Party. By then the stridency 
of the first draft had been toned down and both Carrington and Barber approved of it. 
But the divisions between the ministers present were apparent and it was clear that  
they had no solution on to how to achieve a settlement with the miners. Carrington 
believed that the attitude of the miners would be changed once they had won a 
general election but Whitelaw disagreed and queried how they could fight an election 
without a solution to the miners’ dispute; he argued that the miners would not settle 
just because of an election, ‘They will stick it out. If we win what then are we going 
to do?’ Ministers were also unsure on whether to stand firm on Stage 3 or to tighten 
it still further. Hurd argued they would need a new Phase 4 after the election and 
Heath agreed that there might have to be a freeze until they had got through the 
balance of payments and the oil crisis.
23
  
 
The Chequers meeting was inconclusive and when the deadline for calling an early 
election on the old register passed on 17 January Heath and Prior had a heated 
altercation, during which Heath accused Prior of generating election fever at Central 
Office while Prior told him that Labour MPs were delighted there was to be no 
election.
24
 Election fever had been running high in some quarters and Heath’s delay 
angered some sections of the Conservative press.
25
 But as Kavanagh has pointed out, 
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opinion in different sections of the party was also divided, while the area agents were 
in favour of an election the 1922 Committee of Conservative backbenchers was more 
finely balanced.
26
 Those who argued for an early election cited the private opinion 
poll work by Opinion Research Centre (ORC) whose work carried weight with the 
Conservative Party as it was the only organisation which had correctly predicted the 
1970 victory.
27
 Surveys by ORC suggested that the Conservatives could win an early 
election if it was called quickly in defence of Stage 3 since the unions were 
unpopular and the public supported an incomes policy. But ORC also warned that 
there was sympathy for the miners’ cause and the government was blamed for rising 
prices and if there was a delay public opinion could turn against the government.
28
 
As Hurd commented, this polling evidence was by no means as conclusive as it was 
later claimed in retrospect.
29
 It has been suggested that Heath was ill during this 
period but Heath later denied it in his memoirs.
30
 It seems more credible that Heath’s 
reluctance to call an election was mainly due to his desire to explore all possible 
means of settling the miners’ dispute with the TUC, and these meetings dragged on 
until the last week in January.  
 
Heath and his ministers were also preoccupied with the economy. A combination of 
contingency planning, the effects of the emergency restrictions and the mild weather 
had proved so successful in conserving fuel stocks that the government had 
considered moving to a four-day week and Heath discussed this as a realistic 
possibility at his meeting with the TUC on 21 January. The EPEA had also settled 
their pay claim at the beginning of January within Stage 3 and called off their 
industrial action which removed one source of anxiety from ministers.
31
 
 
But the impetus to relax the restrictions of the three-day week came as much from 
acute anxiety about the general position of the economy which already suffered from 
a balance of payments deficit. The underlying deficit was so bad because the rapid 
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push for expansion had increased demand for imported raw materials, which the 
weak exchange rate and higher commodity prices made increasingly expensive. This 
had been exacerbated by higher oil prices; at the end of December OPEC had 
announced that the price of oil would rise to $11.65, which meant it had quadrupled 
within four months.  
 
On 12 December Barber had warned the Cabinet that, ‘the country was now facing 
the gravest economic crisis since the Second World War’. The likely shortfall in the 
oil supply would lead to a fall in industrial production of 10% in the next financial 
year and in the second half of 1974 output would be down by 8% against earlier 
predictions; instead of an economic growth rate of 3.5% there would be a negative 
growth rate of minus 4.5%.
32
 A week later Barber had introduced a deflationary 
package of emergency economic measures; credit controls were tightened and 
demand reduced by £1.2 million in 1974/5, to be financed mainly from cuts in public 
expenditure.
33
 Barber’s budget was not well received in the Commons or the press.34 
King was also particularly scornful, ‘The measures proposed are partly cosmetic, 
partly inadequate and partly will take too long to have a significant effect.’35  
 
In the last week in January Heath and Barber held two Budget planning meetings 
with Sir William Armstrong, Douglas Allen and Sir Kenneth Berrill (Head of the 
Government Economic Service and Chief Economic Adviser) in which the dire state 
of the economy was discussed. A CPRS/Treasury Paper had predicted a current 
account deficit of £4 billion in 1974 on the basis of oil at $8.50 a barrel and pointed 
out: ‘Whatever the precise outcome of negotiations with the NUM we have therefore 
now entered a world in which prices and incomes will inevitably look very different 
from what they did in the summer...It is now clear that real incomes are likely to be 
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lower than in 1973 and that at best they will be stationary.’36 Berrill warned that the 
longer three-day working lasted the worse the effects would be, ‘lower stocks, more 
shortages of components, more danger of bankruptcies, more unemployment rather 
than short-time working, longer period of strain on sterling and the danger that 
confidence in sterling may go’.37  
 
Heath and Barber were aware that they now faced extremely difficult economic 
prospects in which all their previous assumptions, including the aim of maintaining 
full employment, would need to be revised. Barber argued that the balance of 
payments problems were so great it would be worth the risk of easing the restrictions 
on electricity use as much as possible, and that even if there was a decision for a 
strike ballot by the NUM there was a case for going ahead with 80% working. They 
recognised that they would have to compromise, ‘on an acceptable level of 
unemployment’ which might be 750,000 by the end of the year.38  
 
Barber judged it was now necessary to raise energy prices, this would bring in 
increased revenue but it would also increase the cost of living. As a consequence it 
now seemed likely that the thresholds would be triggered much earlier and more 
frequently than had been assumed when Stage 3 was drawn up. It might be possible 
to revoke them but the political and other disadvantages of re-opening Stage 3 were 
very clear. ‘There would be charges of breach of faith, since the threshold provisions 
had been included with the object of providing for unforeseen price increases.’ There 
were two possible scenarios, one in which it was possible to deal with the developing 
economic situation in a reasonably orderly manner and another in which there was a 
major collapse of confidence which called for immediate and drastic action.
39
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On 24 January Carrington proposed to the Cabinet that industry should now be 
allowed to work a five-day week with 80% electricity, with commerce staying on 
three days electricity. But the Cabinet was clearly deeply divided on the issue. The 
minutes do not attribute views to individual ministers but some argued that the 
strategy had always been to restrict electricity consumption to prolong endurance, the 
miners had always sought to deplete stocks and then impose a strike when the 
economy was least able to resist it. ‘Relaxation now would be seen as a sign of 
weakness by the Government: the miners would be encouraged in their resolve.’ 
However others argued strongly that the three-day week could not be endured much 
longer, the trade figures would get worse and there were signs that many companies 
would soon be in difficulties. ‘The ability of the economy to withstand restrictions 
was a much more critical factor for the endurance of the economy than were the fuel 
stocks.’40 The Cabinet was unable to reach a decision in the morning and reconvened 
at 6 pm that evening but it was then told by Whitelaw that the NUM Executive had 
voted to hold a ballot to ask for the authority to call a full-scale strike.
41
 
 
In a last desperate attempt to avert a strike Heath had sent a long public letter to 
Gormley which amounted to a tour d’horizon of the country’s and the world’s 
economic problems. It promised a fundamental review of miners’ pay and conditions 
to take account of the new economics of energy but it also stressed the importance of 
sticking to Stage 3.
42
 The NUM Executive considered Heath’s plea but they were 
anxious that the three-day week had preserved the coal stocks and ‘after a very full 
discussion’, code for disagreement, decided that more intensive action was needed 
and they would not attend any further meeting unless there was a larger cash offer on 
basic wages.
43
 The Executive voted 16 to 10 to call a ballot asking for the authority 
to call a strike, with a carefully worded question, which engaged the loyalty of the 
membership towards the union. In his memoirs Gormley claimed later that Heath’s 
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letter was designed for public consumption and annoyed the Executive but they were 
also aware of the speculation that the government might move to a four-day week 
and ‘with fuel stocks holding out, and spring around the corner, our final card had to 
be played now or never’.44  
 
The political divisions over the election and the possible move to a four-day week 
were mirrored by a sense of disarray and confusion in the senior civil service and the 
decision of the NUM Executive to hold a strike ballot precipitated the Whitehall 
equivalent of a collective nervous breakdown in the official machine. McIntosh 
recorded in his diary for 25 January that Allen had told ministers that if the three-day 
week continued for any length of time the country may collapse, and as a result was 
persona non grata with them. Allen said that ministers had no idea how to get out of 
the situation if the miners vote for a strike unless they have already decided to have 
an election and that none of them have any real understanding of economic matters 
except perhaps Heath.
45
 Allen’s lack of confidence in ministers was shared by Derek 
Mitchell (Second Permanent Secretary at the Treasury), who predicted economic and 
social disaster. The  Treasury found it very difficult to get the reality of the economic 
situation across to ministers, partly because so much was filtered through William 
Armstrong, who was clearly unbalanced and took a high moral line about the miners’ 
challenge to the government.
46
   
 
Hurd described the ‘Tchekovian’ atmosphere of the weekend conference to discuss 
Anglo-American relations at Ditchley Park (the Foreign Office’s country house used 
for conferences) on 26 and 27 January as the rain lashed the windows and ‘Sir 
William was full of notions, ordinary and extraordinary’.47 A few days later 
Armstrong had a nervous breakdown. Allen’s judgement thirty years later was that 
Armstrong was ‘a great man who cracked. He was under stress and probably his 
advice to Heath wasn’t all that good. But the real problem was that you could talk to 
him, get the impression he agreed with you and suddenly realise that the advice he’d 
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given was quite different, so William was losing our trust in him long before he 
actually went.’48  
 
Both ministers and political advisers testified to the extent to which Heath relied on 
Armstrong for advice. Mark Schreiber (Special Adviser in the Civil Service 
Department) said that Armstrong’s advice was not always very good, but Heath was 
convinced that rational wisdom reposed in the Head of the Civil Service.
49
 Whitelaw 
felt strongly that Armstrong had become more a minister than a civil servant and 
overstepped the mark by making political statements at meetings with ministers.
50
 
Prior judged, “he had become far too political. Messianic was a good word. It had a 
terrible effect.”51 Armstrong’s breakdown deprived Heath of his closest adviser, as 
Whitehead put it, ‘The smoothest piece of the Whitehall machinery had broken 
down.’52  
 
The stalemate around the TUC offer and the failure of all attempts to resolve the 
miners’ dispute strengthened the position of those within the Conservative Party who 
argued for an early election to break the deadlock and give the government a fresh 
mandate. But it was never clear exactly how an election victory, even if it could be 
won, would persuade the miners to settle. The senior officials who were filled with 
gloom about the economic and political prospects and critical of ministers had no 
realistic policy options to offer the beleaguered government. At one point Hunt even 
proposed that the miners could be given more under Stage 3, if other unions would 
accept correspondingly less.
53
 But this suggestion bordered on the bizarre and would 
have been unworkable in practice. By the second half of January both ministers and 
officials who were entrenched behind Stage 3 began to recognise that it contained 
serious flaws but the government was in a state of paralysis and unable to make use 
of any opportunity, however slim, to settle the miners’ dispute. 
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The last loophole  
The last loophole, which the government might have grasped, was the much-delayed 
Pay Board Report published on 24 January, which recommended that flexibility in 
dealing with claims for special treatment was necessary during an incomes policy 
and recommended that the government set up a Relativities Board.
54
 This appeared to 
some to be another way of paying the miners more money without abandoning Stage 
3 and that was Ezra’s reaction, ‘we naturally thought that was the end of the story; 
this was another sort of Wilberforce exercise – it’s going to be expensive but that’s 
it.’55 But although Whitelaw welcomed the Report he also insisted that the miners’ 
case could not be dealt with under this procedure immediately.
56
 
 
Whitelaw later claimed that it did not occur to him that a new Relativities Board 
could provide a way of settling the miners’ dispute.57 But the issue was discussed 
extensively the following day at a meeting between Heath, Whitelaw and Carrington 
and Ezra, with other members of the NCB and senior officials. Ezra urged ministers 
to use the Relativities Board to settle but Heath was adamant that if the miners 
extorted a large settlement by the use of industrial power the TUC could do nothing 
to stop other unions doing the same; the electricity supply workers would use their 
power and the printing unions had just put in for a rise of over 30%. If the NUM 
succeeded the consequences for parliamentary democracy, the authority of 
government and the economy, would be very serious indeed.
58
  
 
This comment illustrated the mindset of confrontation now prevalent but the 
government was under increasing pressure to settle and was urged to do so through 
the relativities machinery in a Times editorial kept on file in the National Archives.
59
 
As he explained to the Cabinet, Heath’s initial view was that the new machinery 
would take time to set up and since the miners’ pay settlement was due on 1 March 
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no proper examination of their case could be carried out by then. Nor had the 
government allowed for expenditure on the implementation of the Relativities Report 
within Stage 3, since its intention had always been to allow for it within Stage 4. 
However, the government was now anxious to regain the initiative and decided to 
send open letters to the TUC and the CBI offering to set up the proposed machinery, 
but only on condition that the miners accepted the NCB offer and returned to normal 
working.
60
 But by this stage Gormley had stated that the NUM would not attend any 
more meetings with the government unless there was more cash on the table.
61
 
 
The next day Heath told the Commons that if the TUC and the CBI accepted the 
Relativities Report then it could be implemented as a matter of urgency.
62
 But the 
TUC was unenthusiastic about the whole relativities procedure since it regarded it as 
another manifestation of the confines of the government’s pay policy. It judged that 
it offered little hope of an immediate end to the miners’ dispute and argued that the 
government already had the power to make the miners an exception to Stage 3.
63
  
 
On the afternoon of Monday 4 February Heath met the TUC representatives at No 10 
again to discuss the Relativities Report. He urged them to accept it as the basis for a 
settlement of the miners’ dispute and to use their influence with the NUM to 
persuade it to agree to the new relativities procedure. But while the TUC 
representatives did not reject the Relativities Report outright they were distinctly 
unenthusiastic about it and did not believe that it could be used to settle the miners’ 
claim. The TUC still wanted the government to accept their initiative. Heath argued 
that the Relativities Report built on the TUC initiative and stressed the advantages of 
a rational evaluation of the miners’ case. When Heath explained that Whitelaw 
would ask to see the NUM Executive early the next day before they met at 9.30 am 
to discuss the result of the miners’ ballot Murray replied that the request would 
probably be rebuffed. Heath retorted that, ‘it was a fine position when an individual 
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trade union could hold a pistol to the head of the elected Government in this way’.64 
It was a long and tortuous discussion over four hours and the official record reveals 
the exasperation on both sides. The TUC refused to try and influence the NUM 
unless the government was prepared to make more money available and Murray was 
bitterly critical of the government in the next day’s press.65  
 
Whitelaw made a last minute appeal for a further meeting with the NUM Executive 
on the morning of 5 February, but, as Murray had predicted, Gormley refused to 
meet him. The miners’ ballot produced an 81% vote in support of the Executive and 
a strike would begin at midnight on 10 February. As Robin Butler recalled, ‘I do 
remember taking the result of the miners’ ballot to him [Heath] in the flat and giving 
it to him. He said, “What do you think we can do now?” And rather boldly for a 
young civil servant I said that I thought there was only one thing to do which was put 
it to the electorate.’66  
 
On the afternoon of 5 February Heath, Barber, Whitelaw and Carrington met the 
leaders of the CBI, who were by this stage apocalyptic in their dire warnings about 
industrial breakdown as a result of the three-day week and desperate for the 
government to settle with the miners by any means possible: ‘There comes a time 
when if you cannot win you disengage and fight on another ground. ..if you have to 
settle the quicker the better...Some degree of honour for Government and Industry 
may be impossible.’67 They hinted that they would make it public that they had urged 
the government to compromise with the miners but Heath was adamant that ‘if the 
miners won their full cake by brute force’ the railwaymen would follow their 
example and so would the electricians in the next pay round.
68
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Later that evening Heath called an emergency Cabinet meeting and instructed those 
present to keep the fact that the meeting had taken place and even more what had 
been discussed secret even from ministers outside the Cabinet. Heath was deeply 
critical of the TUC and even more contemptuous of the CBI, whom he dismissed as, 
‘frightened men’. There were three possible courses of action open to the 
government. It could sit out a coal strike until the will of the NUM cracked. On a 
three-day week fuel stocks would last until end of April and on a two-day week until 
the end of May, but the current account deficit would be very high and the risks to 
both sterling and the economy were very great. It was highly likely that economic 
factors would force the government to settle with the miners. The second course was 
to get the best possible deal with the NUM as soon as possible but this could well 
mean conceding their claim in full, which would destroy the government’s credibility 
and pave the way for the railway unions to make similar demands. The third 
possibility was to call a general election since if they won they would have a 
mandate for another five years and for a firm but fair incomes policy and could deal 
with the situation more effectively. If they lost they could ‘preserve both their honour 
and Party unity’. Although it was finally a decision for the Prime Minister all the 
ministers present declared themselves in favour of a general election.
69
  
 
Only two copies were made of the minutes and no previous historians have drawn on 
this record of Heath’s consultation with his colleagues over a general election. 
Although it was not announced until two days later the decision to hold an election 
was effectively taken at this meeting. In his memoirs Heath recalled that he held two 
political Cabinet meetings, at the first both Whitelaw and Pym spoke against an early 
election but at the second there was no voice of dissent.
70
 Hailsham, who had 
originally been against an election, changed his mind after the whips warned that 
there might not be a Commons majority for standing firm against the miners.
71
 
 
At the final pre-election Cabinet on 7 February Heath announced that he would write 
to Gormley to request that industrial action was suspended until after the election. 
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Since, during an election campaign the Conservatives would need to show how they 
could get the miners back to work, Whitelaw now proposed that the miners’ case 
should be referred to the Pay Board and examined in the light of the Relativities 
Report.
72
 In a ministerial broadcast that evening Heath announced that the miners’ 
pay claim would be dealt with by the Pay Board according to the principles of the 
Relativities Report and the government would accept the result.
73
 This was likely to 
award the miners more than Stage 3 and the very fact of a referral undermined the 
government’s argument that the election was necessary to defend its incomes policy. 
Sewill judged that the late referral on 7 February weakened the whole case for the 
general election.
74
 
 
The referral to the Relativities Board also provided ammunition for Heath’s fiercest 
critic within his own party. Enoch Powell, who had always opposed an incomes 
policy, had already announced that he would not stand as a Conservative candidate. 
In a letter  to his constituency chairman he denounced the election as fraudulent and 
an act of gross irresponsibility, in that it was being called to defend an incomes 
policy which would be abandoned after the election.
75
 But Powell’s criticism was off 
target in that Heath and Barber’s conviction was that incomes policy would need to 
be tightened after the election, not the free collective bargaining which both Powell 
and the TUC espoused.  
 
Heath’s argument was that he delayed the referral of the NUM’s claim to the Pay 
Board because he hoped to gain the support of both the CBI and the TUC for the new 
machinery and most importantly its acceptance by the NUM. Although the Pay 
Board would be likely to award the NUM more than Stage 3 it would be justifiable, 
in Heath’s view, if it was done through a proper rational procedure and not as a result 
of industrial muscle. Heath’s position had some logic since both the TUC and the 
CBI were unenthusiastic about the relativities machinery. Although the NUM 
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eventually gave evidence to the Pay Board Inquiry it never agreed that it would 
accept its findings as binding and it seems unlikely that an earlier referral would have 
averted the strike ballot. But the tortuous episode was marked by muddle and 
confusion and once again the government was on the back foot with the NUM and 
unable to communicate its case to the public with any clarity.  
 
The CCU and the three-day week    
The election campaign was fought during the three-day week, which has entered the 
collective folk-memory as a symbol of the failure of the 1970s. But, as Campbell has 
pointed out, a recollection of conducting ordinary activities by candlelight is 
inaccurate and there has been a tendency to confuse memories of the power cuts of 
1970 and 1972 with 1974. The early introduction of the restrictions on the use of 
electricity coupled with the unusually mild weather in January and February 1974 
meant that the random power cuts of 1972 were avoided so ‘the country was dim and 
chilly rather than actually dark or cold’.76 Beckett’s account focussed on the 
experiences of ordinary citizens, including the vicissitudes of civil servants in 
unheated offices.
77
 Sandbrook has drawn on press reports and popular television 
programmes and argued that the restrictions seemed to many to be an over-reaction.
78
 
Campbell and Sandbrook have both argued that the economic impact was not as dire 
as had been predicted, although Beckett rightly questioned the myth of enhanced 
productivity during the three-day week.
79
  
 
Very little has been written about the role of the CCU in managing the three-day 
week, since its existence at the time was not public and its work continued to be 
shrouded in secrecy. At the time there was only an oblique press reference to Prior as 
chair of ‘the Cabinet emergency committee’.80 In his memoirs Prior devoted only 
three rather uninformative paragraphs to his work as Chairman of the CCU.
81
 There 
is only a brief account of the CCU during the 1973-4 emergency in Jeffery and 
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Hennessy.
82
 Fay and Young had a rather lurid description of its work, which 
described it as something ‘like the plot of an improbable thriller’.   
 
The anonymous figures who command the military and the Civil Service to 
keep essential services going – known as regional commissioners – were put 
on stand-by. And the regional seats of government, the secret bunkers from 
which the country is run after a breakdown of Parliamentary government, 
were prepared for action. This had been done to avert a state of chaos 
described in print by one official, Brendon Sewill, as resembling that which 
would follow a “minor nuclear attack”.83  
 
Both Fay and Young’s and Sewill’s accounts of fears of breakdown in Whitehall 
were exaggerated since the work of the CCU meant that the government was in some 
respects well-prepared for the emergency and despite the pessimism among ministers 
and officials there was not the same panic as in 1972. There is no evidence in the 
records of the CCU that the Regional Emergency Committees were activated. 
Throughout the three-day week the CCU met on average two or three times a week 
chaired either by Prior or by Patrick Nairne (Deputy Secretary Cabinet Office). 
Although Fay and Young asserted that the CCU scarcely met during the campaign
84
 
it met at least weekly.
85
 Heath, who was concerned that the conduct of government 
should be as non-partisan as possible during the election and wanted a clear division 
between political and official matters, had set up an Emergency Action Committee 
(GEN 203) to provide ministerial supervision for the CCU and to take any urgent 
operational decisions on power supplies and picketing.
86
 GEN 203 was also chaired 
by Prior and included Carrington, Carr, Whitelaw, Carr, Walker and Ian Gilmour 
(Defence Secretary 1974). Its terms of reference were to deal with urgent questions 
from the state of emergency, consider any measures needed to prolong endurance 
and provide guidance to the CCU. It met only once on 18 February when it decided 
that the need for petrol rationing was now over and the Regional Petroleum Offices, 
which had been set up to implement a rationing scheme should be run down.
87
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When the introduction of the three-day week was under discussion in mid-December 
the CCU showed a clear grasp of the impact of electricity restrictions and exerted a 
moderating influence on some of the more draconian suggestions for conserving 
electricity. It recognised very quickly that the proposal to allow heating in only one 
room in each house was not only harsh but unenforceable.
88
 Prior advised the 
Cabinet that it would be better to start on a voluntary basis with a massive 
advertising campaign.
89
 The CCU also pointed out that some superficially 
straightforward measures, such as cutting electricity in places of entertainment, 
would actually lead to bankruptcy for theatres and cinemas and the damage to public 
morale would be greater than the savings gained.
90
 It kept a close watch on the 
detailed orders which regulated the state of emergency so that in comparison with 
1972 the restrictions on electricity operated relatively smoothly. There was a slight 
hiccup when schools were not exempted from an order which cut heating in public 
buildings but this was swiftly corrected.
91
 In her memoirs Thatcher recalled her fury 
at this, but Prior blamed the silence of one of her officials at the CCU.
92
       
 
During the three-day week the CCU exercised fine judgements on the competing 
need for electricity across every aspect of national life. Although there had been a 
programme of putting stand-by generators in place in sewage stations and hospitals 
these could provide only a proportion of normal power and there were not enough to 
go round. The CCU deliberated whether to allocate two of the government’s 
generators to the Inland Revenue (PAYE) computer at Liverpool and the Customs 
and Excise (VAT) computer in Southend, or to a private company, Beechams, the 
main manufactures of penicillin, which took eleven days to make and could be 
ruined if interrupted by electricity cuts of more than twenty minutes.
93
 
 
Campbell has argued that, ‘Technically the three-day week was a considerable 
success: the nation’s consumption of coal and oil was substantially reduced without 
serious economic consequences and the public was spared the misery of random 
                                                 
88
 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3589 CCU 73, 61
st
 Meeting, 12 December 1973. 
89
 TNA: PRO, CAB 128/53, CM 73, 61
st
 Conclusions, 13 December 1973, Minute 5. 
90
 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3589, CCU 73, 61
st
 meeting, 12 December 1973. 
91
 Ibid., 47
th
 meeting, 16 November 1973. 
92
 Prior, A Balance of Power, p. 89; Thatcher, The Path to Power, pp. 230-31. 
93
 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3717, CCU 74, 5
th
 meeting, 14 January 1974. 
  226 
blackouts. The lessons of the previous miners’ strike had been well learned: the 
Government was not beaten by shortage of coal stocks.’94 But this is only partly 
correct since the papers in the National Archives show that the position of the coal 
stocks was more precarious than previously thought.  
 
In mid-November at the start of the miners’ overtime ban and the state of emergency 
the level of coal stocks at the power stations was at a record 19.1 million tons. But as 
result of the miners’ action these stocks were run down much faster than the previous 
year so that a month later they had been depleted to 15.5 million tons.
95
 The coal 
stocks then held up reasonably well throughout January, both because of the warm 
weather and because the general public had responded to appeals for savings in 
domestic electricity, plus the end of the EPEA action. It was these factors which led 
to press speculation that the Cabinet would consider moving to a four-day week.
96
 
But this idea was abandoned once the NUM Executive decided to hold a strike ballot, 
since the prospect of the complete loss of coal production rendered it completely 
unviable.  
 
But the high headline figure for the coal stocks concealed the fact that much of it was 
of extremely poor quality. One Treasury official who examined the idea of 
transporting some of the CEGB’s reserves of coal to locations in greater need 
scathingly concluded that it largely consisted of very old stock, of dubious quality, 
which had lain for years in what were essentially convenient dumping grounds, and it 
was questionable how much of it was useable. It could not be moved easily and there 
was not much point in considering further ‘the useless 6 million tons’.97 
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By 25 January, when a full scale strike appeared inevitable, the power station stocks 
were down to 13.6 million tons of coal and the estimate was that by the time the 
strike began on 11 February they would be down to 11.7 million tons of coal, or only 
enough for five and a half weeks of electricity if the three-day week was 
maintained.
98
 In a frank assessment of the mood of the CCU one official reported: 
‘The tone was very gloomy and the Lord President [Prior] seemed particularly 
depressed…there seemed little hope of anything that would lengthen the endurance 
of the country beyond that of the miners…The impression the Lord President gave 
was that he did not think the country could in fact stand up to a miners’ strike and 
that something else would have to be done.’99 
 
Endurance of electricity supplies depended on a number of factors; the weather, the 
level of domestic savings which had begun to tail off, the extent to which power 
stations could be switched from coal to oil, whether or not power stations were 
picketed so supplies could not get through. If all factors were favourable electricity 
endurance could be extended to mid-April, even longer if draconian restrictions on 
its use were implemented, but this would only be at the expense of more adverse 
effects on industry.  
  
The resilience of British industry throughout the three-day week has become part of 
popular mythology. As Beckett put it, ‘The enhanced productivity of British business 
during the three-day week is still an article of faith for many former members of the 
Heath government.’100 In his memoirs Heath asserted that production only fell by 
2%.
101
 Jeffery and Hennessy claimed that production was 75% of normal while hours 
were reduced by 40%.
102
 But the real position was more nuanced.    
 
At the final pre-election Cabinet minister were acutely worried about the effects of 
short time working.
103
 This had discussed a paper by Carrington which estimated that 
the electricity system could withstand a miners’ strike until mid-April but well before 
                                                 
98
 TNA: PRO, CAB 134/3717, CCU 74, 9
th
 Meeting, 25 January 1974. 
99
 TNA: PRO, T 357/179, Pickering to Caff and Easteal, 25 January 1974. 
100
 Beckett, When the Lights Went Out, p. 143. 
101
 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. 506. 
102
 Jeffery and Hennessy, States of Emergency, p. 240. 
103
 TNA: PRO, CAB 128/53, CM 74, 8
th
 Conclusions, Minute 5, 7
th
 February 1974. 
  228 
that the steel industry would be in great difficulty because of a shortage of coking 
coal. This would quickly work through to user industries within four weeks and it 
would become impossible to sustain even a three-day working week. It warned that 
the three-day week would have increasingly severe effects on business confidence, 
liquidity and the balance of payments and that industrial output could fall by as much 
as 27% in the first quarter of 1974.
104
  
 
At the start of the strike on 12 February a paper by the DTI warned that while 
manufacturing industry had maintained an output of around 75% of normal in 
January this would not continue as existing stocks were used up and there was a 
shortage of vital components. It predicted that the important steel producing sector 
would suffer a serious decline in output by mid-March if the three-day week was 
maintained.  Steel was necessary to a wide range of industries and any shortages 
would have long term effects; a shortage of steel for food canning would mean that 
crops would be wasted and there would be shortages next year.
105
  
 
The paper forecast that if oil deliveries to power stations were increased by 20% then 
electricity endurance could be extended to mid-April, but this could only be done on 
the basis of a three-day week if rota cuts were introduced and this could prove 
catastrophic for continuous process industries, such as food production. If a two-and-
a-half day working week was introduced then endurance for both electricity and steel 
could be extended by a fortnight, but such a move would have dire consequences; it 
would result in a considerable loss of industrial output and the effect of cumulative 
shortages would cause financial problems so serious that there would be closures and 
bankruptcies. If industry could see no immediate end to the strike then general 
business confidence could collapse at short notice; while it was impossible to predict 
just when this might happen it was likely to occur before the onset of widespread 
insolvencies.
106
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This pessimistic assessment of the effects of the strike on industry was not at all what 
Heath wanted to hear and his irritation was plain from his handwritten comment on 
the paper. ‘The tone and language of this report is so extravagant and so contrary to 
the other evidence I’ve been given that I can have little confidence in it. Now let me 
have a proper balanced assessment.’107  But the revised assessment a fortnight later 
brought little comfort since it showed that the endurance for steel was slightly longer, 
and for electricity slightly shorter, than the earlier forecast. Both were now likely to 
end at the beginning of April, which the government should regard as the effective 
limit of tolerable industrial endurance.
108
   
 
After the election the DTI and the Department of Employment commissioned a team 
of management consultants to carry out a detailed study of one hundred and twenty 
companies affected by the restrictions of the three-day week. This found that output 
per labour hour improved slightly by about 5%, although at a slightly higher cost, but 
output per week averaged around 83% of normal. The main motivation for the 
increased productivity was the desire of employees to maintain their earnings which 
led them to accept hardship and inconvenience on a temporary basis and put aside 
other disputes. But the extra effort and co-operation was limited by growing fatigue 
and the fading novelty element and the long shifts and Saturday working were 
generally disliked. It concluded that there was no evidence, ‘that three days’ 
enthusiastic work produced almost as much output as in a normal week’.109  
 
This study focussed on those firms which had been particularly affected by the three-
day week and overall the Index of Industrial Production fell by six points in the first 
quarter of 1974.
110
 This was considerably less than both the CBI and officials had 
feared at the outset, since on days without electricity many firms exercised 
considerable ingenuity and employed measures such as switching away from power 
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tools.
111
 But the longer the three-day week continued the greater the damage there 
would have been to the economy as shortages became cumulative. As it was GDP in 
the first quarter was down 2.5% against the final quarter of 1973.
112
 
 
In May 1974 the Wilson Government set up a group of officials, chaired by Patrick 
Nairne, to examine the lessons from the handling of the crisis.
113
 This found that the 
handling of the emergency had been successful in that no one had gone short of food 
or pay and economic breakdown had been averted. The report judged that the CCU 
had proved effective in a number of ways; providing a clearing house for 
developments, co-ordinating action, including scrutinising the orders on electricity 
restrictions and monitoring developments and offering tactical advice to ministers. 
But it also identified an overall need for more strategic economic policy advice 
during an emergency. It had rather strayed outside its remit to deal with essential 
services when it discussed steel production on the rather tenuous grounds that a 
shortage of steel in the food-canning industry might eventually affect the availability 
of food.
 
The Report concluded that while the remit and operation of the CCU was 
sufficient for a short-lived emergency, in a longer one ministers needed wider and 
more strategic policy advice, which the CCU did not have the expertise or the 
seniority to provide. The CCU was not equipped to consider such issues as the 
impact on industry of a prolonged strike or the economic consequences of conceding 
wage claims against the damage done by prolonged disruption.
114
   
 
Prior later declared that ‘much of my work at that time now seems no more than a 
bad memory’ and he rather dismissively concluded that the theory was the better 
prepared we were the more likely we would be able to resist or even prevent a 
serious strike but, ‘The odds were always against us.’115 David Howell (Minister of 
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State, Department of Energy 1974) was more positive and judged that officials ran 
the CCU brilliantly.
116
 Jeffery and Hennessy rightly judged that given its limited 
aims the CCU stood up well to the test of the 1973-4 winter crisis, but quoted one 
official as saying ‘it was pretty close at the end’.117 On a logistical level the 
government’s management of the energy crisis was a success and the work on 
contingency planning proved its worth in extending electricity endurance. But 
although the worst fears of ministers and officials were not realised the adverse 
effects of the three-day week would have become more severe the longer it lasted 
and given the already weak position of the economy it would have been impossible 
to continue with it for any length of time. The problems posed by economy during 
the three-day week also revealed the limits of the CCU and highlighted what Hunt 
had foreseen: that although endurance could be prolonged it was impossible to 
provide alternative sources of energy to maintain normal life. 
 
The election  
There are a number of detailed accounts of the February 1974 election campaign and 
the consensus view among historians is that the Conservative campaign had no clear 
message and was marked by muddle and confusion.
118
 Prior, who had been one of 
the strongest advocates of an early election, later reflected ruefully, ‘The campaign 
itself was a nightmare.’119 The files in the National Archives add little to what has 
been written about the campaign elsewhere although the Note for the Record which 
detailed Robin Butler’s desperate but unavailing attempts to reach Heath and his 
advisers on the evening of 21 February when the Pay Board released figures which 
appeared to show the government had miscalculated the miners’ pay, reinforce the 
impression of hapless misfortune which dogged the Conservative campaign.
120
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The opinion polls showed a narrow Conservative lead throughout the campaign and 
despite their failure to predict the correct result in 1970 the general expectation of 
most commentators at the outset was that the Conservatives would win.
121
 But 
contradictory messages ran throughout their campaign. Heath set up the question of 
‘Who governs Britain?’ in his ministerial broadcast of 7 February.122 The popular 
right wing press latched onto this theme and carried it through the campaign.
123
 But 
against the advice of some of his advisers Heath fought a moderate and non-
confrontational campaign which failed to energise the electorate and disappointed 
Conservative supporters. A Party Election Broadcast on 17 February, presented by 
Barber, accused the Labour Party of being under extreme left-wing influence and 
caused a furore.
124
 Ramsden argued that the ‘who governs’ theme was actually 
popular with many Conservative supporters and the failure to carry it through the 
campaign and the débâcle over the broadcast demoralised the staff of Central 
Office.
125
 The row over the broadcast also convinced Barber to withdraw from front- 
line politics after the election.
126
  
 
The records are however interesting on the consideration which went into the 
possible deployment of police and servicemen and show that the worst fears of the 
planners as far as both violence and picketing and the electricity position were not 
realised. Before the election the government’s suspicion of extremist influence had 
reached a high pitch. At the end of January McGahey made an inflammatory speech, 
which proclaimed that if troops were used to move coal he would appeal to them to 
come to the assistance of the miners. McGahey’s remarks were condemned both by 
the Labour party and by Gormley.
127
 Nevertheless they triggered alarm bells in the 
Cabinet and all over Whitehall and reinforced fears of subversive influences within 
the NUM. Ministers and officials were braced for a repeat of the mass picketing of 
1972 and Heath asked Gilmour to review the issue of military aid to the civil power 
and the availability of troops if mass picketing threatened delivery of supplies to 
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power stations.
128
 Gilmour reported that there were contingency plans to use 
servicemen to move coal, oil and lighting up fuel to the power stations in the event of 
a strike, which would require 18,000 men if the plans were mounted simultaneously. 
But he was also adamant that primary responsibility for maintaining law and order 
must remain with the police; servicemen would be told to avoid physical contact and 
argument with pickets and in any confrontations servicemen would be instructed to 
withdraw to prevent damage to themselves or property.
129
  
 
The experience of 1972 had been studied carefully and the Home Office was 
confident that co-operation between police forces had been improved and, 
‘arrangements for the interchange of intelligence between Special Branch were 
reviewed. The police believe that these arrangements are now fully effective. The 
Security Service is of course also involved.’ There were plans to open a National 
Reporting Centre at New Scotland Yard in the event of a strike so that police 
resources could be allocated according to national priorities, this would, ‘naturally 
receive reports from police forces and from the Security Service’.130 But this note 
also illustrated the difficult line the police had to tread between guaranteeing the 
rights of those who wanted to work and those who wished to picket peacefully. It 
was not a criminal offence for miners to picket the power stations to prevent 
delivery, not only of coal but also other essential supplies, so the police could do 
nothing to undermine the ‘sanctity attaching to picket lines’ and their main role was 
to prevent intimidation.
131
 The Civil Emergencies Book stressed that there would be 
no question of the National Reporting Centre exercising any command over police 
forces and all police operations would remain under the individual control of 
individual chief officers of police.
132
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As in 1972 there was much anxiety about deploying servicemen to contain picketing.  
The CCU discussed the use of servicemen in industrial disputes but it was totally 
opposed to troops being employed on any duties which might bring them into 
confrontation with pickets.
133
 But all fears of violent confrontation turned out to be 
unfounded. Once the election was called Heath had asked Gormley to call off the 
strike but, although Gormley tried, he failed to persuade the NUM executive to do 
so.
134
 However the NUM restricted the number of pickets in any one place to six and 
there was no mass picketing. As Prior acidly observed, ‘the miners were clever 
enough tacticians to play everything quietly…whether at the mines, power stations or 
docks they were as quiet and well-behaved as mice.’135  
 
The election campaign was fought during the three-day week which meant industry, 
shops and offices were on short-time working, and there were many other minor 
restrictions on the use of electricity, such as street lighting, which affected the quality 
of daily life. But the order which had shut down television at 10.30 pm was lifted to 
enable proper coverage of the campaign, which helped to dissipate any sense of crisis 
and reinforced the view that the election was unnecessary.
136
 The Conservative 
campaign was derailed by several unfortunate incidents. On 21 February the Press 
Association, after a briefing by Derek Robinson (Deputy Chairman of the Pay 
Board), reported that the miners pay was 8% below the national industrial wage for 
manual workers, rather than above it as had been assumed. According to the 
government the Pay Board had used a slightly different statistical method.
137
 But this 
was a complicated message to convey and took several days to emerge while the 
press reaction, even from Conservative newspapers, was hostile.
138
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There were several other nightmarish incidents for the Conservatives. On 26 
February Campbell Adamson stated that the Industrial Relations Act had soured the 
industrial climate and he would like to see it repealed. He did not realise his remarks 
were being recorded and offered to resign but the damage was done.
139
 A few days 
before polling day Powell advised Conservative supporters opposed to the EEC to 
vote Labour and then revealed that he had already used his postal vote to do so.
140
 
The Government was further undermined by poor economic statistics: on 15 
February the RPI showed a 35% increase in all prices and 50% increase in food 
prices since June 1970, 
141
 and on 25 February the monthly trade figures showed a 
£383 million deficit for January, the largest ever recorded.
142
 
 
Despite all these tribulations the Conservatives won a slightly higher share, 37.8%, 
of the popular vote, than Labour with 37.1%. But the electoral system gave Labour 
301 seats, 17 short of an overall majority, to the Conservatives 297. The result came 
as a surprise to most ministers and to some officials in No 10. Robin Butler 
remembered that on election night, ‘I had a party at my home and Robert Armstrong 
came. When the first votes came in the atmosphere changed immediately and 
Armstrong left saying he would need to be alert the next day. It was a shock, we 
expected the Conservatives to win.’143 Since neither party had an overall majority 
Heath felt justified in not resigning immediately and attempted to put together a 
coalition with the Liberals, who had won 19.3% of the vote but only 14 seats. But 
this ended in failure and on 4 March he finally resigned and Wilson became Prime 
Minister in a minority Labour government.
144
  
 
On 4 March, the same day that the government formally changed hands, the Pay 
Board presented its report. As expected it proposed that the miners should be given 
an increase in excess of Stage 3 and recommended a total offer of £100 million (the 
NUM claim had been for £130 million). But it also stressed that the conditions 
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which underground workers endured were very different to those of surface 
workers and recommended a much greater differential between the two groups than 
the NUM wanted.
145
  The Labour Cabinet authorised the NCB to reach a settlement 
within the terms of the Relativities Report but the NUM repeated its negotiating 
tactics of 1972 and demanded that its claim be met in full. A detailed Note for the 
Record recorded the protracted negotitions through the evening of 6 March as 
officials tried desperately to locate Michael Foot (Employment Secretary 1974-6) 
and Eric Varley (Energy Secretary 1974-6) to authorise the NCB to grant 
concessions above the limit the Cabinet had set. Eventually the NUM succeeded in 
extracting a settlement worth approx £105 million.
146
 This was an abrupt reversal of 
policy which came as a shock to some in the senior civil service. Robin Butler 
acknowledged, ‘When Wilson came in and said, “We’ve got to settle this strike”, I 
found it one of the most traumatic moments in my career. I’d been working very 
hard for Ted Heath and writing speeches on “Who governs Britain”, and then 
having someone say this was a complete waste of time and write speeches on it. I 
found that very traumatic.’147  
 
Aftermath 
In his memoirs Heath maintained that although an election was never anything better 
than a grim necessity by the beginning of February there was no credible 
alternative.
148
 He held to that view in public ever after. Yet in October 1974 his 
friend, Lord Aldington (Conservative MP for Blackpool North 1945-62) who was 
with him through the early hours of 1 March told McIntosh, ‘When the results 
became clear Heath said, with tears streaming down his face, that clearly, “he had got 
it all wrong”.’149 Waldegrave also told Hugo Young that at the end of the election 
campaign Heath told a small gathering of friends that he had let them down. When 
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they protested that they had all agree not to hold the early election on 7 February, ‘ 
“What I mean,” said Ted, a little resignedly, “is having the election at all”.’150  
 
Historians have questioned why, after resisting for so long Heath finally gave in 
and decided to hold an election. Hurd argued that the overriding reason was that his 
policy of economic growth was now impossible because of the oil price rise, ‘The 
lean years would need new policies and a new vocabulary. There would have to be 
an end to promises.’ He asserted that Heath would not have agreed to hold it on the 
grounds of the coal dispute alone, but it was the coincidence of the miners’ strike 
with the disastrous change in economic prospects which led him to change his mind 
and clinched the argument.
151
 Campbell argued that there was an element of 
retrospective rationalisation in Hurd’s view and that Heath came to regret calling 
the election because it was not fought on the need to adjust to world economic 
changes but ‘on the triangle of issues which had forced him to hold it – the miners’ 
pay claim, the control of inflation and the use of trade union power’.152  
 
After the election defeat many Conservatives argued that it was the delay in calling 
the election which was responsible for the government’s defeat.153 Lawson later 
argued strongly that an earlier election would have made it impossible for the NUM 
to hold a strike ballot and that Heath’s delay was the fatal strategic mistake.154 But 
while Carrington acknowledged that the date was important he was adamant that, 
‘There were only two alternatives, an election or a cave-in’.155 While it is true, as 
Campbell argued, that the election was fought on a narrower rather than a broader 
interpretation of economic problems the evidence in the files supports the argument 
that by February it was unavoidable. The difficulties posed by the three-day week 
were such that it could not have been sustained indefinitely and the economy could 
not have withstood the total loss of coal production entailed by a full-scale strike. 
The argument that because the government had given into the miners once in 1972 it 
was politically impossible for it do so again weighed less with Heath than with other 
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ministers and wide sections of the Conservative Party. This was reflected in the 
divisions within the Cabinet in January 1974 over how to handle the TUC offer and 
whether or not to move to a four-day week. The extent of Heath’s isolation from his 
own party was evident in the delay over whether to call an election and the conduct 
of the campaign.  
 
But the election was not part of a reasoned strategy. Ministers were never clear how 
a renewed mandate would have settled the miners’ pay dispute since the NUM never 
agreed in advance that it would accept the Pay Board Report and a new Conservative 
Government would have been extremely reluctant to grant more concessions. It was 
borne of desperation since the government had reached a total impasse in a trial of 
strength against the miners. Both the TUC and the CBI, which Heath had tried so 
hard to engage as partners in managing the economy, no longer supported him. 
Those critics within the Conservative Party and the unions who alleged that Heath 
had elevated Stage 3 to a dogma were justified but Heath was convinced that it was 
the fairest way to deal with inflation, since it applied equally to all groups within 
society, and that since it was ratified by Parliament it had the full authority of law 
behind it. He also believed that it was right and rational and hence had an almost 
moral force and it was these factors which lay behind his inflexible resistance to 
allowing the miners anything above the Stage 3.  
 
The dangers posed by a miners’ strike were well-understood by ministers and 
officials after 1972 and the government attempted to counter these, first, by 
extending endurance and secondly by incorporating the particular needs of the NUM 
within Stage 3. The latter was a failure and the government was unable to formulate 
any effective strategy to deal with the NUM. Heath relied too much on the secret 
meeting with Gormley and doubtful intelligence about the intentions of the NUM 
Executive. He also set too much store on the effectiveness of the series of large set-
piece meetings with the NUM and the TUC. These large and unwieldy meetings of 
groups of ministers and phalanxes of officials ranged against delegations from the 
TUC and the NUM were reminiscent of international diplomacy in the wake of a 
war. They had been unsuccessful in securing agreement during the tripartite 
negotiations with the TUC and the CBI in the summer and autumn of 1972 and it 
was unwise to use them again.  
  239 
Although the contingency planning was logistically successful in extending the 
length of endurance for electricity it did not, as Hunt had correctly predicted, supply 
a parallel source of energy which would enable the government to run the economy. 
The effort which went into contingency planning also meant that the focus among 
ministers and officials shifted more to withstanding a strike than avoiding one at all 
costs. The government recognised the mistakes which it made in the handling of the 
1972 miners’ dispute and drew a number of lessons from the experience. It correctly 
deduced that the government machinery for contingency planning needed to be 
strengthened but rigid adherence to an incomes policy proved to be a flawed political 
strategy. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis is the first detailed look at the crises of 1972 and 1974 based on extensive 
use of the files in the National Archives. It has complemented the work of previous 
historians and in some areas enabled authoritative judgements to replace what has 
formerly been speculation. It has generally supported the widely accepted judgement 
that the Heath Government was an honourable failure. However, the files have 
revealed with greater clarity than before the cumulative strain on ministers and 
officials as they coped with extremely difficult events and shown that the tactical 
misjudgements for which the Heath Government has frequently been condemned 
were largely the product of attempts to manage competing pressures which in the end 
proved irreconcilable.   
 
To a large extent the crises of 1972 and 1974 were self-inflicted wounds. It was the 
overriding conviction of the need to adhere to an incomes policy (N-1 in 1971 and 
Stage 3 in 1973) which was the dominant strategic factor in the way both were 
managed and in both cases the merits of the miners’ claim was secondary to the need 
to hold the line with other unions. Previous historians have usually seen the statutory 
incomes policy as evidence of a U turn but what has emerged from a close study of 
the files is the similarity between the government’s stance in both cases; the 
difference was one of degree not direction.  
 
In neither case did the disputes with the miners take ministers completely by 
surprise. The archives have produced new evidence that Heath and the ministers 
most directly concerned with the issue were aware that a miners’ strike was a real 
possibility from the summer of 1971. This modifies the emphasis which previous 
historians have placed on the unexpectedness of the 1972 strike. Given the 
uncertainty with which the leadership of the NUM embarked on strike action it could 
have been averted if the government had paid more heed to the warning signals from 
Ezra and others. A settlement only marginally above the pay norm would probably 
have been acceptable to the NUM until just before the strike ballot was called.  
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The crisis in the autumn and winter of 1973 had three constituent elements which 
inter-acted with, and exacerbated each other: first, the threat to oil supplies and the 
price rise;  secondly, the industrial disputes which threatened the electricity supply; 
thirdly, rising inflation, caused by a combination of international factors and the 
government’s domestic economic policies. Ironically, it was the oil shock, over 
which the government had the least control, which was handled most competently. 
The miners’ dispute was the most serious of the three industrial disputes which 
threatened electricity but the dangers it posed were compounded by the action of the 
EPEA and ASLEF and it was the combination of these disputes, not just the miners’ 
action alone, plus the uncertainty over the oil supply, which led the government to 
declare an early state of emergency and the three-day week. Although some 
historians have made passing references to the other disputes they have not given 
them sufficient emphasis.
1
 The papers show just how much these weighed with 
ministers and contributed to the decision to declare an early state of emergency and 
introduce a three-week.   
 
All three industrial disputes in the autumn of 1973 had their origins in the rigid 
statutory incomes policy, which was the government’s only remedy for inflation. The 
papers in the archives confirm the judgement of previous historians who have 
emphasised that it was Heath’s overriding commitment to Stage 3 which was the 
determining factor in his refusal to take any of the opportunities to compromise with 
the NUM.
2
 After his secret meeting with Gormley in July 1973 Heath was convinced 
that he had already made the NUM an exception to Stage 3 and thereafter refused to 
accept that the miners’ leaders took a different view. The determination to adhere to 
Stage 3 was the reason why he rejected Rothschild’s arguments over the relative 
price of coal and oil. It was also why he rejected the TUC offer that if the miners 
were made a special case it would not support any other union in a similar claim and 
insisted that the TUC should offer a cast iron guarantee which it did not have the 
power to deliver.  
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But this thesis has also revealed the extent to which all the possible solutions to the 
second miners’ dispute were given detailed and extensive consideration. None of 
them were as summarily dismissed as some have supposed and all had serious flaws. 
It has disputed that ‘bathing and waiting’ was the solution missed by a hairsbreadth 
which Gormley claimed.
3
 It also shows that Rothschild’s arguments about the 
relative price of oil and coal were considered but dismissed because of their 
inflationary effect. It therefore disputes the judgement of those who have seen the 
CPRS ‘oil card’ as a way out which Heath wilfully refused to follow.4  Similarly the 
TUC offer was given very full, and indeed agonised consideration, but while Heath 
and at least some of his ministers were eventually convinced of the TUC’s sincerity, 
despite the manner of the original tabling, they could not bring themselves to believe 
that other unions would not claim to be a special case. In that they were probably 
right and the evidence has supported the judgement that it was an expedient rather 
than a real solution.
5
  
 
While adherence to an incomes policy was the dominant strategic factor behind the 
government’s handling of the two crises, there were also weaknesses in its tactical 
handling of both disputes. The archives support the view Heath and his ministers 
paid too little attention to the first dispute until very late and then made a series of 
mistakes. An earlier declaration of a state of emergency would have conserved the 
coal stocks within the power stations and prolonged the endurance of the electricity 
system even if it would not necessarily have altered the final outcome. Some 
historians have mentioned the fear that a state of emergency might exacerbate other 
disputes, particularly in the electricity industry.
6
 But previous accounts have not 
given sufficient weight to the acute apprehension which ministers felt at the prospect 
of any disruption to electricity which was the determining factor. But the delay, 
coupled with the government’s failure to explain its reasoning, undermined its 
position and damaged its authority.  
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In the second dispute the government repeated its earlier error of over-reliance on 
moderate elements within the NUM. The general view of other historians has been 
that Heath put too much faith initially in the secret deal with Gormley and on his 
ability to manage his Executive. This is reinforced by the new material in the 
archives which shows that from the beginning of November individual ministers and 
officials were clearly disillusioned with his leadership. It was against all the 
evidence, even after the 28 November meeting, that the government continued to 
hope that the moderates on the NUM Executive would settle within Stage 3. As in 
the first dispute the government failed to understand or formulate any effective 
strategy to deal with the NUM.  
 
Not all the criticisms of the government’s tactics were justified. The decisive factor 
in the miners’ victory in 1972 was the effectiveness of the secondary picketing of the 
power stations which extended the strike beyond the boundaries of the coalfield and 
turned an industrial dispute into a strike which almost strangled the electricity 
supply. The files in the National Archives have revealed in much more detail just 
how near the country came to the end of coal-fired electricity generation and how 
perilous the position would have been if the NUM had not settled on 18 February. 
This answers those of Heath’s critics within the Conservative Party who criticised 
him for the last-minute concessions which he made on the Wilberforce Report.
7
  
 
The papers have also revealed for the first time just how close the government came 
in 1972 to mobilising servicemen on a large scale and they would have been forced 
to do so if no settlement had been reached. Some have argued that the government 
could have defeated the strike if they had used the police or the army at an earlier 
stage to force through deliveries to the power stations.
8
 But the government’s 
restraint in resisting this temptation prevented more violent confrontations and 
possible deaths. Although the government was heavily criticised in 1973 for too early 
a declaration of both the state of emergency and the three-day week there were valid 
precautionary reasons for both decisions given the multiple threats to the electricity 
supply and the extremely uncertain nature of the international oil market. But in both 
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crises the government failed to communicate its strategy and make its case with the 
public.  
 
This thesis has extended considerably our knowledge of Heath’s machinery of 
government reforms in the area of contingency planning. This had been secret until 
the release of the files in the National Archives and only the bare outlines of the 
existence of the Civil Contingencies Unit was known. It has shown that Heath 
identified the inadequacies of the existing Whitehall committee structure to deal with 
the problems of strikes in essential services in the early months of his government, 
much earlier than supposed. But his first attempts to reform the machinery for 
dealing with the interlocked issues of pay, inflation and industrial unrest resulted in 
an over-complicated and labyrinthine committee structure in which the damaging 
issue of the miners’ pay claim was lost in the summer and autumn of 1971. 
 
After the power workers’ strike in the winter of 1970 Heath was fully aware of the 
weaknesses of the Home Office Emergencies Committees, but he failed to push 
through the reforms he needed to achieve his goal of a ‘command post’ in the 
Cabinet Office and accepted an inadequate compromise in the spring of 1971. In this 
he was defeated by Whitehall conservatism, both from Trend’s reluctance to 
strengthen the Cabinet Office at the expense of ministerial departments and the 
Home Office’s defence of its traditional remit, anomalous as it by then was. Heath 
realised the importance of the strategic ‘look ahead’ and tried to put in place 
structures which would enable minsters and officials to do this. Both the CPRS Early 
Warning System and its Report on Energy were examples of this, although the EWS 
turned out to be completely ineffective.  
 
This study has provided the conclusive answer to the question raised by Jeffery and 
Hennessy as to how much the Home Office was really at fault.
9
 It has confirmed that 
the Emergencies Committees’ handling of the first miners’ dispute was deeply 
flawed. Having been gainsaid by Whitehall once Heath was determined not to be so 
again and drove through the creation of the CCU, which was effectively in operation 
from the early summer of 1972, before the Hunt review was concluded. Hunt’s 
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review was a comprehensive overhaul but not a fresh look at contingency planning; it 
consolidated the work done by the earlier Weiler review, hitherto undocumented, and 
reinforced the lesson that the government could not withstand sustained disruption to 
the electricity supply. From the autumn of 1972 the CCU prepared methodically for 
the consequences of industrial disruption which stood the government in good stead 
in the autumn and winter of 1973.  
 
The evidence in this thesis has disproved the assertion by some historians that the 
government failed to prepare adequately for a second miners’ dispute.10 The files 
show that by the autumn of 1973 the CCU had ensured that stocks of both coal and 
oil had been built up and contingency planning was well-developed so the endurance 
of vital services was prolonged even though the CCU came under immense pressure 
from the combination of multiple disputes, which exceeded the planners’ worst fears. 
The CCU was an immense improvement on the Emergencies Committees and proved 
effective in identifying and planning for industrial disputes. It enabled government 
departments to communicate effectively with each other and the handling of the 
three-day week was a great improvement on the crisis in 1972. But in an interesting 
echo of the criticisms of the Emergencies Committees, by early 1974 the CCU had 
grown in size from the small tightly knit body which had handled the dock strike in 
the summer of 1972. This perhaps reflected an inevitable tendency in Whitehall that 
any committee widely perceived to be influential attracts the attendance of ambitious 
officials.   
 
However, the emphasis on contingency planning to deal with industrial disruption 
also had a dangerous effect on the government’s strategy in that it reinforced in 
ministers’ minds the possibility of withstanding a miners’ strike rather than the need 
to avoid one at all costs. Hunt’s report had perceptively identified electricity as the 
key industry for national survival and he had freely acknowledged the limits of 
contingency planning in this area; it was impossible to put in place enough 
alternative generating capacity to run the economy. But what Hunt had not fully 
foreseen, and the experience of the three-day week demonstrated conclusively, was 
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that prolonging the endurance of vital services would be at the expense of the normal 
running of the economy. The more the government conserved energy for essential 
services the more it deprived productive industry and consumers with adverse 
economic and electoral consequences. The archives show that the three-day week 
was simply not economically sustainable for any length of time and was not as 
successful as some historians have thought.
11
  
 
The secrecy which surrounded the CCU led to some exaggerated descriptions of it as 
‘an alternative government that takes over the running of Britain in an extreme 
national emergency’12 and the implication that unelected officials were abrogating a 
possibly unconstitutional amount of power to themselves.
13
 This thesis has provided 
a more comprehensive and detailed picture of the origins and operation of the CCU 
and refuted such sinister interpretations of it. The CCU never became the strategy 
body which Heath wanted, nor could it be since it had neither the remit nor the 
capacity to negotiate pay settlements and so prevent the strikes which threatened 
essential services. But the CCU was an important and effective reform to the 
capability of the centre of government. Although erroneous to see its creation as 
simply the product of Cabinet Office imperialism it undoubtedly marked an accrual 
in the power of the Cabinet Office and contributed to the continual process of 
strengthening it. It enabled James Callaghan (Prime Minister 1976-79) to navigate 
through a series of disputes from the oil tanker drivers to the public sector strikes 
during the winter of 1978-9.
14
   
 
Unlike Heath’s other reforms to the machinery of government the CCU was not 
planned in opposition but was a direct response to experience in government. It can 
be considered the reverse side of the coin both to the Whitehall reforms, which were 
designed to strengthen the centre such as the CPRS and PAR, and to the Industrial 
Relations Act, but whereas those were public this was kept extremely secret. The 
CPRS has hitherto been seen as the most effective and successful of Heath’s reforms 
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to the machinery of government
15
 but that encomium most properly belongs to the 
CCU, which outlasted the CPRS which was abolished in 1983. It was a significant 
part of Heath’s legacy, accepted even by Thatcher, and it laid the foundation of the 
modern system of contingency planning.  
 
There is a tension in the literature between those who have argued that Heath’s was 
one of the most collegiate and cohesive Cabinets of the postwar era and those who 
have taken the view that he was a dominant Prime Minister who put a firm stamp on 
his government. His cabinet ministers testified to his readiness to discuss issues and 
support his colleagues.
16
 James argued that Heath was ‘extremely solicitous about 
ministerial collegiality and ran the most harmonious Cabinet of recent decades’.17 
Hennessy emphasised that although his instincts were collegiate his personality 
frequently intimidated his colleagues and has described his style as ‘directed 
collegiality’.18 But others have disagreed. Margach asserted, ‘It was a one-man 
Government’.19 Butler and Kavanagh also judged that, ‘In public and in private, it 
was a Heath government throughout’.20 While Ramsden argued that by the time 
Heath became leader of his party he had already demonstrated an inflexible 
determination to get his own way and that he dominated the government.
21
  
 
Both the collegiate and the more authoritarian side of Heath were evident in the 
handling of the two miners’ disputes. On the authoritarian side the records show the 
manner in which Heath constrained the NCB and took control of the 1972 dispute 
from the Home Office, necessary as it was and very much at the eleventh hour. They 
also confirm the extent to which Macmillan and the Department of Employment as 
well as Ezra and the NCB were by-passed in 1973. Hennessy has cited the secret 
development of the 1972 Industry Act and Chevaline improvements to the Polaris 
missile system as examples of Heath’s occasional by-passing of the Cabinet.22 To 
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this it can now be added that he also kept from the Cabinet his determination to 
abolish the Emergencies Committee, using the rationale that the CCU was linked to 
the plans for nuclear war to keep its development secret until it was firmly 
established. The records also confirm the oral evidence from Heath’s ministerial 
colleagues that Heath never told the Cabinet about the meeting in the garden of No 
10 between himself, Sir William Armstrong and Gormley in July 1973.  
 
Although Heath took over the personal management of both crises he was careful to 
involve his colleagues at key moments. The acute stage of the 1972 crisis was 
managed by the Cabinet Committee GEN 78, where some ministerial disagreements 
such as Carr’s wish to set up arbitration were overruled. But where there was a much 
more fundamental split among ministers, such as on the evening of Friday 18 
February over whether to stand firm against the miners on the Wilberforce Inquiry or 
to negotiate further, Heath did not force the issue and agreed to consult the Cabinet 
further before making any final decision. In the autumn of 1973 Heath initially 
attempted to use the Cabinet’s Economic Strategy Committee as a forum to deal with 
the miners’ strike and this was where the early decision to declare a state of 
emergency in November and the imposition of a three-day week were first discussed. 
But once the miners had decided to implement the overtime ban ES was unable to 
formulate a clear strategy and Heath felt it necessary to involve the full Cabinet. Both 
the state of emergency and the three-day week were fully discussed and endorsed by 
the Cabinet.  
 
In 1974, as in 1972, at key moments of disagreement, such as over how to handle the 
TUC offer or whether to move industry to a four-day week Heath acknowledged 
ministerial disagreements and did not impose a view on the Cabinet but postponed 
decisions to allow time for reflection. The problem with this was that the Cabinet 
then became enmeshed in the tactical as well as the strategic handling of the dispute 
and ministers who had no detailed knowledge of the issues around the miners’ pay 
claim and whose perspective was mainly determined by Conservative Party politics 
became involved. This aspect is clearly evident in the last Cabinet meeting before the 
Wilberforce settlement in 1972 and the Cabinet meetings which discussed the TUC 
offer and the four-day week in January 1974.  
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Heath’s dominance over his Cabinet was evident in both crises and the role played 
by other ministers was secondary, and in both cases the management of the crises 
was adversely affected by the combination of personal weaknesses and ministerial 
burdens on his Cabinet colleagues. In 1972 Maudling’s lack of engagement with the 
miners’ dispute, which was only partly due to the distraction of the problems in 
Northern Ireland, was a significant factor in the failure of the Emergencies 
Committees to deal with the strike. Davies struggled to deal with serious cases of 
industrial failure and to master the wide remit of the new DTI, while Carr was 
preoccupied with the Industrial Relations Act.  
 
Heath’s dominance was even more evident in the second crisis when his personal 
commitment to every element of Stage 3 and determination to withstand the miners’ 
pay claim was the dominant factor. Other ministers played minimal and ultimately 
negative roles. Barber was exhausted and overwhelmed by the deteriorating economy 
and his instinctive rejection of the TUC offer was unhelpful. Neither Macmillan nor 
Whitelaw proved effective in dealing with the NUM. Although Whitelaw was 
personally close to Heath and shared his desire to achieve a settlement, he did not 
have the same commitment to the statutory incomes policy and he understood neither 
this nor the minutiae of the miners’ pay claim. Carrington and Prior, the other two 
ministers who were personally close to Heath, were both convinced after the defeat 
in 1972 that the government’s authority would be undermined in the Conservative 
Party by compromise with the miners. This argument weighed much less with Heath 
and their strong advocacy of an early election contributed to his sense of isolation in 
the final weeks of the government. 
 
That Heath was inclined to favour bureaucratic solutions to problems and was too 
reliant on the civil service at the expense of political advice was clearly held by some 
of his Cabinet colleagues.
23
 Hurd judged that both the pressures of events and the 
structures of government crowded out political advice.
24
 Most historians have taken 
the view that civil service views, particularly those of Sir William Armstrong, were 
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too dominant and some have even seen him as a Permanent Secretary manqué.
25
 This 
was particularly emphasised by his critics on the Conservative right after the election 
defeat in 1974.
26
 Perhaps not surprisingly Heath’s senior officials such as Robert 
Armstrong denied that he was over-influenced by his officials and maintained that he 
listened carefully to all sources of advice.
27
 Heath’s relationship with Sir William 
Armstrong and Lord Rothschild has been much commented on by previous 
historians.
28
 This thesis has found little written evidence, except the record of the 
garden meeting in July 1973, to add to what is already known about the influence of 
Sir William Armstrong.  
 
The files have, however, revealed new aspects of Heath’s relationship with 
Rothschild and the CPRS. They have shown that although the CPRS did valuable 
early work on the oil price and the threat to oil supplies from political developments 
in the Middle East this was an acknowledged area of concern across Whitehall. 
Rothschild and the CPRS were not uniquely prescient in this area. The papers also 
thrown an interesting light on Rothschild’s contributions to possible solutions to the 
crisis in the winter of 1973-4 and demonstrate that by the early months of January 
1974 the strain of events had clearly taken a toll on his judgement. The exaggerated 
language of some of his memos was continued in his open letter to Harold Wilson on 
his resignation in October 1974 when he called for a period of national austerity, ‘a 
freeze, rationing and harsh taxation on luxuries...because we are at war, with 
ourselves and with that neo-Hitler, that arch enemy inflation’.29  
 
Trend’s insistence that the CPRS should service the Cabinet as a whole and not just 
the Prime Minister’s office has already been documented, as has his wariness of the 
CPRS Early Warning System.
30
 The papers in the archives have also revealed shown 
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that Trend played a similar role in the autumn of 1970 in obstructing Heath’s desire 
to reform the system for dealing with industrial disputes, and that he was 
unenthusiastic, even after the first crisis in 1972, for a unit in the Cabinet Office 
which might undermine the role of individual departments. They confirm the 
judgement of him as a conservative constitutionalist reluctant to oversee the growth 
of a strong centre at the expense of individual government departments.  
 
The files also reveal the strong contrast between the ‘Socratic questioning’ method 
employed by Trend and Hunt’s more forceful and direct advice. Hunt was clearly the 
driving force behind the creation of the CCU and enabled Heath to achieve his 
desired reforms for dealing with civil emergencies. Heath clearly felt a close affinity 
with him but he became Cabinet Secretary only in the autumn of 1973 when the 
government was already committed to the statutory incomes policy, which had been 
designed before the oil crisis. Hunt’s experience in designing the CCU was to stand 
him in good stead in the management of similar disputes during the premiership of 
James Callaghan, and, above all, in the close relationship he forged with the Prime 
Minister during the Cabinet meetings on the IMF crisis.  
 
The papers show that while Heath received clear advice from both Hunt and Robert 
Armstrong there is no evidence that either of them over-stepped the mark in any way 
to offer political opinions. Nor is there any evidence that they were in conflict with 
advice from political sources about the actual management of the two disputes. The 
main argument of Heath’s critics within the Conservative Party was that in 1972 the 
government should not have given in to the miners and conceded the Wilberforce 
settlement, but as this thesis has shown, the electricity position was so dire that the 
government had no alternative. The criticism in 1974 centred around the delay in 
calling an election, which from a party political view had a good deal of justification, 
there were no realistic suggestions from ministers or political advisers on how to 
settle the dispute with the miners. After the election defeat hostility towards the 
statutory incomes policy and Heath’s rigid adherence to it grew, but with very few 
exceptions it had been supported by the Conservative Parliamentary Party.  
 
The crises of 1972 and 1974 saw the government in conflict with an adversary, 
which was a symbolic embodiment of the weaknesses of the British economy. The 
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NUM typified an increasingly powerful and resurgent trade unionism, which was 
perceived by the government to be motivated by sectional rather than the national 
interest. They thus encapsulated and intensified many of the long running themes of 
British politics: ungovernability, overload, economic decline, the growth of trade 
union power and the debate over the postwar consensus. The surprise defeat of Heath 
and the shock to the governing elite was reflected in a body of literature from the 
mid-1970s onwards which identified new trends in British politics which threatened 
the stability of the political order. Clutterbuck documented the growth in physical 
violence,
31
 Finer saw the rise of adversary politics,
32
 King analysed the attrition of 
‘overload’33 and Addison viewed the postwar consensus as under pressure.34  
 
Historians have differed as to whether the Heath Government’s two conflicts with 
the NUM were simply disputes about pay or whether they exemplified, and 
contributed to, a trend towards an increased polarisation and even violence in British 
politics. Hurd argued that Heath had been broken by ‘the brutal exercise of trade 
union power’, but that he neither sought nor welcomed confrontation with the trade 
unions.
35
 While Phillips maintained the contrary view that it was a straightforward 
industrial dispute about pay.
36
 Both disputes have to be seen in the light of the bitter 
conflict over the Industrial Relations Act which set the context for the government’s 
relations with the trade unions for the rest of its term in office, even after it had 
effectively abandoned the Industrial Relations Court and tried but failed to reach a 
tripartite agreement on prices and incomes during the summer and autumn of 1972. 
Although Heath continued with attempts to gain the co-operation of the unions, as 
shown by his meetings with the NUM Executive and his long sessions with the TUC 
in January and February 1974, it is clear from the archives that a legacy of distrust 
remained on both sides.  
 
This thesis has revealed the extent to which the government was convinced that there 
was a political motive behind some of the miners’ leaders and the continual 
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undercurrent of anxiety about subversion which underlay the government’s handling 
of both disputes. It has found some evidence in the archives which supports 
Andrew’s contention that officials exercised a restraining influence on ministers, but 
it has also shown that anxiety about subversion was not confined to minsters and was 
shared by senior officials. Morgan dismissed Heath’s anxieties on this issue as 
mistaken.
37
 But the mass picketing during the 1972 strike was a new phenomenon in 
industrial disputes which justified ministerial alarm at the militant rhetoric of class 
war employed by NUM officials such as Scargill and McGahey. Although the main 
driving cause of both disputes was pay there was undoubtedly a political edge to the 
two crises.  
 
The political element in the disputes was also heightened by the manner in which 
Wilson, in a text-book illustration of ‘adversary politics’, opportunistically aligned 
himself with the trade unions, over both the industrial relations legislation and the 
two miners’ disputes, for electoral advantage. The large demonstrations against the 
Industrial Relations Act and the mass picketing were paralleled by the sharply 
antagonistic exchanges in the Commons between Wilson and Heath over these and 
issues such as unemployment. These were given more edge by a personal dislike 
between the two men so that from the perspective of the mid-1970s there appeared to 
be a new level of animus in British politics. This trend intensified during the later 
1970s and 1980s when the personal and political differences between Mrs Thatcher 
and the Labour leaders James Callaghan, Michael Foot and Neil Kinnock became 
even more marked.   
 
As Gormley himself feared the NUM’s successes in 1972 and 1974 provided an 
example of successful strike action which was emulated by other unions and 
contributed to the growth of industrial militancy throughout the decade and into the 
early 1980s.
38
 The clashes between the police and massed pickets first seen at Saltley 
were repeated at the disputes at Grunwick in 1977 and Wapping 1986 and during the 
miners’ strike of 1984-5. Anxieties about governability continued throughout the 
decade with the formation of the National Association for Freedom and rumours of 
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right wing former military officers preparing to combat anarchy.
39
 But the worst 
fears that the political system was in some way broken proved unrealised when, after 
two indeterminate outcomes in February and October 1974, the electoral system 
delivered a decisive and democratic mandate to the Conservative Party in 1979. 
 
As defined by King ‘overload’ was a combination of circumstances beyond the 
government’s control and governmental over-reach, and both aspects of this were 
evident in the government’s handling of the two crises.40 Heath had recognised the 
problem of overload on the Cabinet early on and tried to deal with it by creating 
fewer and larger Whitehall departments. But the attempt to deal with Cabinet 
overload had the effect of increasing ministerial overload and meant that the DTI was 
so large that the miner’s issue was neglected in the autumn of 1971 and it was 
seriously over-stretched during the energy crisis in the autumn of 1973.  
 
As Ramsden has argued, it was demonstrably a government with an over-ambitious 
programme. Its two main aims of entry into the European Community and reform of 
industrial relations both required contentious legislation, which had difficult 
Parliamentary passages. To these it then added a detailed statutory incomes policy 
and an interventionist industrial policy, which both also required complex 
legislation.
41
 Heath was also temperamentally inclined to pull issues into No 10 and 
to over-involve himself in the details of policies. The overload which adversely 
affected the handling of the two crises was in some measure a consequence of the 
government’s own policies which resulted in widespread ministerial exhaustion by 
the end of 1973.  
 
However, much of the burden of overload was involuntary. The problems of 
Northern Ireland, which were not of the government’s making and over which it had 
little control, were a serious distraction in handling both crises. As Sir Philip Allen 
admitted, in 1972 Northern Ireland was the major preoccupation of the Home Office 
and detracted significantly from its concentration on the miners’ dispute. It was also 
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a serious distraction for Heath and the Cabinet during the autumn of 1973 when the 
intense negotiations which led up to the Sunningdale Agreement on power sharing 
added to ministerial exhaustion, especially in the case of Heath and Whitelaw.  
 
By far the biggest element to overload was the multiple problems posed by the 
British economy. The economic circumstances in the autumn of 1971 and the first 
two months of 1972 were very difficult with rising unemployment and the fallout 
from the industrial collapse of several major firms such as Rolls Royce and Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders. By the autumn of 1973 the economic problems were even 
greater; the inter-linked problems of rising inflation, the enormous balance of 
payments deficit and most particularly the fall-out from the oil price rise and the cut 
in supply were overwhelming.  
 
As King argued, the range of problems which the government was expected to deal 
with had increased and its capacity to influence them had decreased.
42
 The oil shock 
in the autumn of 1973 marked an end to hopes for economic growth and a growing 
realisation that the levers of the British economy no longer worked in the same way 
they had done since 1945. The lesson that the UK was increasingly at the mercy of 
global forces beyond its control was to be delivered even more forcefully by the 
financial markets in the IMF crisis in 1976. But in 1974 the interventionism which 
led inexorably to overload was seen as more than just a preferred policy option, but 
by both ministers and officials as the duty and responsibility of governments of both 
major political parties. Writing in 1975 King thought that it was but a ‘forlorn hope’ 
that some of the functions of government could be removed, but a retreat from 
interventionism in the details of economic management was to be one of the defining 
traits of the Conservative Government of the 1980s.    
 
The notion of the ‘the postwar consensus has proved a notoriously elusive one for 
historians to pin down and highly dependent on the temporal vantage point of the 
historian. But there has been a general agreement that its chief elements included a 
commitment to the goal of full employment and support for a welfare state, within 
the framework of Keynesian economics. Governments of both parties saw trade 
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union co-operation and participation in tripartite discussions on economic 
management as part of the mode of operation and way to achieve that goal. Several 
historians have argued that the fall of the Heath Government marked the end of the 
postwar consensus.
43
 Other possible milestones are the Healey Budget of 1975 which 
abandoned the commitment to full employment, Callaghan’s speech to the Labour 
Conference in 1976, which appeared to abandon Keynesian economic policy, the 
election of the Conservative Government in 1979 and its deflationary Budget in 
1981.
44
 Attempts to pin down the exact date have proved unsatisfactory and it is 
more fruitful to see it as a process of gradual erosion.
45
  
 
The extent to which Heath represented a continuation or a break with the past has 
been debated. During the Heath Government and its immediate aftermath the radical 
and confrontational aspects of its policies were salient. Writing in 1979, when the 
Conservative Party in opposition had embarked in a radical new direction on 
economic policy Hurd argued that the Heath Government ‘should be regarded as a 
necessary first attempt, the rough work of pioneers’ to deal with the old problems of 
inflation, unemployment, lack of investment, overweening trade union power, 
industrial and agricultural stagnation, weakness in Europe and the world.
46
  
 
But after the Conservative Governments of 1979-97 presided over high levels of 
unemployment which would have been unthinkable ten years earlier and politics 
became increasingly polarised historians stressed that Heath’s aim was 
modernisation and reform of the postwar settlement particularly the economy, and 
emphasised his continuation with, and attachment to, the ‘postwar consensus’. 
Hennessy argued that, ‘Heath, from first to last, was attempting to breathe new life, 
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economic vitality especially, into that postwar settlement.’47 Campbell also judged 
that Heath wanted to reform rather than dismantle the postwar settlement while 
Sandbrook saw him as only partially prefiguring Thatcher in his stress on the 
importance of entrepreneurship.
48
   
 
This thesis has found evidence to support both views since what has emerged most 
clearly from the archives is the internal contradictions in Heath’s attitude to the trade 
unions as he confronted them over the Industrial Relations Act and the statutory 
incomes policy and yet sought the co-operation of the TUC in the general running of 
the economy, particularly in the control of inflation. Heath felt genuine sympathy for 
the problems of working people and this was recognised, at least later, by some 
union leaders. But at the same time it is obvious that he had little respect for trade 
unions as institutions. The archives show that there was an explicit recognition in the 
autumn of 1971 that the government needed to win a major battle on public sector 
pay
49
 and that in 1973 there was ‘a need for a “red meat” industrial settlement’.50  
 
From the autumn of 1970 the Heath Government was as anxious about inflation as 
Thatcher’s was to be ten years later. But Heath was deeply opposed to a free-market 
approach, his view of free collective bargaining was that it was a ‘free-for- all’ and 
he believed that the statutory incomes policy was both a rational solution and, most 
importantly, a fair one for all sections of society. In retrospect the incomes policies, 
especially the over-complex and detailed statutory policy, appear almost absurd and 
doomed to failure but at the time Heath and his ministers, as well as officials, 
believed it was the only way to contain inflation without increasing unemployment. 
So while ministers and officials were to some extent prisoners of an outdated mindset 
and dimly aware of it, neither they nor the electorate were yet prepared to pay the 
price of increased unemployment to deal with inflation.  
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There are indications in the records that Heath and Barber recognised that the 
previous economic orthodoxies were no longer valid. In the early months of 1970 
Heath questioned whether the established assumptions about the relationship 
between prices and unemployment still held. In early 1974 during the Budget 
discussions Heath and Barber were uncomfortably aware that a higher level of 
minimum unemployment would have to be tolerated. But these signs that ministers 
recognised new economic realities were only glimmerings. Both ministers and 
officials were more clear-sighted about the problems than the solutions and there is 
no indication that either had any idea of how to resolve the miners’ dispute, remedy 
the balance of payments deficit or control inflation. From the papers in the National 
Archives it would appear that had they won the election the government 
contemplated tightening the incomes policy by abolishing the thresholds, which 
would have been a recipe for more conflict with the trade unions.
51
  
 
The evidence in the papers underscores the contradictory nature of Heath’s polices, 
in that he was caught between a desire to modernise Britain and reverse relative 
decline but also constrained by the past, particularly the experience of high 
unemployment in the 1930s. While the underlying motivation behind the industrial 
relations reform and incomes policies was consensual the outcome was 
confrontational. This was not only because of the nature of the policies but also a 
product of Heath’s style of government, which his handling of the miners’ disputes 
encapsulated. He had an unbending conviction in the rationality of his government’s 
policies and an inability to engage in the politics of compromise and positioning of 
which both Wilson and Gormley were such able practitioners. Heath’s style of 
government was inextricably linked with his personality and what comes through his 
handling of the two crises is his fundamental belief in the efficacy of rational 
persuasion. This led him to put so much emphasis on the large set piece meetings 
with the NUM and the TUC, but while he appealed to the union leaders to recognise 
the public interest he failed to communicate effectively and persuade either them or 
the electorate.  
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Heath recognised correctly that both the TUC offer and the election were political 
expedients rather than solutions. But in January 1974 there were no solutions 
available and it came down to an inevitable choice between two expedients. Even if 
the Conservatives had won the February 1974 election it is not certain how easily 
they could have settled with the NUM. It was Heath’s faith in rationality which led 
him to put so much emphasis on the machinery of government but as the second 
crisis demonstrated, contingency planning proved to be an inadequate substitute for a 
political strategy. 
 
The crises can be seen as turning points in that both of the two major political parties 
drew lessons from them which determined the political weather for the next thirty 
years. The role which the trade unions had played in the downfall of the Heath 
Government, coupled with its earlier failure to carry through the reform proposals of 
In Place of Strife, convinced the leadership of the Labour Party that it could only 
govern with the consent of the unions. It devised a ‘Social Contract’ which rejected 
incomes policies and included public expenditure on a wide range of social 
policies.
52
 Under the Labour government of Harold Wilson (Prime Minister 1974-76) 
these policies of high public expenditure, absence of wage restraint, coupled with the 
threshold agreements of the incomes policy which it retained, resulted in the soaring 
inflation of 27% in the autumn of 1975.
53
 
 
This undermined international confidence in the British economy and precipitated 
the sterling crises in the spring and autumn of 1976. The government of James 
Callaghan was then obliged to apply to the IMF for a loan and agree to stringent 
conditions, an event which was perceived as both a national humiliation and a major 
watershed in economic policy.
54
 Callaghan’s loyalty to the trade unions and his 
desire not to alienate them and split the Labour movement was his overriding 
preoccupation throughout the crisis. The public sector strikes against the stringent 
terms of the Callaghan Government’s 5% incomes policy in the winter of 1978-9 
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were fuelled by the resentment of low-paid workers at the policy of public 
expenditure cuts, identified with the terms of the IMF loan. They were unlikely to 
have occurred if the trade union leadership had not been emboldened by the example 
of the victories of the NUM in 1972 and 1974. 
 
These events and the debacle of the ‘winter of discontent’ destroyed what remained of 
the Labour Party’s reputation for economic competence after the deflation of July 
1966 and the devaluation of the pound in November 1967. The confidence of the 
party leadership in the good sense of the trade union movement was undermined and 
it generated a sense of failure and betrayal by the membership which drove the party 
leftwards and culminated in the 1983 election manifesto, dubbed ‘the longest suicide 
note in history’.55 As a reaction to this, during the second half of the 1980s and 
1990s, the overriding goal of the Labour Party in opposition was to rebuild a 
reputation for sound economic management. In office after 1997, as it strove to retain 
internal and international confidence, it distanced itself from the trade unions and 
embraced the market economy, governed by only light touch regulation.  
 
The two confrontations with the NUM and the circumstances of the February 1974 
election were critically decisive in forming the attitude of generations of 
Conservative politicians to the trade unions. The determination to reduce their power 
was reinforced by the ‘winter of discontent’ which generated an electoral mandate 
for the government of Margaret Thatcher (Prime Minister 1979-90). As has been 
generally recognised the Thatcher Government learnt valuable lessons from the 
confrontations of 1972 and 1974 and it proceeded to dismantle many of the unions’ 
legal privileges by piecemeal.
56
 Its economic policy of de-regulation, emphasis on 
control of the money supply and privatisation of swathes of nationalised industry 
also eroded the old industrial base on which trade union power depended.  The 
effectiveness of these policies was demonstrated in its defeat of the NUM in the 
1984-5 miners’ strike. Its experiences in 1972 and 1974 had led the NUM to believe 
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victory would again be achieved relatively painlessly but by then the rules of 
engagement had altered.
57
  
 
From the vantage point of the early years of the twenty-first century the experience 
of the Heath Government seemed to have little bearing on contemporary politics. The 
Labour Government of Tony Blair (Prime Minister 1997-2007) and Gordon Brown 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer 1997-2007) was a time of economic growth, high 
levels of public spending and a stable level of unemployment. But the sub-prime 
banking crisis which began in the autumn of 2007 ushered in a period of 
international economic recession, severe public expenditure cuts and consequent 
strikes, when policymakers once more struggled to manage events which were 
beyond their control. By the end of 2011 some commentators once more argued that 
the established assumptions which had underpinned economic policy making for a 
generation were broken.
58
 Others heralded the spectre of a return to travails worse 
than those of the 1970s.
59
 Whether the outcome of these predictions will be borne out 
remains to be seen, but there is now added interest in reviewing a period of 
comparable difficulty to the present era.  
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Appendix 1  Chronology 
 
1970 
18 June Heath Government elected with an overall majority of 30. 
(Conservatives 330, Labour 288, Liberals 6). 
16 July First state of emergency declared over dock strike. 
29 July Dockers awarded 7% pay award and dispute resolved.  
October Prospects for Industrial Unrest warned of the dangers posed by the 
increasing number of strikes. Ministerial and Official Groups on 
Strategy to deal with Industrial Unrest established. 
11 November Rolls Royce rescued with a government loan. 
3 December Industrial Relations Bill published. 
7 December Power station workers began a work-to-rule in pursuit of 25% pay 
claim, followed by power cuts. 
12 December  Second state of emergency declared. 
14 December  Work-to-rule called off; appointment of a Court of Inquiry headed by 
Lord Wilberforce. 
15 December Industrial Relations Bill passed second reading. 
1971 
January Review of the Emergencies Committees established chaired by Sir 
Philip Allen. 
20 January  Post Office workers strike began in pursuit of 15-20% pay claim.  
1 February Ford workers strike began. 
3 February Home Office review rejected the idea of a central operations centre to 
handle civil and industrial emergencies. 
4 February  Rolls Royce nationalised. 
5 February First soldier killed in Northern Ireland. 
10 February Wilberforce inquiry awarded the power workers 15%.  
1 March  One-day strike against the Industrial Relations Bill. 
8 March Post Office strike ended. 
30 March Budget cut taxation and increased pensions and benefits. 
 Ford workers accepted a 33% pay award and a no-strike agreement 
over two years. 
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April/May  Weiler Reports on Contingency Planning recommended basic 
improvements to communications but left the Emergencies 
Committees intact.  
 CPRS Early Warning System set up at the instigation of Lord 
Rothschild.  
29 July  Upper Clyde Shipbuilders’ work-in began. 
6 August Industrial Relations Act passed. 
9 August Internment in Northern Ireland introduced. 
14 October NUM Executive rejected the NCB offer of 7% and called for an 
overtime ban from 1 November. 
28 October Commons vote on the principle of entry into the EEC passed with the 
support of 59 Labour MPs. 
1 November Miners’ overtime ban started.  
9 December NUM voted for a national strike. 
1972  
9 January Miners’ strike in pursuit of 47% pay claim began. 
20 January Unemployment rose above 1 million. 
17 January ‘Flying picketing’ began. 
22 January Treaty of Accession to the EEC signed.  
30 January  ‘Bloody Sunday’, 13 civilians killed in Londonderry.  
4 February Picketing began at the West Midlands Gas Board coal depot in 
Birmingham. 
7 February Pay agreement of 7.8% for the electricity workers reached. 
10 February Third state of emergency declared. Mass picketing forced the closure 
of the Saltley Road gates to the West Midlands coke depot in 
Birmingham.  
11 February Carr announced an inquiry into the miners’ dispute headed by Lord 
Wilberforce. John Davies announced drastic restrictions on the use of 
electricity in offices, shops and public buildings. 
17 February Second reading of the European Communities Bill passed with a 
majority of 8.  
18 February Wilberforce reported that the miners had ‘a just case for special 
treatment’ and awarded them increases worth up to 27%. NUM 
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leaders finally accepted the Report after extracting further concessions 
at a late-night meeting at No 10. 
April Industrial Disputes Committee (GEN 96) established with Lord 
Jellicoe as chairman and John Hunt as deputy chairman to deal with 
the railways dispute.  
16 June First meeting of Committee to Review Contingency Planning (GEN 
108), chaired by John Hunt. 
1 August GEN 96 became the Civil Contingencies Unit. 
3 August Fourth state of emergency declared over the dock strike. 
7 September CPRS Early Warning System abandoned. 
2 November Breakdown of the tripartite talks with the TUC and the CBI. 
6 November Announcement of 90-day freeze on wages and prices. Stage 1 of the  
counter-inflation policy.  
1973 
January Civil Emergencies: Action to Increase Preparedness submitted to  
  Heath and approved by the Industrial Relations Policy Committee. 
1 April  Stage 2 of the counter-inflation policy which limited pay rises to £1 a 
week plus 4% began.   
14 May CPRS Report An Energy Policy for Britain which predicted a drastic  
  increase in the price of oil and recommended increased investment in  
coal and nuclear energy was submitted to Heath.  
24 May Jellicoe resigned from the government.  
16 July Meeting between Heath, Gormley and William Armstrong in the 
garden of No 10.  
24 September Rothschild’s ‘Letcombe’ speech predicted a gloomy outlook for the 
UK economy. 
6 October Outbreak of the Yom Kippur War.  
8 October Announcement of the details of Stage 3 of the counter-inflation 
policy.  
10 October NCB offered the miners a deal at the limits of Stage 3, 7% plus other 
additional payments.  
11 October NUM rejected NCB pay offer.  
23 October Heath met NUM at No 10 where the NUM asked for a pay increase 
above Stage 3 and refused to ballot its members on the NCB offer. 
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24 October NUM delegate conference gave the Executive the authority to call for 
an overtime ban. 
1 November EPEA (power workers’ union) overtime ban began. 
7 November Stage 3 which limited wage rises to £2.25 a week or 7% came into 
effect. 
8 November NUM announced overtime ban. 
12 November Miners’ overtime ban began.  
13 November Fifth state of emergency declared.  
28 November  Heath met the NUM Executive at No 10 and offered them a wide-
ranging enquiry into future of the coal industry.  
2 December Whitelaw became Employment Secretary.  
4 December ASLEF work-to-rule began.   
6-9 December Sunningdale Conference on future of Northern Ireland. 
12 December Barber warned the Cabinet that it was the gravest economic crisis 
since the war. Cabinet agreed to the three-day week. 
13 December Heath announced a three-day week from 1 January. 
17 December  Barber announced a deflationary package of £1.2 million. 
1974 
1 January  Three-day week began. 
8 January Department of Energy under Lord Carrington created. 
9 January  NUM rejected Whitelaw’s offer of an enquiry into pay and  
  conditions. At a meeting of the NEDC the TUC proposed that if the  
  miners were treated as a special case other unions would not use this  
as a bargaining tool.  
14 January Heath met the TUC at No 10. 
17 January Cabinet discussed but rejected the TUC proposal to make the miners  
  an exception to Stage 3. Deadline for holding a general election on the  
  old register passed. 
21 January  Heath met the TUC at No 10. 
23 January Heath sent an open letter to Gormley which appealed to the miners 
not to go on strike. 
24 January Cabinet debated whether to relax the three-day week. NUM decided 
to hold a ballot calling for a strike. Pay Board Report on Relativities 
which recommended an enquiry into pay differentials published. 
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31 January Heath announced in the Commons that if the TUC and CBI accepted 
the Pay Board report it could be implemented urgently. 
4 February Heath met the TUC at No 10 for the last time. 81% of the NUM 
membership voted for a strike. 
5 February Meeting of ministers decided on a general election. 
7 February Heath announced a general election and that he had referred the 
miners’ pay claim to the Relativities Board.  
15 February RPI figures showed a 35% increase in prices since June 1970. 
21 February Pay Board briefing which appeared to suggest that the miners’ pay 
was lower than had been assumed.  
25 February Trade figures showed a large deficit.  
28 February General Election. Labour was the largest party with 301 seats, but 
with a slightly lower share of the popular vote (37.1%) than the  
Conservatives (37.8%) who won 297 seats. 
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Appendix 2  List of Abbreviations 
 
ASLEF Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
CCU  Civil Contingencies Unit 
CEB  Civil Emergencies Book 
CEGB  Central Electricity Generating Board 
CPRS  Central Policy Review Staff 
DE  Department of Employment 
E  Ministerial Emergencies Committee 
EO  Official Emergencies Committee 
EETPU Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union 
EPEA  Electrical Power Engineers’ Association 
ES  Economic Strategy Committee 
ESOT  Task Force on Oil Supplies 
EWS  Early Warning System 
GEN 19 Ministerial Group on the Strategy to deal with Industrial Unrest 
GEN 20 Official Group on Strategy to deal with Industrial Unrest 
GEN 72 Ministerial Committee on Coal Miners’ Strike 
GEN 78 Ministerial Committee on Coal Miners’ Pay Dispute 
GEN 94 Committee on the Railways Dispute 
GEN 96 Committee on Industrial Disputes (formerly Rail Emergency) 
GEN 108 Committee on Civil Emergencies Planning 
GEN 203 Emergency Action Committee 
IAG  Industrial Assessment Group 
ID  Official Committee on Industrial Disputes 
IO  Official Committee on Inflation 
IRP  Industrial Relations Policy Committee 
MACC Military Aid to the Civil Community 
MACM Military Aid to the Civil Ministries 
NEDC  National Economic Development Council 
NEDO  National Economic Development Office 
NIRC  National Industrial Relations Court 
NPLA  National Power Loading Agreement 
NUM  National Union of Mineworkers 
P  Ministerial Steering Committee on Pay 
P(P)  Sub-committee on Pay Negotiations 
PO  Official Committee on Pay 
RECs  Regional Emergency Committees 
TGWU Transport and General Workers’ Union 
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